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 Abstract 
 
 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs have become a staple 
feature of modern peacekeeping missions. These programs combine individual, group and state-
level interventions in an effort to create the conditions necessary for peaceful transitions in post-
conflict societies. Little research has been done on the individual-level factors associated with 
DDR success. This study examined quantitative data from a longitudinal data set on 741 Haitian 
men from who participated in or qualified to participate in DDR programs after the 2004 coup. 
The three DDR interventions were: the traditional model of vocational and job placement 
program, a faith-based program including vocational or classical education with sports, 
community service, and social services, and an educationally-focused leadership training 
intervention.  Interviewed at baseline, six months later, and then every twelve months for six 
years, the participants’ behaviors and attitudes were examined to determine the success of 
components in three types of DDR approaches and to determine which of the three interventions 
was most effective at reducing criminal behavior and increasing pro-social behaviors of 
participants. 
A Linear Mixed Model was used to examine the impact of education (both classical and 
vocational) as well as participation in organized sports and recreation activities on a variety of 
outcome measures including engagement in crime, socializing with armed peers, family 
functioning, and engagement in non-violent methods of civic participation. Both types of 
education were found to have a positive impact on self-efficacy and internal locus of control 
(which are tied to an individual’s sense of control over their own life and future). Furthermore, 
xv 
 
 
 
they decreased involvement in crime, violence, and association with armed peers, and an 
improvement in family functioning, the ability to make decisions, involvement in volunteering, 
and non-violent political engagement. Being involved in sports and recreation was similarly 
associated with a decrease in violence and crime and a decrease in associating with armed peers.  
This findings support criminological research which suggests education has a positive 
impact on decreasing crime amongst those who have committed crimes in the past. This also 
makes a small contribution to establishing an evidence base for DDR interventions, which are 
widely seen by policy makers as being an essential part of the peacekeeping process in some 
types of conflict but for which there has been little empirical evidence of their effectiveness. 
Suggestions for future research and social work practice implications are also addressed 
including the impact of education on identity creation/reformation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction to the Study 
This dissertation aims to establish which one of three Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) programs was most successful at reducing post-intervention criminal 
involvement of participants. DDR interventions have become a staple feature of modern 
peacekeeping missions. However, there has been little research on their efficacy. DDR programs 
combine individual, group and state-level interventions in an effort to create the conditions 
necessary for peaceful transitions in post-conflict societies. Over the past 15 years during which 
they have been most widely used, DDR programs have rarely been subjected to empirical 
evaluations and when thus examined, have had mixed record of success. Much of the research 
has focused on the state and group level conditions necessary to successfully demobilize and 
reintegrate former combatants or on the process of intervention implementation. Little research 
has focused on group or individual determinates of successful DDR efforts or on the content of 
particular interventions which are associated with DDR success. (de Watteville, 2002; 
Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Mendelson-Forman, 2006; Moestue & Muggah, 2009; Muggah, 
2005)  
In this dissertation I examine individual-level and intervention-specific variables that 
contribute to the success of DDR efforts, with “success” for the individual ex-combatant being 
characterized as separating oneself from organized armed groups, abstaining from criminal 
behavior, and/or engaging in pro-social community building activities including non-violent 
forms of political expression. Three different types of DDR interventions are evaluated: 1) 
vocational training and job placement services using a Community Violence Reduction (CVR) 
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approach (intervention A) based on strain theory; 2) a faith-based DDR program with features of 
a traditional DDR intervention including residential intake, counseling and vocational 
rehabilitation (intervention B) based on social control theory; and 3) an educationally-focused 
leadership training intervention modeled on efforts to rehabilitate urban gang leaders 
(intervention C) based on theories of social ecology and social disorganization.  Intervention A 
most closely resembles a conventional DDR program, and is thus referred to as “treatment as 
usual” throughout the text. My main research question is to determine which of the three which 
intervention is the most successful at reducing post-intervention criminal involvement of 
participants in three different types of DDR programs 
The study methodology is quantitative and includes the analysis of survey data collected 
at baseline during the fiscal year 2007-2008, at program exit (approximately six months), and at 
each subsequent year post-intervention. In addition, some variables were coded based on a 
record review of participant’s educational, occupational, health and SES data collected since 
intake. A unique opportunity for a natural experiment was offered in this situation as a limited 
number of participant slots existed in the two of the program, resulting in ex-combatants being 
randomly assigned through a lottery to intervention B or C. Intervention A is the preferred DDR 
approach currently being supported by the United Nations mission in Haiti and is thus also 
included in the study though participants in this intervention were self-referred.  
The Haitian Context 
In 2004 a group of heavily armed and well-funded insurgents, backed by foreign powers 
and the domestic elite, overthrew the elected government of Haiti. Though it was not a coup -- as 
the Haitian Army had been disbanded nine years earlier -- the major players on insurgent side 
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called themselves the “re-created” army and included many former members of the Haitian 
military. They were joined by members of armed militias loyal to the country’s elite as well as 
members of criminal gangs and private security squads hired by some of Haiti’s wealthiest 
families.  (Burron & Silvius, 2013; Cynn, 2008; Dupuy, 2005; Kolbe & Huston, 2006; 
Mendelson-Forman, 2006) 
The armed conflict began in 2002, culminated in the 2004 ouster of President Jean 
Bertrand Aristide and continued to simmer through 2007 under the violently repressive interim 
government of Gerard Latitude, an American of Haitian descent from Boca Raton, Florida who 
was installed as the new prime minister. Democratic elections were held in 2007, at which point 
both state-sponsored violence and crime in general began to decline.  (Hallward, 2008; Kolbe & 
Muggah, 2010) Beginning in June 2004, the United Nations mission in Haiti began disarmament, 
DDR campaign modeled on traditional DDR programs such as those operated in Northern 
Uganda, Liberia and Sierra Leone MINSTAH CVR, n.d.; MINUSTAH, 2011).  
Haiti’s DDR campaign was a resounding failure. Armed groups continued procuring and 
using their weapons, often morphing into criminal groups rather than politically motivated ones. 
Few members of armed groups were successfully reintegrated into society. Worse, the potential 
threat of armed violence continued to shape the decisions and interactions of both domestic and 
international political actors. In 2007 the DDR efforts changed to include extensive funding and 
support of community based violence reduction projects. These projects had mixed success. 
(Kolbe & Muggah, 2012; MINUSTAH, 2011; Muggah & Kolbe, 2012) 
A History of Political Violence. Since democratization of Haiti began in the mid-1980s, 
armed political groups have been consistently associated with the use of violence against 
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civilians and have been blamed in some quarters for increased urban crime. Despite a history of 
relatively frequent coups and armed uprisings, Haiti has historically had low rates of crime and 
even today exhibits moderate to low levels of violence in relation to other Caribbean countries 
(UNDC, 2011). Indeed, organized violence declined steadily Port-au-Prince between 2007 and 
2011 before beginning a steep incline in late 2011 and early 2012.  
A host of underlying structural conditions – from persistent unemployment and social 
inequality to political uncertainty – influence the shape and character of violence and crime in 
Haiti (Maguire & McCreesh, 2011).  As in other countries, crime rates have increased with 
recent increases in social disorganization (rapidly urbanizing and densely populated slums, 
limited income earning opportunities, weak penetration of services, limited educational base, 
decaying municipal services, and dispersed police and justice capacities), offering few incentives 
for members of armed groups to choose a law-abiding path in post-conflict Haiti. Membership in 
armed groups within particularly poor and highly populated zones has vacillated over the years, 
as political, economic and social conditions have changed. (Becker, 2011; Dorn, 2009) 
Since its inception in 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) has supported a succession of interventions to contain, prevent and reduce 
violence across Haiti. In the wake of the failed DDR campaign between 2004 and 2006, 
MINUSTAH shifted to a community violence reduction (CVR) program that has continued since 
2007 to the present, though two faith-based DDR programs begun in 2004 continue without 
MINUSTAH funding and several other DDR-style interventions (also not funded by 
MINUSTAH) have been created by individual NGOs. MINUSTAH-funded interventions have 
been, for the most part, fairly partisan in that they have targeted members of armed groups from 
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a particular political persuasion. Non-MINUSTAH funded interventions have ranged from those 
that serve only ex-combatants drawn from the “rebel” army to those that serve individuals from 
all sides of the political spectrum. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2011; IOM, 2011; 
Kolbe & Muggah, 2012; MINUSTAH CVR, 2011) 
In the shift from traditional DDR to CVR, the UN Security Council Resolution 1702 
(2006) requested that MINUSTAH “reorient its DDR efforts towards a comprehensive 
community violence reduction program adapted to local conditions, including assistance for 
initiatives to strengthen local governance and the rule of law and to provide employment 
opportunities to former gang members and at-risk youth”. (MINSTAH CVR, n.d.)  
The CVR intervention was intended stabilize urban communities throughout the country, 
including the capital – Port-au-Prince – through a combination of targeted activities. The 
intervention aims to create conditions where development to take place by targeting risk factors 
for individual recruitment into armed groups and by improving overall community well-being. 
DDR projects under the new CVR mandate have focused primarily on vocational education and 
employment of members of armed groups and those at risk for recruitment into armed groups. 
The Problem 
 Those orchestrating an intervention in a post-conflict setting come up against a vast array 
of needs. The needs most aid providers respond to first include: meeting the basic survival needs 
of the population, emergency health needs, and short-term security threats. However, the longer 
term needs of conflict survivors (both civilian and conflict participants) are often overlooked 
during the initial post-conflict response planning. In particular, education, recreational needs, and 
mental health are often unnoticed as societies struggle to keep people alive and mitigate 
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emerging threats to the stability of the state. This dissertation illuminates problems associated 
with providing appropriate rehabilitative services to ex-combatants by programs which attempt 
to incorporate holistic services into their intervention approach. Furthermore, it demonstrates that 
programs that provide participants with identity-shifting opportunities better enable participants 
to rejoin society peacefully. 
    This dissertation goes beyond the typical post-project evaluation in several ways. First, 
this research is based on a multi-faceted longitudinal dataset on participants in DDR programs 
following the 2004 coup in Haiti. The data includes attendance logs for programs, program 
accounts and billing, qualitative interviews with participants and evaluations with psychological- 
and views-oriented instruments over a seven year period. Second, having a program evaluation 
that spans across a long period of time affords the opportunity to assess the long-term impacts of 
DDR programs. Program evaluations in this field tend to be short-term oriented, since they are 
often focused on issues of intervention service delivery and use of funds.  Lastly, this research 
augments its relevance by situating the findings of this research in both academic and policy-
oriented terms. 
 This dissertation contributes to a nascent body of literature on the efficacy of DDR, 
furthering research knowledge in both social work and political science. Though individually-
focused intervention research of this type is relatively rare in political science, this dissertation 
uses that method to help us understand the process of change DDR participants experience over a 
period of years after exposure to this popular intervention. It demonstrates that DDR programs 
can be an effective use of limited funds. It also highlights the importance of investing in holistic, 
programs which reshape participant’s vocational, political, and social futures through education, 
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group sports and recreational activities, community service, and targeted skills-building 
activities.   
Peacekeeping mission are by far one of the most common venues through which social 
work services are delivered to individuals, groups and communities. This dissertation gives 
evidence of the efficacy of social work interventions in post-conflict communities. It also gives 
further support to interventions which are known to work in other contexts (such as with prisoner 
reentry programs in the developed world) but which are rarely tested in other populations. 
Ultimately, the problem DDR interventions are responding to is simple. Societies do not know 
how to best transition participants in violence from wartime to peace. This dissertation adds to 
what we know about what works in post-conflict transitions and suggests mechanisms that have 
evidence of working that can be applied in the future.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Questions. There are two research questions at the heart of this study. 
First, what is the relative effectiveness of these three different approaches to DDR? With 
this question, I what to make policy-relevant recommendations based on the measured 
impact of these DDR approaches. Second, which aspects of interventions more effective 
than others? To answer this, I look at what specific components of an intervention are shared 
and how individual responses to these interventions differ.  
Hypotheses.  This study proposes four hypotheses and finds support for each: 
 Hypothesis #1. Receiving education increases an ex-combatant’s confidence in their own 
ability to make change as quantified by the participant’s scores on the Generalized Self-
Efficacy Scale and the internal locus of control score.  
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 Hypothesis #2. Receiving education reduces the likelihood that the participant will 
engage in criminal or maladaptive behaviors including associating with armed peers, abusing 
alcohol, being violent, or engaging in crime.  
 Hypothesis #3. Participants who engaged in sports and recreation were less likely to 
revert to criminal behavior or interact with armed friends in the post-demobilization  
 Hypothesis #4. Receiving education is associated with increased pro-social capacities and 
behaviors.   
 Two findings, in particular, stand out as these hypotheses are assessed. First, the faith-based 
intervention (intervention B) significantly outperforms the other two interventions. One of the 
key factors behind this is the fact that it successfully provided vocational- and classical-
education services which contributed the formation of a new identity. The high intervention 
fidelity and active participation of ex-combatants demonstrated that this intervention format was 
successful at reducing the risk of maladaptive behaviors in the future. Furthermore, we can rule 
out the possibility that participants with better prospects self-selected into intervention B, since 
participants were randomly assigned into intervention B or C.  
 The second notable finding is that intervention A (treatment as usual) was extremely 
ineffective in this case study. In fact, those in the intervention had more maladaptive behaviors 
after the intervention than the control group. This is partially explained by the low intervention 
fidelity. The program purported to provide educational and other rehabilitative services, but in 
reality, very few participants actually completed the entire program. Furthermore, the 
intervention provided spaces and opportunities for ex-combatants to gather, meet each other, 
establish transregional networks, solidify criminal attitudes, and plan future criminal acts. This 
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finding, in particular, has tremendous policy implications. This demonstrates that DDR 
interventions which are poorly done are worse than no intervention at all. 
Description of Research Data 
The data includes rich and detailed records of each individual’s participation in the 
intervention activities include their attendance sign-in sheets, billing records, class and group 
attendance check-off sheets, internal program notes, medical examination records and test 
results, vocational testing data, casemangement notes, and additional documentation from each 
participant’s dossier. In addition to program-recorded data, an extensive interview as conducted 
with study participants during eight interactions over a period of seven years.  
The specificity of the data allows me to be precise about what in each intervention is 
being compared. This overcomes a major obstacle in program evaluation: often the services 
planned for an intervention do not take place as specified or are not all received by all 
participants. Through available records I was able account for the number of hours, days, or units 
of services each participant actually received. This rich data on the implementation allowed me 
to take seriously the issue of intervention fidelity and account for cases where there were 
incomplete or interrupted intervention services. This illuminated the serious problem of 
intervention fidelity which was discovered with treatment as usual (traditional DDR) 
participants. 
Policy Significance 
 One of the most surprising findings of this study is that the traditional DDR approach, in 
this particular case, is grossly ineffective. The treatment as usual approach ex-combatants worse 
off than those who were eligible to participate but got no services. This means that there is a 
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burden on the peacekeeping organizing community to implement rigorous monitoring and 
evaluation steps during DDR implementation with clear consequences for programs which fail to 
follow the plan outlined in their Terms of Reference (TOR). In this case, not one of the 
traditional DDR participants received all of the services in all areas which were planned. Some 
dropped out early. Others skipped vocational training classes due to illness, transportation 
problems, personal crisis, because they lacked reading skills needed in the program to which they 
had been assigned, or for other, unspecified, reasons. Based on desk review of records, it is clear 
that no effort was made to hold program leadership accountable for this oversight while 
participants were still in the program and while deficiencies could still be remediated.  
Thus, it is unclear if traditional DDR, when done properly and completely, is ineffective. 
What is clear is that when DDR programming is done poorly, it is worse than if nothing had been 
done at all. The conclusion of this study should not be to drop the traditional DDR approach. 
Rather, the conclusion one should draw from this is additional research is needed to determine if 
this finding holds in other incompletely implemented traditional DDR programs.   
Outline of the Study 
  Because the content and research questions of this study cross disciplinary boundaries in 
a number of areas, I will begin by giving a broad background to position and contextualize the 
history, theoretical basis, and existing research knowledge on which this study was created. In 
the second chapter I begin by discussing the Haitian context and recent developments 
influencing the character of the interventions examined.  Though Haiti has a rich history of 
protest, dissent, insurrection, and intervention that could inform a discussion of recent DDR 
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efforts, fully covering this history is beyond the scope of this dissertation and thus, this section is 
limited to the events preceding the most recent UN intervention. 
In chapter two I discuss the structure and the role of armed groups in Haiti. Included in 
this this discussion is the definitional issues posed by implementing an intervention designed for 
insurgent group members in post-conflict countries in a country whose armed conflict may or 
may not be considered war and whose participants may or may not be considered combatants. I 
discuss the lack of research on armed groups, the known characteristics of armed groups 
including urban gangs, and the relationship that armed groups have with each other and the 
community in general. I end the first chapter by framing this content within the question of 
whether the recent armed conflict in Haiti can be defined as a type of war.  
Chapter three provides context to the DDR intervention within the peacekeeping process. 
I outline the relationship of DDR programs to peacekeeping missions in general and to the 
complementary components of peacekeeping such as security sector reform. I give extensive 
background for those programs in Haiti and the relationships they have currently and historically 
with DDR. I describe the history and work of the DDR programs in Haiti.  
Then I turn to reviewing, in chapter four, the existing literature on the specific areas of 
research relevant to the questions posed in this dissertation: specifically I look at the theoretical 
assumptions and research knowledge about trauma, self-efficacy, and crime as it relates to young 
men (the target population of the intervention). In this chapter I examine the place of the theories 
of change adopted by the three interventions: social strain (intervention A), social control 
(intervention B), and theories of social ecology and social disorganization (intervention C). I also 
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look at trauma, locus of control, and self-efficacy as I contextualize the position of these 
concepts in this research study. 
Chapter five focuses on DDR intervention components. The first section of the chapter 
furthers my review of the literature by looking. at the role of particular programmatic thrusts in 
reducing criminal behavior of young adults in DDR programs, in violent communal contexts, 
and in general. I focus on two areas, education and organized sports, which were included in 
Haiti’s DDR efforts. In last part of the chapter I describe the three intervention projects. I discuss 
their theories of change and the specific components that they incorporated into their 
programming. 
Chapter six introduces the data set and describes the three interventions being studied. 
Also included in this chapter is a review of the clinical measures included in the data. The 
methods used for collecting, organizing, storing, retrieving, recoding, and analyzing the data are 
also presented in this chapter. The background of the three programs and the content of their 
intervention efforts is detailed. 
Chapter five begins with a description of the data and the demographics of the participant 
and control groups. The concept of intervention fidelity and challenges related to that with this 
data set are presented. I describe the changes which took place across time and across groups 
during and after the intervention period. Key relationships between variables are also presented 
and examined. Next I turn to testing several proposed hypotheses regarding the invention content 
and short and long term effects on participants.  
Chapter six contextualizes these quantitative findings within the larger body of literature 
and the current practices within DDR programs as well as within the larger dialogue of 
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international social work and the relevancy of social work to post-conflict reconstruction and 
development. Also included in this this chapter is a summation of the limitations of this research 
study along with suggestions for future research directions. Policies which help – and hinder – 
the adoption of evidence-based interventions within DDR programing are discussed as they 
relate to the findings of this study. Specific programmatic and policy changes are suggested at 
the local and international level. This discussion is situated from a right-based perspective, 
reflecting social work values.  
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Chapter 2: Background 
The Structure and Role of Armed Groups 
Though a preoccupation with organized violence has dominated much of the discourse on 
politics and development in Haiti, little research exists on Haiti’s urban gangs and insurgent 
groups. It is difficult to tackle Haiti’s complex urban issues, development challenges, or political 
dilemmas without being confronted with the specter of armed urban gangs. These omnipresent 
groups are credited with overthrowing governments, silencing the political opposition, 
preventing foreign and local investment, creating a nascent kidnapping industry, and terrorizing 
entire cities. (Becker, 2010; Cockayne, 2009; Dorn, 2009; Dziedzic & Perito, 2008; Kovats-
Bernat, 2006; Lacey, 2007; Lunde, 2012; Marcelin, 2011; Reed, 2011; Willman & Marcelin, 
2010.) 
While many narratives have been advanced about the origin of Haiti’s armed gangs, most 
are similar in form and content to Becker (2010):  
“[President] Aristide resorted to distributing weapons to youth groups (known as bazes or 
bases) in exchange for their support. Weapons provided to defend Aristide also gave the 
groups the wherewithal to commit crimes and dominate neighborhoods. With his 
departure, these gangs (which at that point were fully involved in criminal activity) 
quickly established control.” (p. 137)  
This narrative, as well as others describing the role and behavior of these groups, has shaped the 
character of stabilization and development activities. Assumptions about the role and influence 
of Haiti´s urban gangs have also profoundly influenced the country´s internal politics. Political 
parties and politicians alternate between overtly using armed urban gangs to distancing 
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themselves from them entirely (and sometimes doing so simultaneously). As a result, it is 
impossible to discuss Haiti without addressing the issue of gangs. Yet there is scant empirical 
knowledge about the groups, their composition, their activities, or their motivations and few 
researchers have questioned members about their own identity and functions (Hagedorn, 2007). 
A Matter of Definition.  Though the international community typically defines Haiti’s 
armed urban groups as “gangs” and “criminal networks” (and in some cases the youth members 
are called “child soldiers”), Haitians see things differently. Indeed, most conceive of these 
groups as “political associations,” “community associations,” and most commonly, as “bases”. 
For its part, the specialized unit of the Haitian National Police tasked with monitoring and 
reducing criminal activity generated by these groups is called the “anti-gang unit”. It is 
specifically focused on armed urban groups in Port-au-Prince’s popular zones.  
Other police units as well as MINUSTAH, the United Nations Mission in Haiti, have 
responded to and investigated Haiti’s other organized armed groups including the disbanded 
Haitian army (referred to as the ex-FADH) which re-formed and then occupied government 
buildings in recent years. In 2002 and 2003, when the ex-FADH groups first began engaging in 
armed combat against the Haitian National Police, there were at least four different groups of ex-
FADH (collectively they were called the “Rebel Army”) and most of the members appeared to 
be former soldiers. By early 2004 the ex-FADH groups had taken over large parts of the country. 
At that time, though the ex-FADH groups remained separated from each other they appeared to 
work in cooperation, and their membership had expanded to include recruits from other armed 
groups, private militias and urban gangs in major cities outside of Port-au-Prince. 
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More recently, ex-FADH groups appear to have coalesced into one united entity with the 
leaders being former soldiers from the Forces Armées d'Haïti and the bulk of their rank and file 
membership being comprised of young people who never served in the Forces Armées d'Haïti. 
Thus, the fact that these groups are referred to as the “ex-FADH” is somewhat misleading since 
only their leadership and a small percentage of the rank and file are actually former soldiers with 
the remainder being young people who support the recreation of the Armées d'Haïti. 
Urban gangs are only one of several armed groups which currently or recently operated in 
Haiti (see Figure 2.1). Other groups include the ex-FADH (a group of disbanded Haitian Army 
soldiers and their followers), private militias working for businessmen and/or traffickers, 
criminal networks involved in trafficking and kidnapping, as well as armed insurgent groups 
based in rural areas which, in cooperation with the ex-FADH, ousted Haiti’s president in 2004.   
Armed groups which are not from urban popular zones are treated in a markedly different 
way by the international community and the Haitian government. For example, since 2012, 
groups affiliated with the erstwhile army have openly held armed marches, called well-attended 
press conferences denouncing the present government, and were allowed to present various 
demands to representatives of the international community and the Haitian government, some of 
which (including demands for cash payments) were granted by the current administration. 
Despite some high-profile arrests of leaders, the ex-FAHD and the other insurgent groups 
involved in the 2004 overthrow of the elected government are widely viewed as politically 
motivated insurgent organizations while urban gangs are seen as criminal entities (Hallward, 
2011). Interestingly the rank and file membership of these two types of armed groups is similar 
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in some ways, notably their reason for joining the organization and childhood experiences of 
family violence (see Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.1  
Armed Groups Currently or Recently Operating in Haiti 
 
Group Characteristics 
Urban Gangs such as Baz 
Labanye, Lame Ti Machete, Bois 
Neuf, Armee Sans Tete, Baze 
Solino, Rat 
Small, geographically isolated groups comprised of 
(mostly) young men in the urban popular zones. These 
groups may or may not be politically motivated and 
are often financially backed by businessmen. They 
usually engage in small scale crime including violence 
against those perceived to be a threat to their 
neighborhood, extortion from local businesses or 
street merchants, and local sales of contraband. Urban 
gangs usually provide social services to residents 
including assisting with medical care and burial costs, 
paying tuition fees for disadvantaged children, 
garbage collection, home repair, and the organization 
of social and musical events. 
Ex-FADH groups such as Front 
pour la Libération et la 
Reconstruction Nationale, the 
Revolutionary Artibonite 
Resistance Front, Gonaives 
Resistance Front/Cannibal Army, 
Lambi 12 Grande Saline, and 
Group Zero. 
Group size ranges from several dozen to several 
hundred at each location; groups are nationally 
coordinated and leadership is comprised of former 
soldiers. Recently ex-FADH groups occupied former 
military bases and other government properties 
throughout the country and operated training programs 
for new recruits. Rank and file members are 
considered recruits; they have access to weapons and 
may advance into leadership positions. 
Private Militias Comprised mostly of men who have worked for 
private security companies, these groups identify with 
those who hire them and thus often lack group names 
and a sense of group identity. Private militias may 
engage in criminal activities including trafficking, 
extortion, and union-busting, though many limit their 
activities to security provision that is similar to - 
though more extensive than - that provided by private 
security companies. Rank and file members are 
regarded as employees; they have access to weapons 
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and occasionally advance into leadership positions. 
Criminal Networks Also not generally identified by a particular name, 
criminal networks are usually regional or national and 
are often associated with wealthy and powerful 
families. These groups are involved in both legal and 
illegal business ventures including imports/exports, 
trafficking of weapons, drugs and people, the lottery, 
money-lending, protection rackets, and money 
laundering. Rank and file members are regarded as 
employees; they have access to weapons though 
advancement into leadership positions appears to be 
determined by familial ties. 
 
Figure 2.2    
Demographics of Rank and File Membership in Armed Groups (from Kolbe, 2013) 
 Armed Insurgent Groups (n=88) Armed Urban Gangs (n=432) 
Mean Age 25.70 (SD: 9.44) 22.06 (SD: 8.31) 
Gender Male: 96.59% Male: 95.83% 
Mean years of 
education 
11.13 (SD: 4.22) 6.95 (SD: 2.36) 
Reason for 
joining the group 
To serve my country: 30.4% 
To improve my life: 58.7% 
To serve my community: 28.8% 
To improve my life: 31.6% 
Mean Locus of 
Control Score 
8.15 (SD: 2.50) 6.98 (SD: 2.90) 
 
Additionally, the attitude that group members exhibited about their ability to influence 
events in their own lives, was measured using the Rotter Locus of Control (LOC) scale, which 
has been widely used in international social science research (Smith, Trompenaars, & Dugan, 
1995). An individuals’ locus (Latin for “location”) ranges on a scale from internal to external 
with “internals” believing that their actions determine what happens and “externals” believing 
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that outside forces such as a higher power, chance or an authority has control over what happens 
to them (Crandall & Crandall, 2013; Eckstein & Gniewosz, 2013; Lefcourt, 2013).  
Figure 2.3.  
Place of Origin of Members of Armed Groups (from Kolbe, 2013) 
 
The concept of LOC emerges from social learning theory which proposed that a 
combination of both environmental (social) and psychological factors influence individual 
behavior (Oskarsson, Dawes, Johannesson, & Magnusson, 2012).  Locus of control orientation is 
linked to engagement in political behavior such as demonstrations, voting, joining community 
organizations, and engaging in other forms of political and social change (Condon & Holleque, 
2013; Dawes, Cesarini, Fowler, Johannesson, Magnusson, & Oskarsson, 2014; Eckstein & 
Gniewosz, 2013).  In this case we see that members of ex-FADH groups were more likely to be 
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externally motivated while members of armed urban gangs were more likely to believe that their 
actions could impact the world around them (Figure 2.4).  
Figure 2.4.  
Locus of Control of by Type of Armed Group  
 
Membership in Haiti’s armed urban gangs has vacillated over the years. Figure 2.5 
demonstrates how the percentage of young men aged 18-29 who are in gangs in the capital’s 
impoverished neighborhoods has ebbed and flowed in a similar pattern over time.  In the early 
2000s when armed ex-FADH groups launched an insurgency against the government of Haiti led 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide of the Lavalas political party, many urban gangs took sides in the conflict 
aligning themselves with the pro-democracy/pro-Lavalas movement or the anti-Lavalas/rebel 
movement. After the insurgency was successful in early 2004 leaders of the interim Haitian 
government hailed the ex-FADH and their allies as “freedom fighters” and a period of increased 
political repression against the Lavalas movement began. (Hallward, 2009) 
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Figure 2.5  
Percentage of Males (18-29) in the General Population of Selected Neighborhoods of Port-au-
Prince Claiming Affiliation with Armed Urban Groups  
 
During this three year period of political repression, membership in armed groups across 
the spectrum increased. Both pro- and anti-Lavalas gangs actively sought funding and members.  
When ex-FADH supported anti-Lavalas gangs and attacked pro-Lavalas gangs, it only fueled the 
membership drive and accelerated violence.  Crime, committed by both political actors and 
crime committed by opportunistic criminals, increased. As shown through observations of 
Haitian politics and empirical evidence demonstrated through survey research, periods of 
democratic crisis are frequently associated with increased crime more generally.  One exception 
  
 
23 
to this pattern is Greater Bel Air (including Delmas 2): between 2007 and 2013 the relative risk 
of gang involvement for young men (aged 18-29) in this area decreased considerably.  
 Overall, the policy and research literature on armed groups in Haiti tends to be 
methodologically weak and analytically imprecise. There has been little field-based empirical 
research conducted with members of armed urban groups in Haiti. As we can see from above, 
even the definition of what is and is not such a group is in dispute. This reflects a larger debate 
among policy makers and academics about how to define gangs (Hagedorn, 2008).  Competing 
definitions impact how and where policing as well as violence prevention and reduction 
interventions are carried out, and this definitional confusion complicates measurement of 
violence over time and obscures the evaluation of public policy interventions (Hagedorn, 2005). 
It is difficult to compare the few studies which have been conducted on Haiti’s gangs when no 
common definition has been established. Moreover, most assessments do not adequately account 
for the fast-changing social and political dynamics or the impact that outside political forces and 
funder priorities have on the location, targets and parameters of anti-gang interventions.  (Donais 
& Burt, 2015; Donais & Knorr, 2013; Dorn, 2009; Kovats-Bernat, 2000; Schuberth, 2015) 
The overwhelming negative perceptions of Haiti’s gangs as described by Becker is 
reinforced by the Haitian government, multilateral and bilateral agencies, the media, and 
practitioners involved in providing security and development support. Yet the stereotypes of 
gangs and gang members featured in the daily narrative often conflict with reality.  In 2010, 
when 245 foreigners working or volunteering full time in Port-au-Prince on community 
development and social welfare projects were asked to define “gang” their answers varied 
considerably (Kolbe, 2013).  Another similarly composed group of 250 foreign development 
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workers interviewed in 2005 gave wildly different answers, reflecting the push, at that time, to 
vilify members of the political opposition by accusing them of “gang activity” (Kolbe, 2013). 
Though the demographic composition, political affiliation, and basic characteristics of gangs 
changed little between 2005 and 2010, the perception of gangs among those who opinions 
influenced policy changed considerably. The word clouds below (Figures 2.6 and 2.7) represent 
the words and phrases commonly appearing in transcripts of qualitative interviews with 
development workers, with the increased font size representing increased frequency of mentions.  
Figure 2.6 
Words Commonly Used by Development Workers When Describing Haiti’s Gangs (2005) 
  
Uncritical representations of the severity of violence in Haiti can reproduce overly 
aggressive policing responses and severe peacekeeping interventions. As a result, heavy handed 
interventions can inadvertently harm innocent bystanders, alienate residents, and contribute to 
marginalization of a given neighborhood within the wider society. Likewise, sensationalist 
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reporting of supposedly gang-led campaigns of violence and beheadings dubbed “Operation 
Baghdad” by the media and false allegations of terrorist connections with pro-Lavalas groups led 
to increasingly aggressive tactics by special policing forces and peacekeepers between 2005 and 
2007.   Though “Operation Baghdad” and reports of beheadings were later revealed to be rumor 
rather than an actual event, it is still widely believed by some to have occurred and has even been 
the subject of an admittedly simplistic academic study (Hallward, 2009; Kovats-Bernat, 2006; 
Lunde, 2012).  
Figure 2.7  
Words Commonly Used by Development Workers When Describing Haiti’s Gangs (2010) 
  
   
A similar situation has occurred, albeit on a much larger scale, with the Mara Salvatrucha 
(commonly known as MS, Mara, and MS-13), a street gang that originated in Los Angeles and, 
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as members were deported from the United States, spread throughout Mexico and Central 
America.  This group differs from Haitian street gangs in the severity and use of force, access to 
firearms and sophistication of organization, but it has also experienced a similar shift towards 
organized crime that is seen in Haitian gangs.  Poorly conducted journalism and weak analytical 
studies of MS-13 have led to misconceptions about the true nature and extent of its activities. In 
particular, journalists tend to see the group as an ultra-violent criminal organization while some 
scholars have produced unsupported claims of an Al-Qaeda connection (Hamm, 2009; 
Papachristos, 2005; Seper, 2004).   These misconceptions have led to heavy handed or “mano 
dura” policing tactics that have, overall, been counterproductive, instead increasing social 
exclusion of marginalized persons and, paradoxically, fueling the growth of gangs (Miguel Cruz, 
2010; Rodgers, 2009). 
One of the challenges with defining Haiti’s gangs is due to the evolution of armed urban 
groups over time. When asked to describe how gangs differed from insurgent groups, members 
of armed groups, residents, community leaders and development workers were in dispute about 
which groups were more violent and which groups existed legally but a common set of criteria 
nevertheless have emerged (see Figure 2.8). These characteristics can be used to (loosely) 
determine if a group is an ex-army insurgent group or if it is an urban gang, but they do not fully 
resolve the problem of definition, and thus, eligibility for traditional DDR interventions.  
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Figure 2.8  
Characteristics of Armed Urban Gangs versus Ex-FADH Groups 
 Ex-FADH Groups Armed Urban Gangs 
Location Primarily rural with some urban and 
peri-urban presence; not tied to one 
particular base  
Urban, almost entirely in the popular 
zones; based in a neighborhood with 
clearly defined boundaries 
 
Leadership Military structure with clearly defined 
leaders 
One main leader who has trusted 
assistants 
 
Current or 
Recent 
Activities 
Training, patrolling the streets, 
demonstrating, policing 
Provides protection for neighborhood, 
crime including extortion, solves 
local problems for residents 
Origin Created by members of the disbanded 
Haitian Army 
Emerged naturally in poor 
neighborhoods where people felt 
threated and marginalized 
 
Higher 
Authority 
Wealthy elite from a particular political 
background who fund the groups 
The group itself, the leader of the 
group, residents of the area, funders 
 
Physical 
Appearance 
Army uniforms or civilian clothes with 
some elements of an army uniform; tend 
to be between 20-40 
Similar in physical appearance and 
dress to others of the same age group 
and socioeconomic background; tend 
to be between 15-30 
Weapons Some arms, carries weapons openly at 
times 
Few arms, weapons rarely carried 
openly 
 
Remuneration 
for members 
Small stipend paid to rank and file 
members, unknown payment to leaders 
 
Members receive what they need 
from the group and are sometimes 
allowed to keep the spoils of conflict 
 
Another problem impacting definition relates to the use of violence. Violence committed 
by armed groups in Haiti is not necessarily attributed to exclusively political or economic 
  
 
28 
motivations. Rather, it is often informed by a complex fusion of the two, in addition to social 
factors. It is important, however, to recognize that “politicized” actors – whether aligned to state 
or non-state interests – are often the key proponents of community violence. As Figure 2.5 
demonstrates, reported membership in armed groups varies considerably over time and 
geographic location. During periods of decreasing repression, membership in armed groups 
drops as individuals move on to other forms of political participation, leaving leftover members 
to turn to less ideologically-motivated activities, including crime. While crime overall decreased 
between 2006 and the present, it was also more frequently committed by criminals, neighbors, 
non-political gangs, and unknown individuals. (Kolbe & Hutson, 2006; Kolbe & Muggah, 2012) 
This reflects the larger body of research on sporadic community violence. In most cases 
of violent outbursts worldwide, the majority of individuals in a high-risk community never 
actually turn to violence. However, the complex interaction of risk factors concentrated in a 
particular geographic area is what leads to violence amongst subsets of the population. In a 
modest attempt at examining why the youth of Citè Soleil engaged in violence after 2004, 
Willman and Marcellin (2010) conducted a household survey (N=1575), 10 focus groups, and 15 
ethnographic interviews. Qualitative findings indicated that conflict is fueled by the propensity 
of residents to give up on trying to change things (i.e. parents reforming children and residents 
simply moving away). As a result, the fragmented community is unable to hold violent youth 
accountable. Second, some youth see violence as their only option for acquiring things they want 
or need. Third, youth in the survey pointed to violent behaviors learned from adult role models as 
a contributing factor for their actions. Ultimately, the authors conclude by pointing out that the 
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line between being any agent of violence and being a victim of circumstance prone to violence is 
very thin. 
While the groups themselves evolve and the dynamics within and between groups shift 
over time, so does the understanding of the groups and their role in society. As Haiti experiences 
economic, political and social change it is not surprising that the definition and perception of 
gangs also changes. At times it is difficult to distinguish gangs and gang-related activity in Haiti 
from organized crime and criminal networks – a problem encountered in other countries as well.  
It may very well be that in Haiti, gangs and organized criminal networks are not mutually 
exclusive and can only be distinguished by their current complexity and degree of integration 
with within a geographically specific community. (Papachristos, Hureau & Braga, 2013) 
How do Gang Members Define Themselves and Their Conflict? To better understand 
how DDR programs attain success, we must first understand the perception gang members have 
of themselves and their activities. During 2009 and 2010, 432 members of armed groups 
participated in a series of qualitative interviews with a research team from the Small Arms 
Survey examining their role in the development of their community and their relationship with 
residents, the government, international bodies and one another. A focus of the discussions was 
on whether or not hostilities during the post-coup period (2004+) had reached the level where 
they could be considered a gang war. They thought that including armed violence between urban 
gangs in the definition of war would increase the number of those eligible for services under 
DDR programs. Facilitators began part of the discussion by explaining how social scientists 
determine if an armed conflict tips over to war. Participants were then asked to reflect on current 
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and recent conditions to evaluate whether the situation had at any point approximated a gang 
war. 
War was defined for participants as the contentious use of lethal violence by 
“combatants” composed of at least two organized groups, states or other organized parties. The 
use of war is strategic and instrumental; actors that engage in war have specific aims that they 
believe are most expediently achieved through armed conflict with another organized group or 
state. War is not new or accidental. War is a learned behavior deliberately used to achieve a 
particular end. When human beings are able to develop peaceful alternatives to war, it will cease 
to be used to resolve political problems. This definition of war, incorporating elements of 
definitional terms and aspects of war from multiple classical sources in the political science 
literature, was provided to participants in both an oral description and in written form. 
War as violent activity with participants. Participants discussed each aspect of the 
definition of war individually. War has alternately been described as a “state of being”, a 
“contest of wills” and as a “continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz, et al, 
1989).Interviewees discussed whether in order for a situation to be considered a war, it must 
involve actions or whether periods of political repression or a “war of words” that proceeded 
periods of intense fighting were also considered war. Are all wars comprised of a series of 
events, some of which involve armed combat or the use of weapons against combatants or both 
combatants and the civilian population? In response to this question by the researcher, the 
discussions included, but went beyond, international legal norms such as the Geneva 
Conventions, that are used to define war. Participants raised additional questions as well: If there 
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is no fighting, can it be said to constitute a war? If weapons are not used, is it war?  If armed 
violence is only carried out against civilians, is it a war or is it a massacre? 
All members of armed urban gangs interviewed in the study agreed that wars needed to 
involve a high degree of violent activity. While they agreed that the use of the term “war” to 
characterize ideological and social campaigns is useful to raise political awareness (for instance, 
to say that the political opposition is waging war against a group in the media by spreading 
rumors and making fallacious allegations), such actions are not actually wars. There was some 
dispute over whether armed violence against those who were unarmed, unable to defend 
themselves or unwilling to respond with violence (including non-violent urban gangs), 
constituted war. As one 19-year-old said:  
“At different periods we decided not to fight back [when we were attacked]. That doesn’t 
mean that the other side wasn’t at war with us. They were at war. They were waging a 
war on us. But we didn’t have the political capital to fight back so we rested and waited 
until another time to respond… We can’t say that that year was a year of peace. It was 
still a year of war.” 
Other gang members pointed out that urban gangs are often unarmed because guns and 
ammunition were difficult to obtain in Haiti and that during times when groups were unarmed, 
state actors still engaged in violence against the gang and their communities.  
“In 2003 and 2004 we didn’t have any guns. But the foreign military, the police, 
everyone was doing a war on us. They came here, shooting all over the place. Many, 
many people were killed. They said we had guns when we didn’t and they used it as an 
excuse to massacre us.”  
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Another gang member agreed:  
“I can say that for the year or two after [the February 2004 coup] we were defending 
ourselves with rocks. I didn’t have a gun. None of us did. A rock was my weapon. It 
might not have been a war, but it felt like it.” A 25-year-old from Martissant put it this 
way: “When I don’t have weapon with which to defend myself, if my zone is attacked it 
is still a war. It’s a just a war that we’re going to lose.” 
Are gang members combatants? The difficulty of distinguishing gang members and 
combatants poses a challenge to DDR programs, since these definitions influence the target 
population of an intervention. During the Small Arms Survey interaction with members of armed 
groups, an oral translation of the Third Geneva Convention was provided. This document defines 
a combatant according the third Geneva Convention. A combatant is a person who conducts 
military operations according to the laws and customs of war, is part of a chain of command, 
wears a fixed distinctive marking visible from a distance, and bears arms openly. (International 
Commitee on the Red Cross (ICRC), 1949) 
There was disagreement between the gang members over whether gang members were 
combatants or not. Some gangs followed a strict chain of command while others stated that their 
groups were more loosely organized. Every gang member who participated in the Small Arms 
Survey study agreed that gangs had leaders and those to whom they were accountable (these 
included funders – usually wealthy businessmen – and communities as well as “ideals” such as 
democracy or patriotism).  Both leaders and members of armed urban gangs pointed out that the 
chain of command is often porous and that in all armed groups – both state and non-state ones – 
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the rank and file may answer to more than one authority. One low level gang leader put it this 
way:  
“We have always gotten money and political support from the [name of wealthy 
business owner]. So we are accountable to him. You can say that he’s at the top of our 
chain of command because all he has to do is call my cell phone and [closing phone] 
that’s it! I do what he wants. I send my guys out to take care of the problem. He has an 
issue with his employee, someone is stealing from him, or there is someone in 
competition for his business, we take care of it.   
“But I’m still the boss and I still have a boss. Maybe my boss and [the 
businessman] disagree and [the businessman] wants us to take out someone, but my boss 
doesn’t want to do that because it’s someone we know or have an agreement with. Then 
my boss gets his way and we lie [to the businessman] or suggest another solution… In the 
army they had the same thing. A soldier answers to his commander but the commander 
might be friends with this general or that other politician and so even though the 
President thinks he’s calling the shots, he isn’t really at the top of the chain of command.” 
Another gang member put it this way:  
“A man is not a dog. We don’t have just one master. We answer to our boss but 
we also answer to God. We answer to our beliefs. The conflict happens with the guy 
above you says to do something and you have another master. Maybe your master is the 
Church. Or your family. Or your beliefs, like you want democracy or you are patriotic. If 
one order violates the order of the other master, what do you do?  Who do you follow? 
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This is a dilemma we all face, even the police, MINUSTAH [UN peacekeeping] soldiers 
and the [disbanded Haitian army] – everyone has this problem.” 
Gang members who participated in these conversations did cite a number of problems 
with the criteria listed in the Third Geneva Convention. Many noted that this criterion defines 
combatants as those who follow the laws and customs of war while some “combatants” in Haiti 
do not.  
“If the police rape our women, that’s not following the laws of war. But the police 
are the same as soldiers.” 
“Sometimes we don’t follow the customs or laws of war. Sometimes we steal. 
Sometimes we don’t respect the rights of the residents [of this zone]. But that doesn’t 
mean that we aren’t fighting a war… We are more likely to violate the laws of war by 
doing crimes against the population when we are in war than during times of peace. 
Sometimes this is just what the circumstances call for and we are forced to steal from the 
people.” 
“MINUSTAH [The UN Mission in Haiti] and the PNH [Haitian National Police] 
those are the combatants we were at war against in 2005. So when the foreigners and the 
police killed children. Killed women. Raped people. Kidnapped people. Tortured people. 
When they did this, wasn’t it against the laws of war? So what do we say about this? Do 
we say they are not combatants even though they have uniforms and they follow 
command?” 
“When the customs of war violate the laws of war, then I say it is still a war.” 
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“Instead of saying it is a war because the soldiers meet these criteria; we should 
say it is a war when the soldiers are doing military operations. Because you can have an 
army that is in reserve for when you are attacked. Right now we are not at war, but I say 
that [name of gang] is our army.” 
One interesting discussion appears in the transcripts of more than half of the 
interviewees; this was whether private security companies hired by businesses and wealthy 
families, and sometimes deployed as private militia, meet the definition of combatants. Gang 
members agreed that although individual people may be the ones engaging in violence, they 
must be doing so on behalf of an organized group, party, nation or state. Lone individuals 
committing acts of violence, no matter their motivation, are terrorists or criminals, not soldiers. 
The debate emerged about whether individual private security guards engaging in violence were 
combatants, even if they were not acting within a group.   
“A private security guard is a mercenary. He does whatever the guy who hired 
him wants, even if it’s illegal.  He is part of a chain of command. He wears a uniform and 
he acts on behalf of the bourgeois.” 
“When a company turns their private security into a militia to protect their 
business interests, it is a crime. For a business to do violent acts to protect the interests of 
the business, this is against the laws of our country.” 
“If we say that the private security hired by the business is not made up of 
combatants what do we say when the business gives money to [name of an urban gang] to 
protect their business?  Then is [the gang] comprised of combatants while the private 
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security workers are not defined as combatants?  For me, I would say that if they are 
killing people then they are both combatants.” 
Gang members were split over whether private security guards could be considered 
combatants or not. Most agreed that while historically their groups had been at war, they were 
not currently at war. This was one justification for rejecting the designation of ‘combatant’. 
However, others pointed out that though the past year has been relatively peaceful in comparison 
to previous ones, that the groups are still organized to respond to violence when it threatens their 
community, making them the equivalent of a “reserve” or “standing” army (one young man 
defined his group as a “public community security force” in contrast to the private security 
forces hired by businesses and wealthy families).  
Even though it is a prerequisite for participating in most DDR interventions, accepting 
the designation of “combatant” is complicated by other issues as well. Gang members 
participating in the Small Arms Survey study pointed out that some gangs have complicated and 
formal methods for inducting members while others are more loosely associated. Nearly all 
agreed that interpersonal relationships and a high degree of trust is necessary for an individual to 
be a member of a gang, leading to some uncomfortable situations in which individuals whose 
families are not well known in the area are labeled as “non-members” by both residents and gang 
members, despite having the same function and responsibility as group members.  
If gang members are defined as combatants, another problem emerges as well: how do 
we define those individuals who are not members but provide essential services for the armed 
urban groups? Are they members of the armed group?  Are they eligible for DDR services? All 
of the gang leaders interviewed stated that numerous non-member residents provided services for 
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the group including support services (e.g. cooking, delivering messages, taxi rides, etc.) and 
work tasks that were illegal (e.g. collecting protection payments from small business owners and 
street merchants, being a guard or lookout during a crime, hiding stolen property, etc.).  During 
interviews there was consensus among both residents and gang members that such individuals 
are not members of the urban gangs, however, under Haitian law simply associating (even as 
friends) with gang members is an illegal activity and puts these residents who provide support 
services at risk of arrest.   
Another justification for rejecting the term “combatant” was that group members did not 
agree that they were organized in the same way as an army and that they do not openly bear 
arms. Some stated that they were organized for political change and that the violence was used 
against their group, any responses were self-defense and that the group itself was not organized 
with the purpose of committing violence or crime.   
How do residents define gangs? Residents of popular zones have a complicated 
relationship with armed urban groups. Those that are more predatory inspire fear and disgust 
from residents while those armed urban groups which provide protective, advocacy and social 
services to residents are spoken of with respect and admiration, albeit with some apprehension as 
well. As one resident of Bel Air put it: 
“The guys from [name of gang] are like the mafia that you see in the movies. You 
have a problem with your business or some guy is bothering your wife, you can go to 
them. They’ll back you up. They’ll help you out. But you don’t want to get on their bad 
side either.” 
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Members of the gangs are defined by residents based on the behavior of the group as a 
whole rather than on the purported aims of the group or what the group members say about their 
objectives. Gangs that have a political bent or history are comprised of “militants” while those 
which engage mostly in crime and intimidation are referred to as “criminals.” The term “bandit,” 
widely used in reference to people arrested and accused of gang affiliation during the post-2004 
coup period is eschewed by ordinary Haitian citizens. 
“The word ‘bandit’ is like ‘chimere’,” explained one Delmas resident, referring to the 
derogatory term used against young men in the city’s poverty-stricken popular zones suspected 
of supporting the Lavalas political party, “You say it to defile the person. A ‘bandit’ in [the 
government’s] eyes is someone from the popular zones, someone from the pro-democracy 
movement, someone that is a threat to the establishment, or someone you can call a criminal so 
you can arrest him for malfeasance and keep him in jail without a trial. To call someone a bandit, 
used to mean they were criminal, but now it’s a word that’s used so much against people who are 
not criminals, that it has lost any meaning.”  
When presented with the same material reviewed by members of urban gangs who 
participated in qualitative interviews, residents overwhelmingly disagreed with the assertion that 
gang members are combatants. Most stated that they were ordinary residents who were either 
criminals or were forced to defend their neighborhood against real and perceived threats.  The 
organized aspect of urban gangs was minimized by residents who pointed out that gang leaders 
hold positions of leadership because of interpersonal power relations, not because they are 
commissioned or authorized by a higher authority. Many residents also noted that though gang 
members may own weapons they generally own fewer weapons than wealthy Haitians and they 
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are often unable to bear arms openly because they don’t have the funds or connections to obtain 
a gun permit.  
The nature of the conflict. Residents and members of urban gangs were asked to decide 
what characteristics were important for defining a conflict as a war. During the course of 
interviews key themes emerged including the type and severity of violence in proportion the 
provoking event, the justification for the use of violence, the relative authority of those using 
violence, and the intention behind the use of violence.  
Interestingly, all four themes reflect ideas within existing scholarship on just war.  The 
discourse on just war balances two separate but related dimensions: the right to go to war and the 
lawfulness of conduct in war. These two dimensions are independent, in that an unjust war can 
be fought in accordance with the rules of just war and a just war can be in a way that violates the 
principles of just conduct in war. The justness of a war is usually the burden of the state (or, 
presumably, the insurgent group initiating the war); the justness of conduct during the war is the 
burden of the combatants and those leading them.  The criteria used to determine if a war is 
morally and legally defensible is jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum includes at least six separate 
criteria, each of which must be met to be a just war – all of which were raised repeatedly during 
interviews with gang members.  
Types and severity of violence. The criterion for proposed DDR interventions is usually 
set out in a Request for Proposals (RFP) written by the funding agency. The RFP includes a 
summary of the type and severity of violence experienced by the community during the conflict. 
Generally the RFP solicits DDR intervention projects which respond to their understanding of 
the scope, type, and severity of violence during the conflict. This is key because implementing 
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partners may shape their DDR intervention to respond to the funder’s perception of the type and 
severity of violence, rather than the needs of the actual community. The RFPs examined during a 
desk review of DDR project proposals considered for the Small Arms Survey study and this 
dissertation research included both confusing and inaccurate information about the type and 
severity of violence during the conflict period. 
The type of violence experienced by urban Haitians has differed in recent years, as has 
the perpetrators. While police and non-state actors including members of ex-FADH insurgent 
groups were blamed for half of all murders and nearly a third of all sexual assaults in 2005; they 
were assigned responsibility for only five percent of murders and less than one percent of sexual 
assaults in 2012 (Kolbe & Hutson, 2006; Kolbe & Muggah, 2012). Port-au-Prince residents were 
significantly less likely to be arrested without being charged, exposed to tear gas, and beaten by 
state agents or accidently shot in 2012 than they were seven years earlier (Kolbe & Hutson, 
2006; Kolbe & Muggah, 2012). But when one examines residents of the popular zones where 
conflict between competing gangs created regular street fights, it becomes clear that residents are 
actually more likely to be murdered in the post-DDR period than they were in 2005 (Kolbe, 
Puccio & Muggah, 2011). Living in popular zones is becoming increasingly dangerous for 
residents, in large part because of an increase in homicides tied to gang conflicts which emerged 
after the January 2010 earthquake (Kolbe & Muggah, 2012). 
In order to understand the reasons why this is the case, some context on the post-2010 
earthquake is needed. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster the vast majority of residents 
stopped sleeping inside their homes; those that had yards or lived in neighborhoods with lightly 
traveled streets slept in tents or under the open sky near their own house. But people living in 
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densely populated areas often lacked yards or shared their yard with multiple families. These 
popular zones also lack sufficient roads, and have narrow dirt paths forming chaotically 
organized corridors between buildings. The absence of a yard was one of the strongest predictors 
of which households ended up moving into Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. Those 
without yards were, in general, the city’s poorest and most marginalized residents. (Kolbe, et al, 
2010) 
As households relocated to new neighborhoods, moved between various IDP camps, and 
resettled in new homes (often in different areas of Port-au-Prince) existing social networks which 
provided a protection against crime were disrupted. Individuals who previously were protected 
from some types of crime by virtue of their residence in a neighborhood where a particular gang 
was active suddenly became vulnerable to crime. New neighborhoods and “cities” were created, 
such as the Corail IDP camp where hundreds of thousands now live on an isolated and windy 
desert plain near the city’s garbage dump.  To fill the void, new gangs were formed and old 
gangs split, created new alliances, and took over territory formerly controlled by other groups. 
Boundaries which had been solidified by years of fighting, negotiations, threats and alliances 
became porous.  
At the same time, the rapid influx of money into popular zones and IDP camps further 
disrupted existing social networks. Development efforts spearheaded by NGOs, foreign 
governments, MINUSTAH, and religious organizations pumped cash and resources into 
neighborhoods, often with little accountability or thought to how the money might influence the 
political, economic, and socio-cultural environment of the community.  Many groups, and even 
some gangs, formed neighborhood associations and applied for funding from foreign entities.  
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In one neighborhood a successful “cash-for-work” program where youth removed rubble 
and cleaned canals was run entirely by a local gang. A leader of the group, who had previously 
been deported from the United States and thus wrote in English well enough to complete a grant 
application, suggested that the gang created an association so they could apply to a faith-based 
charity for funds. The gang/association was awarded a USD $50,000 contract which they used to 
employ several hundred youth for five months. Because they used the money judiciously and 
spent little on administration, the group was able to keep the program going for three months 
longer than they were required to do in their contract.   
However, not all groups and leaders were as responsible as the abovementioned gang. 
Corruption, nepotism and exploitation (sexual and otherwise) of residents were rife (Klitgaard, 
2010). Many international organizations wanted to do work in poor neighborhoods but lacked the 
necessary contacts or language skills to navigate the process (Schuller, 2007). More often than 
not, mobilizing funds to people who used them well occurred by default rather than design. The 
sudden surge of cash and access to resources gave some groups -- both gangs as well as other 
community groups -- and individuals new forms of power; community leaders who had 
previously been able to advocate for the neighborhood or were a bridge between gangs and the 
rest of society were suddenly voiceless. Despite official positions by many international 
organizations prohibiting interaction with gangs, most NGOs and development projects did end 
up negotiating, working, or forming informal relationships with gangs. Some gangs that had been 
weak before the earthquake became stronger due to covert relationships with corrupt NGOs and 
development workers, emboldening their members to engage in violence aimed at expanding the 
group’s reach. (Griffin & Persad, 2013)  
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Proportional use of violence. According to jus ad bellum, conflict should be waged only 
if there is the serious likelihood that it will be successful. War should be not be used for futile 
causes. Any armed conflict should have reasonable probability of success without the use of 
disproportionate force. If disproportionate force must be used to assure a likelihood of success, 
than the war doesn’t meet this criteria. Macro-proportionality is also important. The benefits that 
will emerge from war must be greater than whatever costs the war will generate for the civilian 
population. And war should only be used as a last resort, after all efforts at peaceful settlement 
have been exhausted and negotiations breakdown. This can be an arduous process involving 
threats, promises, and intervention by multiple actors. Strategies such as economic sanctions and 
blockades should, in principle, be used before war (though some political scientists and policy 
makers disagree with this perspective) (Barker, 2009). 
Members of armed urban groups overwhelmingly agree that while the use of violence 
should be in proportion to a threat against the group or its community, the amount of force used 
and the severity of violence with which conflict is waged in Haiti is rarely proportional to the 
reality of the situation. One gang leader discussed a 15-month armed conflict between the police, 
foreign troops acting in concert with the police anti-gang unit, and the gangs in the area of Bel 
Air. Reports from journalists and human rights workers indicated that U.S. marines and Haitian 
National Police engaged in unprovoked attacks against civilians in this neighborhood while 
attempting to find and arrest suspected supporters of the Lavalas, the political party to which the 
overthrown president belonged. After a number of bystanders were shot by U.S. marines in early 
2004, Haitian radio stations began reporting that weapons and ammunition caches used by gang 
members against the police were hidden in the neighborhood.  
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At the time, gang leaders publically stated that they were in possession of few weapons 
and no ammunition:  
“Looking at the events I see all the steps that the Americans, [President] Latortue, 
and then MINUSTAH took in their war against Lavalas. Their response was an 
overreaction to the reality. But by overreacting, they created a new reality so that the 
threat looked greater than it was and this justified the level of their violence…. In turn, 
[another armed group] responded with violence and that started a cycle that went on for, I 
don’t know, a year?  
“The foreign military blocked our neighborhood. You couldn’t get in or out. They 
made threats against us in the media. They also made promises of peace and municipal 
services if we turned in our weapons. The problem was that in justifying the initial 
violence against [Bel Air] and making an excuse for shooting our women and children, 
they created an illusion that the benefits of violence against us out-weighted the costs of 
accidently shooting a few market women. It was a no-win situation for us. So we had to 
fight back, even if we were just fighting with rocks.”  
Other gang members interviewed for the Small Arms Survey study agreed that disproportional 
response is often linked to cyclical violence by armed gangs: 
“When we fight [another armed urban group], the violence we use against this is a 
lot more than they used against us. Say, for example, that I come into your zone. And 
don’t have good relations. So you beat me up. And then my guys go and use a knife to 
cut someone in your zone. Then you come back and shot my girl. So I send my friends 
out and they kill two of your friends. It keeps going and going.” 
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“I think that all confrontations using guns involve more violence than is 
necessary. The Americans didn’t need to invade the whole Middle East to kill Sadaam 
Hussein. The PNH [national police] don’t need to shoot everyone in a house when they 
come to make an arrest. We don’t need to go after everyone in neighborhood when we 
have a problem with one person. When someone has power and they can use as much 
force as they want, that’s what they do. They have the strength to do it so that is what 
they choose. Then, when the other side responds they will use the maximum violence 
possible.” 
The authority of those using violence. Jus ad bellum requires that those waging war 
must have the proper authority to do so. This authority is often established through international 
institutions. An institution such as the United Nations passes resolutions which authorize 
intervention by member states, though there is debate about how much support within the UN is 
needed for action to be taken (some have argued that if the security council passes a resolution 
with key members abstaining or opposing then proper authority hasn’t necessarily been 
established). States should avoid taking unilateral action, as this can be construed as an attempt 
to circumvent establishing proper authority before intervening.    
But how does this apply to the Haitian context? Did insurgent groups such as the 
Cannibal Army have the right to initiate a war?  And what about an armed urban gang? Since 
DDR efforts are designed to target those who have the right to initiate war, should armed urban 
gangs even be included? These questions were posed to residents and members of armed groups 
to better understand the context within which DDR was being implemented. 
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Residents and members of armed groups interviewed by the Small Arms Survey research 
team were in marked disagreement about who has the authority to initiate a violent conflict. Two 
thirds of the members of armed groups interviewed were in favor of non-state actors such as 
gangs, having the right to initiate a war as long as they were organized and politically motivated 
while less than 3 per cent of residents agreed with this assertion. Where the two types of 
interviewees did agree was in relation to the authority that a gang exerts to protect its 
neighborhood. Nearly all gang members and two thirds of all residents interviewed thought that 
if a neighborhood is attacked by a state actor or foreign peacekeepers than the gang has the 
authority to respond on behalf of the neighborhood.  Some residents went so far as to call 
defense of the neighborhood a “duty”, and said “I don’t like the behavior of those guys [in the 
gang] but if the police come in here shooting, [name of gang] has an obligation to protect us.” 
One resident explained the difference in gang’s authority to engage in armed conflict on 
behalf of the neighborhood like this: 
 “If the government comes to hurt us, then [name of gang] is like our security 
guards. They have to protect us. But if [name of gang] gets into a conflict with [another 
gang from a different area] then their conflict is likely personal or it is regarding their 
crime. So when [that other gang] attacks us to punish [the gang in our neighborhood] we 
get resentful. They don’t have the right to force us into a fight between thieves. But they 
do have the right to defend us if we are targeted by [the government].” 
Intention behind the violence. According to jus ad bellum, the use of violence must be 
done with just cause; action should be taken if it is to save innocent human lives that are in 
immediate danger whose lives would be lost without an intervention.  Intimately related to “just 
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cause” is “right intention”. Just wars are not for economic interest or out of revenge. Though it is 
possible for a war to be waged for a just cause, but without a right intention, for instance, when 
human life is in danger, but the intervening actors would not intervene unless they received some 
other benefit.   But ideally armed conflict should be initiated when the intention is to save 
innocent lives. (Stahn, 2007) 
“I only hurt people to protect my own people.” 
“Some [gang members] delight in violence. They like the smell of blood. We 
don’t want those kind of people in [our gang]. If you kill someone it should be a rational 
decision. You shouldn’t kill someone because you get hot and you want revenge.” 
“We can say that when [there was armed fighting in 2005] this was a war because 
it was for defense. Wars are about defending yourself, your family. When people start 
something because they want [to expand the geographic boundaries of the gang’s 
territory] that is not defense, so it’s not a war. It’s greed.” 
“It is only a war if you do it to better the lives of the people. A crazy person does 
a war just to make others suffer.” 
Clarity on the intention behind violence is helpful in structuring the content of DDR 
interventions. If violence is initiated because members of armed groups feel a strong need to 
protect their neighborhoods and members from other armed groups, or from police, then 
understanding then DDR efforts may need to include community-level interventions such as 
peace accords between neighborhood gangs and the police. This strategy was employed by the 
Brazilian NGO Viva Rio in the Bel Air neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. Each month in which 
there were no murders committed in the zone resulted in each party to the peace accord (gangs 
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and police) being offered incentives including primary school scholarships to give to their 
supporters.  
If the intention behind the violence stems from anger, revenge, hate, bias, or a similar 
“thirst for blood” (as one former gang member but it), then DDR projects may need to include 
components that address psychosocial aspects of interpersonal relations, self-control, anger 
management, or similar skill-building or coping interventions. Without a clear understanding of 
the intention(s) behind violence, policy makers are left creating a DDR Request for Proposals 
(RFP) that includes only what they suspect are the reasons for the violence, rather than that 
which is actually expressed by participants in the violence. 
Weapons of war. Schelling (1966) points out that an essential component of war is the 
power to hurt, basically the ability to use lethal force against your enemy. Similarly, for Cicero 
(1913), the acts of war are those in which weapons (axes, swords, pikes and the like) are used to 
kill. The weapons used in war are not limited to firearms; other weapons which have the power 
to hurt are also included under this definition. Bombing, even when no solider ever sets his foot 
on enemy soil, is still war. So too was primitive warfare where battles were fought with 
sharpened sticks, rocks, or by hurling fire at ones opponent (Weir, 2005).  
Weapons need not directly and immediately kill in order to satisfy this definition. For 
instance, the use of gas that disables and potentially kills, or poisoning the water supply used by 
your opponent’s military would also be an acceptable “weapon” under this definition. Similarly, 
the weapons used must be capable of killing; if only flash grenades and Tasers are used in battle 
then it’s not a war (Schneider, 1997). 
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Contrary to the assumption that members of armed urban gangs are actually armed, 
individual gang members often lack weapons, and gangs as a whole possess fewer weapons per 
member than those owned by upper income Haitian families.  Rocks, knives, fists and feet were 
the most commonly used weapons in physical altercations initiated by gang members.  Many 
gang members noted that the perception that the group is armed is what gives them an advantage 
in conflict. Interviewees in the Small Arms Survey study noted that toy, water, paintball and 
airsoft guns (with the orange safety cap pried off) were commonly carried by members to give 
the impression of being armed (Kolbe, 2013).  
“I’m one of the old guys here. I’m 35 and I haven’t had a gun in ten years. I lost 
my gun when I got arrested. I haven’t had once since. I don’t need one because I have the 
reputation of carrying a gun in my pants… If I ever did need to shoot someone, I could 
go get a gun. But for right now, why do I need a gun?” 
“You don’t have to actually have a weapon; you can just make then think you 
have one. If you put your cell phone in your pants like this [demonstrates] then they think 
it’s a gun and that intimidates people.” 
“The only weapon I have used is a rock. I didn’t like using it because it makes the 
violence too intimate. I would prefer to use a gun but I don’t have the money to buy one.” 
“Once I pointed a [toy gun] at this guy and he handed me his wallet. I was just 
joking around. I gave it back. But I didn’t forget that incident because I see that the belief 
I am armed is what makes me strong.” 
“I have a gun. It’s an old one that I got from my father. I knew that [name of 
another gang] was invited to this [interview] so I brought it to show them. [laughter] The 
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guy at the door made me lock it in the closet before I could come in. [laughter] It isn’t 
loaded. The bullets are pricey! I have to pay for my boy’s school fees so I can’t buy any 
bullets. But when he grows up I want to teach him how to shoot and give him my gun. 
When you have a gun you just feel like a man.”  
Gun ownership in general is remarkably low in Haiti. When asked in 2009 whether or not 
they held a weapon, 1.9 per cent of Port-au-Prince area households reported owning firearms. 
(Kolbe and Muggah, 2011) This increased to 2.3 per cent in 2010 but dropped to 2.1 per cent by 
2013.  (Kolbe, 2013). This is considerably less than the percentages given by MINUSTAH and 
other international actors in 2009 and 2010 who estimated that 8 to 22 percent of all households 
are gun owners (ICR Haiti, 2015). Poor households and those in popular zones were much less 
likely to own a gun than wealthier households and individuals from other parts of Port-au-Prince.  
(Kolbe & Muggah, 2013) 
Surprisingly, gang members are no more likely to own a weapon than other residents of 
their neighborhood. In fact, gang members are significantly less likely to own a gun than a 
middle or upper-income person of the same gender (Kolbe & Muggah, 2013; Short & Hughes, 
2006). There is no statistically significant relationship between gun ownership and political 
involvement, a family history of gang membership, or current membership in any armed group 
(Kolbe, 2013).  
The lack of guns poses a unique challenge for DDR programs and their participants since 
the first step in entering DDR is usually the voluntary, and often ceremonial, disarmament of the 
insurgent groups. If gangs members are not armed and do not produce weapons during the 
disarmament period, it may appear that armed urban gangs are refusing to fully comply with 
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peace accords or other agreements by refusing to give up their guns. During the 2004-2007 
period, armed urban groups responded to the “disarm or die” campaign and other efforts to force, 
coerce, or cajole disarmament by turning over a few unusable or older weapons. Most study 
participants said that urban gangs retained roughly half of their weapons stock, but that a gang of 
50-100 members usually only had four or five weapons to share.  
Participants in the Small Arms Survey study were under the impression that turning in a 
gun was a perquisite for participating in DDR. Whether it was, informally demanded or was a 
formal part of the DDR process in Haiti is unclear. Official documents state that any member of 
an armed group could present himself at the program office and request to be placed in the DDR 
program. However, more than forty interviewees in the Small Arms Survey study said they were 
told by Haitian DDR office staff that they could not enter the program without turning in a 
weapon or being “referred” by a United Nations staffer.  
  How do we understand the scope and intensity of the conflict? Though there will 
continue to be debate about the definition and characteristics of Haiti’s armed groups, it is still 
possible to try to understand causes, effects of and alternatives to armed urban conflict. 
Understanding the scope and intensity of the conflict assists policy makers in creating and 
evaluating DDR efforts and helps us understand why and how some intervention components are 
needed more than others. Creating a model for measuring the scope and intensity of the conflict 
is one step towards the experience of what Cicero (1913) called “contention by force.” A 
common definition for these groups and their conflict is still essential, but towards that end, so is 
an understanding how we can quantify the nature of the conflict created by such groups. Ideally, 
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this should have been resolved before DDR efforts began so that a country level or regional level 
measure of success or failure of the DDR efforts could have been established. 
Residents of popular zones, community leaders, development workers and members of 
armed groups have all identified common themes which can shape a model of conflict scope and 
intensity. This includes the structure of the group and its relationship to the community and other 
groups, the types and severity of violence used, the intention behind the violence and its 
proportion in relationship to provoking events, and lastly, the nature of the battles and weapons 
themselves. 
Researchers have favored murder or death rates over economic costs studies, medical 
care utilization rates, or responses to clinical measures during household surveys as method for 
quantitative study to determine the scope and intensity of conflict. Before, during, and after rates 
can be compared. In DDR evaluation efforts, murder rates are often an easy to use quantitative 
indicator of success. For example, the research department at the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio has 
used murder rates in favelas (both those that participated in peace accords and those which did 
not) along with murder rates in their invention zone of Greater Bel Air (in Port-au-Prince) to 
demonstrate the efficacy of their non-traditional DDR efforts. Decreased murder rates can be 
used to demonstrate DDR success on the community or group level while high murder rates in 
non-participating communities can be used to illuminate the need for DDR programming or to 
lobby policy-makers for increased DDR funding. 
Comparing murder rates. One seemingly easy way to determine the scope of the conflict 
is to look at how many people have died, how they died, who killed them, and where they were 
killed. In Haiti, murder rates are clearly associated with increased gang activity during some key 
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periods. As groups engage in street battles, the number of those killed (intentionally or 
unintentionally, as in the case of bystanders) goes up, so too do criminal murders as the focus on 
the gang’s conflict (gang vs. gang or gang vs. state actors) consumes much of the group’s time 
and energy, opening the space for opportunistic crimes by non-members against residents who 
are normally protected by the gang. Household survey research has been successfully used to 
estimate crude murder rates as well as to establish the frequency of perpetration by various 
groups, the methods used for killing and the place of the murder.  However, it is unclear how 
many deaths are necessary to tip the scale from ordinary levels of crime to a state of emergency 
or from a state of prolonged conflict that is not war to a state of something that is war. 
Small and Singer (1970) set the bar at a thousand battle deaths.  But this creates two 
serious and related problems. First, it defines war in such a way that the measure of the cost of 
war is intrinsically linked to its definition. This creates an inferential problem if a scholar wanted 
to research what causes wars to be more or less costly as the inclusion criteria for wars will be 
armed conflicts that have a particular cost.  Secondly, Singer and Small only included battlefield 
deaths in their definition. Not only did they limit the deaths to those occurring among soldiers, 
but they also limited the deaths to those as a direct result of combat.  
Wars are messy. Rousseau (1762) was one of many who pointed out that combatants are 
not the only ones killed in war. In fact civilians frequently bear as much or more of the costs of 
war as do soldiers. Some estimate that as many as 100,000 civilians have been killed thus far in 
the Iraq War (Burnham, et al., 2006). An estimated 3.9 million were killed during war in the 
Congo (Coghlan, et al., 2006). In Haiti, 8,000 people died in the capital the 22 months after the 
main events of the 2004 civil conflict, far more than the several hundred who were killed on the 
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battlefield in the years of rural fighting by insurgent groups which preceded the overthrow of the 
government.   
Combat is not the only way that soldiers die. Combatants are killed in accidents, friendly 
fire incidents, and by preventable illness. In 1918 half of the American soldiers who died in 
Europe were killed not by a bullet or a bomb, but by influenza. In 2010, for the second year in a 
row, more American soldiers committed suicide (n=468) than the number of those killed in battle 
(n=462). It is clear that war kills both civilians and soldiers and it kills both on and off the 
battlefield.   Taking all of this into consideration, any discussion on the definition of war cannot 
simply be based on battlefield deaths. Though war is violent and through it people are killed, the 
definition of war proposed in the Small Arms Survey study requires only one death of a 
combatant. This opened the door to further study of the true costs of war, study that won’t be 
limited by the bias in Singer and Small’s definition.  
Definitional Issues in Haiti. 
Clearly, the narrative that has dominated the discourse on Haiti’s gangs is overly 
simplistic. The research that does exist on Haiti’s armed groups demonstrates that complexity of 
gang identity, roles, functions and the impact on stabilization and development activities. The 
role of the media, political groups, financial backers and the international community further 
complicates efforts to understand and address gang violence as researchers strive to unpack how 
conflict tips the scale from “ordinary” violence to war.  
Haiti’s armed groups are heterogeneous. Despite similarities among the rank and file 
membership, motivation and relationships – both personal and historic – play a large role in 
motivating individuals to be active with and within armed groups. Differentiating between 
  
 
55 
groups is key for policy makers working in the DDR arena as the motivation and relationships 
influence both the success of community violence reduction efforts, as well as the success of 
security and policing efforts. The lines between groups are not always easy to distinguish and in 
the past, misunderstandings about the political affiliation, financial backing and access to 
resources of particular gangs has hampered stabilization and development efforts.  
It should also be noted that the perceptions, functions and activities of armed groups 
change over time in Haiti. Efforts to establish democratic governance and the presence of foreign 
peacekeepers have had a profound impact on the development of gang violence in urban Haiti, 
with membership in gangs and other armed groups increasing during times of government 
repression. It is important to note the shift in how armed groups are viewed by residents and 
development workers as well as also how they viewed themselves. The use of generic and all-
encompassing concepts such as “gangs” may obscure rather than reveal underlying motivations.  
Armed groups in Haiti have comparatively sophisticated understandings of the basic rules 
of war, even if not described as such. Indeed, there are established understandings about the use 
of force, proportionately, authority structures and other factors. The experience of such groups in 
Haiti forces us to revisit our understandings of “tipping points” from conflict to war and our 
understanding of who should participate in DDR efforts.  
In the next chapter I expand on this discussion by tackling the relationship of DDR to 
peacekeeping efforts. I begin with a review of DDR preconditions, processes, and theoretical 
underpinnings. I discuss the history of DDR in Haiti as part of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
process. I also discuss the role of DDR in the larger peacemaking and peacekeeping process in 
Haiti as well as the current status of DDR efforts.  
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Chapter 3: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration  
 A brief review of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is useful for 
understanding the significance and content of this study. In this chapter I will begin by providing 
an overview of DDR including the preconditions for DDR and the role that DDR plays in the 
larger peacemaking process. Next, I go on to give a short history of DDR efforts in Haiti, 
particularly efforts to reduce crime through DDR in conjunction with Security Sector Reform 
(SSR). I end by discussing the current status of DDR in Haiti. 
DDR in the Peacemaking Process 
DDR is becoming an important part of post-conflict peace resolution; it has emerged as 
an essential feature in peacekeeping operations during the last 20 years (Dupuy & Peters, 2010). 
DDR is not only an important component of peace stabilization; it is also vital for the long-term 
economic development of the country (Spear, 2006). The first D in DDR is disarmament: the 
collection, control, documentation and disposal of ammunition, explosives, small arms and other 
weapons controlled by the combatants and, sometimes, civilians (Jackson, 2015a). The second 
D, demobilization, is the formal and controlled disbandment of combatants from insurgent 
groups or armed forces (Lebow, 2014). And lastly, reintegration is the process by which the ex-
combatants acquire civilian status, a sustainable livelihood, and permanent community-based 
housing. Reintegration is not only a social and political process, but it is also an economic 
exercise that takes place within the community at the local level and within a given time frame 
(Ojeleye, 2010).  
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Goals of DDR. The literature identifies a number of complementary goals undergirding 
DDR. These goals include providing stability and security, reducing the hazard of future conflict, 
producing individual-level change, and resolving the difficulties which created or facilitated the 
growth of an insurgent movement. The goal which, arguably, receives the most attention and 
funding is the creation of a stable and secure post-conflict environment which is vital to enabling 
the start of development and recovery. This is initially accomplished through disarmament, since 
a sustainable peace is difficult to establish in areas where the population retains small arms and 
light weapons after armed conflict ceases (Dupuy & Peters, 2010; Jackson, 2015b). But, past 
experience reveals that disarmament alone is not the most effective way to achieve this goal; it 
should be accompanied by demobilization as well as reintegration of ex-combatants to increase 
the possibility of success (Roach, 2013). 
Another goal of DDR is to reduce the possibility of conflict reemerging. This goal is 
accomplished at the macro, mezzo, and individual levels through the creation of peacekeeping 
missions. At the macro level, donor countries in peacekeeping missions support the internally- or 
externally-conflicted states with foreign aid which can be used for infrastructural development, 
movement towards the rule of law, and helping with treaty and agreement monitoring. This is 
important because treaties and agreements specify post-conflict actions to be taken by the state, 
and external intervention adds a layer of accountability to the process. 
At the mezzo level, DDR addresses the state’s actions to address the problems (if any) 
associated with public support for the armed conflict. These problems are diverse and can 
include anything from ethnic strife to lack of economic stability. The state is charged with 
resolving problems in conjunction with international actors and responding to citizen concerns in 
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the post-conflict period through the creation of programs and policies, the reformation of state 
institutions, and distribution of resources to the public. Weinstein (2007), in explaining patterns 
of rebel violence during civil wars, argues there are two types of insurgent groups: resource-
wealthy and resource-poor. The former, he writes, attract opportunistic individuals, while the 
latter, being forced to rely on social endowments such as political ideology or religious identity, 
attract highly committed individuals. The latter may be motivated, he explains, by a strong 
commitment to addressing social injustice, inequality, oppression, lack of political voice, or other 
problems in society. The DDR process is a time for the state to make mezzo-level changes to 
address these motivating influences, if they were not resolved during the war or during the treaty 
and peacemaking course.  
At the individual level, efficacious post-conflict DDR is accomplished by addressing the 
issues which led to individuals to decide to take up arms and which complicate an individual’s 
economic and social stability once they leave the armed group. An essential aspect of 
reintegration is engaging ex-combatants in viable economic activities and in the larger 
socioeconomic developments of society (Er, 2009). In this way, DDR is a holistic exercise which 
benefits all members of society, including the spouses and dependents of the ex-combatants. 
Community-based approaches are often used in DDR to meet the goal of social engagement by 
intervening with services such schools, recreation clubs, clinics, garbage pick-up services, and 
public works projects in the neighborhoods and communities where ex-combatants will be 
reintegrated (Dwyer, 2012). 
DDR Phases 
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Disarmament. DDR serves central roles in creating peace and stability among countries 
that have experienced internal conflicts. The first stage of this aspect of DDR is to disarm the 
civilian population in order to ensure peaceful negotiations are reached and upheld. Disarmament 
is conducted in a way that the rebels or ex-combatants are given an opportunity to surrender their 
arms without making them feel they have capitulated or lost standing in the community.  Past 
experience reveals that sustainable peace in the country requires the disarmament as well as 
weapon management programs which address the root problem of the issues that triggers the 
conflict (Jackson, 2015). In addition, fruitful disarmament programs should include disarmament 
procedures and obligations that should be incorporated in a peace agreement and DDR plan 
(Wagle & Jackson, 2015).  International bodies, such as the United Nations, should encourage 
the involved parties to include provisions that will ensure that the weapons that will be recovered 
are destroyed.  This will help in avoiding a situation where the weapons that have been collected 
from being used in another conflict (Jackson, 2015).  
Furthermore, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) recommends that 
disarmament of ex-combatant should be complemented by a program that is comprehensive and 
which helps in managing the weapons that are collected from the ex- combatants. This program 
should come up with measures that target irregular armed individuals and groups as well as the 
procedure that control the entrance of new weapons in the country to the extent possible (Unruh 
& Williams, 2013). The neighboring countries, as well as other countries that supply weapons to 
this country, strict monitoring facilitates the respect of these arrangements aimed at successful 
disarmament (Lebow, 2014). In addition, policymakers stress the importance that effort is made 
to ensure any United Nations-mandated embargo is achieved during this process (Roach, 2013). 
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Operations manuals from peacekeeping organizations stress that during the disarmament phase 
information about the profile, size and deployment of the armed forces should also be collected.  
It is also necessary to sensitize the public about the disarmament exercise in order to alert the 
population and encourage them participate if needed (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011). 
Past experience has shown that weapons which are surrendered in the first phase are 
usually either useless or of poor quality (Jackson, 2015).  This was true during Haiti’s 2004-2007 
disarmament efforts. In 2004, disarmament began in Haiti with “a small pile of [50] rusted, taped 
and dilapidated weapons” surrendered to French troops (“Haiti Disarmament Begins,” 2004). 
According to Dupuy and Peters (2010), as disarmament exercise continues, high quality weapons 
are surrendered with mutual confidence and trust building up gradually. In most cases, during the 
disarmament exercise, the best weapons are surrendered at the last stage of the process; they 
were often reserved to that point due to possibility of reoccurrence of the conflict. This never 
occurred in Haiti, where disarmament efforts produced only small numbers of low quality 
weapons, even after peacekeepers and the Haitian National Police moved from voluntary and 
incentivized disarmament to a highly publicized “disarm or die” campaign (which was equally 
unsuccessful in locating and capturing weapons stocks). (Disarmament Delayed”, 2005; Action 
Aid, 2006)  
In order to build greater confidence during the disarmament exercise, well planned 
monitoring and verification plan can be executed (Bryden et al., 2012). Since it is not easy to 
predict how fast the confidence will grow, internal policy documents from DDR funders and 
peacekeeping organizations recommend that national DDR campaign efforts include a 
reasonable measure of flexibility in the timetable phases. DPKO operations manuals further 
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emphasize that it is very important to provide security to the combatants who have surrendered 
their arms in initial phases in order to ensure disarmament exercise to be successful. In cases 
where the public security forces are unreliable or nonexistent, the peacekeeping forces should 
provide security to these people (Jackson, 2015).  
It is also important for the disarmament planning group to consider expertise such as 
military, political, humanitarian as well as public information that is available in order to plan a 
disarmament program that is comprehensive before implementing the process (Lidegran, 2014). 
The main goal of providing security is to ensure that the people who have surrendered their 
weapons in the initial phases can do so without fear of future attack by other armed group 
members (Munive & Jakosben, 2012).  This requires that in disarmament exercise there should 
be enough police officers that are backed by military forces, who are well armed and equipped to 
provide security to ex-combatants, as well as the weapons that have been surrendered. It is 
unclear which of these aspects failed in Haiti though themes which emerged in the Small Arms 
Study survey (discussed in the previous chapter) highlight the lack of security experienced by 
members of armed groups in the post-conflict period. 
Disarmament in Haiti. In Haiti the DDR process did not include ceremonial 
disarmament. It is likely that ceremonial disarmament, in which armed groups give up weapons 
during a public ceremony on the order of their commanders, was absent from Haiti’s process 
because there was no peace process involved in the post-coup period. The international 
community refused to respond to insurgents until after they had nearly overthrown the 
democratically elected president (in part because the elected president was unpopular with the 
U.S., Canada, and France, which invaded in 2004 as part as part of the Interim Multinational 
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Forces (IMF), under U.N. Security Council authorization, not to establish or keep the peace, but 
to complete the coup d’état).  Foreign support for the Rebel Army and other rural insurgents 
complicated matters. At the time of the 2004 overthrow of the elected president, he and his party 
was supported by roughly half of the population. The multinational forces then were seen as 
invaders who opposed democracy rather than peacemakers. No effort was made to establish a 
peace process, and if such an effort had been made, it is unclear what the IMFs would have 
considered to be an object of such a process, given their involvement in furthering violent 
conflict within Haiti. 
In June 2004, a little more than three months after the IMFs invaded Haiti and completed 
the overthrow of the elected government, the United Nations established a peacekeeping mission. 
With this mission came the first efforts at DDR. However, with no peace process in place, an 
unclear categorization of armed groups (rural armed insurgents affiliated with the “winning” side 
and supported by the IMFs were called “freedom fighters” and were not labeled by the IMF as 
insurgents, while armed urban gangs which had, for the most part, not engaged in the conflict or 
in any action against the government, were labeled as insurgents and targeted with indiscriminate 
violence by the IMFs). The new UN mission inherited a difficult DDR situation. With competing 
policies and ideas about who should be demobilized, bias against pro-democracy and Lavalas 
supporting armed groups, and with political pressure to avoid disarming the rural anti-democracy 
insurgents, the DDR faltered from the beginning.  
There was no formal peace process. The DDR leaders lacked credible carrots and/or 
sticks to persuade armed groups to enter into the process. Misinformation about who was armed 
and who wasn’t, lack of accurate information about the scope and nature of the armed conflict, 
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and lack of political will within the UN system and from the main MINUSTAH funders, 
hampered DDR activities and the creation of a DDR process. Eventually, foreign DDR staffers 
found themselves negotiating, through Haitian staff intermediaries who themselves had 
competing interests, with individual armed gangs to try to get them to join the DDR program. No 
large-scale or formalized disarmament ever took place.  
The rural insurgent groups which organized and led 2002-2004 armed conflict against the 
Haitian government were never disarmed or targeted for disarmament in the DDR process. 
Weapons and equipment, include grenade launchers, surface to air missiles, helicopters (which 
were transferred to the island as part of the US government military equipment drawdown 
program), and more than 20,000 guns were retained. Some circulated back into individual 
household stocks through the market, others were hidden, and some were retained and used as 
the anti-democracy insurgent groups engaged in public demonstrations and trainings between 
2004 and 2013 in an effort to advocate for re-creation of the disbanded Haitian army. 
Demobilization. The other role of DDR is the demobilizing of ex-combatants from 
armed forces. Demobilizing refers to the controlled and formal discharge of active combatants 
from the armed groups or forces (Lebow, 2014). There are normally two stages of 
demobilization and the first one involves getting individual combatants and putting them in 
temporary centers such as cantonment sites, barracks, or assembly areas.  In this stage also, there 
is massing of troops in cantonment sites: camps, hospitals, residential institutions, or other 
facilities that are designated for this role (Lidegran, 2014; Munive & Jakosben, 2012). The 
second stage is called reinsertion and it entails providing the support package to the demobilized 
combatants (Lidegran, 2014). 
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Cantonment sites are crucial during DDR process especially if the ex-combatants have to 
wait for a certain period of time before they are transported back to their homes to be resettled. 
In a comprehensive and efficient DDR program, peacekeeping forces as well as other 
implementing agencies are well guided and informed on how to construct and prepare 
cantonment sites (Dupuy & Peters, 2010). In addition, DDR funding agencies advise providing 
joint cantonment sites that share facilities in order to ensure that the parties to the conflict 
reconcile in earlier stages. The ideological training and cultural programs that are offered in the 
cantonment sites can help to instill the ex-combatants with a strong sense of loyalty and this 
make them to be more willing to be the members of the communities they come from. (DPKO, 
1999) 
There are certain factors are recommended for consideration while identifying and setting 
up the cantonment site.  Cantonment sites should be located in an area that is accessible and also 
not far from ex-combatants concentrations or bases (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011). This will 
encourage the ex-combatant to participate in disarmament and demobilization exercise. The site 
should also be located in area where there are effective mode of transport such as roads and 
airfields (Jackson, 2015).  This will enable the combatants to access cantonment site and 
surrender the weapons in their hand. Furthermore, the cantonment should also be located in an 
area where there is ample security and the ex-combatants will feel protected. The forces should 
guard the perimeter wall of the site at all times and any act of intimidation or harassment should 
not be tolerated.  An internal threat that could arise should be reported to the relevant authorities 
and appropriate actions be taken (Bryden et al., 2012). The cantonment should also have an 
armory or weapon storage facility that is well guarded. The weapons that are collected from the 
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militia group should be stored in these facilities in a temporary basis before they are transported 
to the main armory. The weapons that have been surrendered should be transported out of the 
camp as soon as possible and they should be transported to the permanent storage site while 
under tight security (Jackson, 2015; Roach, 2013; Lidegran, 2014).  
It is also recommended by DDR program funders that the period during which ex-
combatants live in the cantonment site should be short as possible because due to high cost of 
staff to deal with logistics and the cost of the residential component. Policy makers argue that 
this aspect of the DDR exercise requires a significant amount of funding and it is therefore 
necessary to make it as brief as possible in order to cut the costs (Roach, 2013).  Additional 
reasoning given by DDR funders is that extensive cantonments periods can lead to 
disenchantment and boredom among the ex-combatants and this can lead to the emergence of 
demonstrations or internal conflict, which in return can lead to the attack of peacekeeping forces 
and personnel who guard the cantonment site, stealing of food and other supplies, or destruction 
of property. However, there no publically available empirical research which examines the 
relationships between cantonment period and post-DDR success at the individual, group, or state 
level. Assumptions about negative impacts of “prolonged” or lengthy cantonment on individuals 
or groups have not been empirically examined to date. 
There are cases when the families of ex- combatants accompany ex-combatants to the 
cantonment sites.  In DDR exercises, there is no clear policy that address these families. 
According to Munive and Jakosben (2012), there is a need for clear guidelines to be developed 
that respond to critical concerns of these families. DDR program evaluators have recommend 
that such guidelines include clarification on who is responsible to look after family members 
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during demobilization exercise, the kind of support they should be given as well as the criteria to 
be used to determine the families to be given the assistance as well as the person who will come 
up with that criteria (Ojeleye, 2010). Additionally, families moved to cantonment sites may 
include women who have been abducted, raped, or partnered with the insurgent against their 
will, as well as children who are a product of rape (Wilén, 2012). The cantonment site is often 
the first opportunity to address the needs of these women and their children as well as the desire 
of abducted girls and women to separate from the armed insurgent. In past DDR interventions, 
girls and women who were violated by insurgents experienced a secondary violation when they 
were forced to stay with the insurgent in the cantonment site and repatriated to his village, rather 
than returned to their own home and family village (Otega, 2010).   
Demobilization in Haiti. In Haiti the DDR process did not include a cantonment period. 
This likely occurred because the events in Haiti did not follow the traditional process of a 
peacekeeping mission. The United States, which led the IMFs, invaded Haiti while the 
democratically elected president was still in office and participated in his removal from power 
(and in deed, from the country itself). A problem of labeling occurred. In the politically charged 
public narrative put forth by the United States, which justified the IMFs intervention and their 
own activities, U.S. politicians labeled armed urban gangs as insurgents and identified the actual 
insurgent groups (which had been waging a war for two years and had captured nearly all of the 
north, the central plateau, and parts of the south) as rebels against an unpopular administration 
who should be supported in their activities. In February 2004, when US marines first landed in 
Haiti, armed urban gangs were rarely engaged in violence and those that they did engage in was 
limited in scope and geographic location. It was only after the interim Haitian government (IHG) 
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came to power and began targeting oppressed minorities and political groups affiliated with the 
pro-democracy movement that urban gangs became a major player in the national conflict.  
In a typical UN peacekeeping mission, the intervention of peacemaking troops would 
have occurred to support democracy, approval from the UN Security Council would not have 
occurred after U.S. troops were already on the ground, and the insurgent groups engaged in 
armed combat would have been targeted for DDR. Instead, the armed urban gangs, which were 
concentrated in poor urban areas historically associated with the overthrown president’s political 
movement, were targeted. Cantonment was not offered (or perhaps even suggested) because it 
was not necessary. In March 2004, the armed urban gangs were living at home in their 
communities doing what they had always done. They were not part of a large, organized effort to 
overthrown democracy. Nor were they engaged in organized combat. 
Later, when armed urban gangs did engage in what may be considered combat, some 
DDR projects were funded which included short-term cantonment. The two programs examined 
during a desk review completed as a part of the background research for this study targeted 
children under 18 (whom the project proposals referred to as child soldiers but who likely never 
engaged in any form of combat given the nature and structure of armed gangs in Haiti’s urban 
areas).  
Cantonment may have been particularly useful if DDR efforts had initially targeted those 
insurgents who were actually engaged in combat. The Rebel Army and other rural insurgent 
groups which overthrew the government in 2004 were comprised of a mix of older, former 
members of the disbanded Haitian Army (many in their late 30s or 40s) and younger 
disenfranchised rural youth who joined the groups for a mix of personal, political, social, and 
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economic reasons. Cantonment would have been an opportunity to separate impressionable 
youth from older, politically motivated ex-army insurgents, so that these young insurgents could 
have targeted services and the opportunity to make a real choice about whether they wanted to 
continue in the group or leave. It would have also given those with an interest in establishing 
peace a chance to negotiate peace accords with leaders and disgruntled members of the 
disbanded Haitian army.  
Reintegration. The other role of DDR is reintegrating the people who have been 
demobilized into the society and encouraging them to engage in sustainable income generating 
activities, as well as ensuring they acquire civilian status (Ojeleye, 2010). Reintegration is 
normally an economic and social process that is implemented within a given time frame 
(Jackson, 2015). In addition, it normally takes place at the local level and it is a part of general 
development of the country that most of the times require long-term external help (Dunne & 
Wight, 2013). Unlike disarmament and demobilization procedures, which require hard data on 
forces and weapons, reintegration usually requires information on aptitudes, skills, intentions as 
well the expectations of ex-combatants (Ojeleye, 2010). During the reintegration process certain 
aspects, such as the objectives of reintegration which are part of national strategic plan for 
reconstruction, reconciliation and development can also be considered (Jackson, 2015). In 
addition, DDR funders recommend that the priorities, scope, time frame and goals of the 
program for every target group be considered as well as the preliminary needs assessment as a 
baseline for future evaluations of the reintegration process (Lidegran, 2014). Other aspects which 
may need to be considered during this process are the funding mechanisms, mechanisms for 
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coordination, implementation and monitoring of the program, as well as the information and 
technical support that is required in order to ensure that the exercise is successful. 
 Disarmament, demobilization as well as reintegration normally requires a significant 
change in attitude of former combatants and also the civilian population, especially the ones who 
live in areas where the rebels return to (Munive & Jakosben, 2012).  DDR funding organizations 
recommend that priority be given at all levels of planning and in particular the implementation 
process to public dimension (Baas, 2012). Moreover, local and national inputs are also very 
important in this process.   
 The other factor that needs to be considered in the reintegration process is the inclusion 
of specific provisions that deal with child soldiers (Roach, 2013).  Donors, peace negotiators as 
well as child advocates should agree as early as possible the help or assistance that is appropriate 
for child soldiers who were engaged in the war. It is also necessary to agree on the form and how 
long the assistance should be provided (Dupuy & Peters, 2010).  There is need for the policies as 
well as strategies which address the conditions of demobilized child soldiers be developed and 
implemented according to the assessment of impacts of the conflicts on these children and their 
families. In DDR programming, there is need for standardized and transparent procedures be 
performed in order to identify the combatants who fail to meet the criteria of age limit and length 
of service. In addition, it will also help to identify the ex-combatants with special needs and who 
deserve special attentions such as the people with disability or child soldiers (Baas, 2012; 
Brincat, Lima & Nunes, 2012; Veale & Stavrou, 2007).   
The reintegration process should promote the best interest of the child soldiers. 
Programming should not only enhance their self-esteem but should also promote integrity in 
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order to enable them participate actively in the lives of the families and communities from which 
they come. The activities that will be allocated to these children should also be based on their age 
as well as developmental stage (Baas, 2012). In addition, the special needs of the children with 
special needs should be considered in order to avoid leaving them out of DDR program or 
marginalizing them.  Reintegration program can only be effective if it is developed through 
confidence and trust. Furthermore, there is need for adequate and sustained commitments of both 
time and resources as well as close and continued cooperation of all the stakeholders (Lidegran, 
2014). 
Reintegration in Haiti. Under the IMFs there was no effort at any aspect of DDR 
including reintegration. From the creation of MINUSTAH in 2004 through 2007, reintegration 
efforts were coordinated at the national level by a committee and were administered from a 
centralized DDR office. Beginning in 2007 the national DDR committee was disbanded and its 
work was absorbed into the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio and UN related DDR efforts were officially 
coordinated by the newly created Community Violence Reduction (CVR) office located at Camp 
Charlie on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. CVR is officially part of the DPKO.  
Reintegration efforts have been funded by a variety of sources including the DPKO, the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other national foreign aid 
bodies, the UNDP, other international and regional organizations, NGOs, and a variety of 
charities and religious organizations. Typically funding agencies have supported DDR programs 
by issuing a Request for Proposals (RFPs), selecting projects in line with the DDR goals from 
among those responding, and funding the implementing partner (IP) agency or organization. This 
process all takes place within 12 months, so projects are often funded for as little as six months 
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at a time, with most receiving funding within a few months of the start of the funding cycle and 
offering about nine months of continuously funded services. This haphazard and uncoordinated 
process to creating and offering reintegration services has led to serious gaps in the availability 
of needed services with some communities and hundreds (if not thousands) of eligible ex-
combatants being excluded from the DDR process. 
Conditions Associated with DDR Success.  The literature identifies several 
preconditions associated with increased DDR success. On the macro and mezzo levels, success is 
associated with the establishment of domestic security early in the process. The environment 
must have a minimum level of security before conflicting parties are willing to give up their 
weapons (Rotberg, 2010). Increased security also gives DDR institutions a chance to operate 
effectively without being disrupted by violence. Normally, third parties such as the African 
Union (AU) or United Nations (UN) play a crucial role, through peacekeeping missions, in 
ensuring that there is compliance with a ceasefire and respect for public order (UN DPKO, 
2010). Clearly, the presence of peacekeeping forces is not expected to end all violence and 
hostility; however, these forces become a credible deterrent to unilateral agreement violations 
that would jeopardize an entire DDR program (Diehl, 2013). 
The inclusion of both or all sides of the conflict is also associated in establishing a safe 
post-conflict environment. This implies that all the parties need to be included in a DDR program 
and all parties must also disarm at the same time. Failure to include all relevant actors facilitates 
the resumption of fighting, perhaps giving the side which has not yet fully disarmed an 
advantage over the already-disarmed actors (Rudolph & Lahneman, 2013). This is a classic 
example of how a commitment problem can undermine reaching a mutually-preferred settlement 
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in a conflictual bargaining situation. Actors have uncertainty about the future intentions and 
actions of the other party, and fear that the agreement will be broken if the other party has an 
opportunity (Walter, 1997). Thus, leaving one or more actor, even a seemingly insignificant one, 
on the sidelines can derail the peacemaking process by encouraging spoilers to a peace deal 
(Newman & Richman, 2006). 
Relatedly, some researchers argue that is very important that the parties involved develop 
a degree of ownership of the DDR process (Humphrys & Weinstein, 2005). This reduces the 
possibility that group members and leaders believe one actor or several actors are favored in the 
process. Rather, it should be clear to all the parties involved that each group or side is being 
treated the same way, hence giving them the same kinds of opportunities to reintegrate with the 
society. The institutions which implement DDR processes can facilitate cooperation by 
communicating with all actors at both the political and the military commander level (Von, 
2011). Peacekeepers and other external observers, must be perceived as neutral, credible, and 
impartial by all the sides so they can be useful in expediting the process in a way in which all 
sides can take ownership  
A commitment to Security Sector Reform is also associated with DDR success on the 
macro-level. Both the conditions of inclusion and security reform need to be integrated into the 
political agreement in order to end hostilities during the DDR process (Muggah, 2008). Over the 
past 15 years, DDR programs have not always been successful at driving the peace process 
(McMullin, 2012). To be successful, DDR should be implemented in conjunction with a 
ceasefire and either a negotiated settlement or peace agreement. It is very clear that DDR 
reinforces an agreement by ensuring that it guarantees security and confidence building 
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measures. The DDR process cannot precede a political agreement. Normally, shared political 
will, reconciliation, and a policy of amnesty tend to create optimal conditions for DDR program 
implementation (Betts, Loescher and Milner, 2013). Some of the specific issues that need to be 
directly addressed through the peace process and through the integration of the political 
agreement include: clear criteria for program participation, establishment of a credible DDR 
implementing institution, the definition of the realistic goals, and an implementation framework.  
DDR programs that are multi-dimensional and address the needs of the entire community 
have a greater chance at success. This is because by taking a comprehensive approach, less 
jealousy is fostered between participants and members of the community. (Banholzer, 2014) 
Programmatically, in cases where DDR involves a large number of soldiers, complex processes 
are required to ensure coordination among different actors. Successful comprehensive 
approaches embed DDR within the process of peacekeeping, development and recovery. This 
can be done by integrating the efforts of national actors, international military forces, the police, 
government institutions and key civilian actors (Shibuya, 2012).  
Successful DDR, thus, requires the integration and coordination of services, agreement 
on programmatic goals and policies, and an agreed upon theory of how change will occur 
(Fusato, 2003). In addition, links should be made with related programs including any SSR, rule 
of law efforts, or community development efforts happening in communities where demobilized 
individuals are being reintegrated (Verkoren, Willems, Kleingeld & Rouw, 2010). DDR 
programs are not likely to succeed without careful coordination at both national and local levels 
(Willemijn, et al, 2010). 
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Failing to accomplish all three of the steps in DDR can have dire consequences for a 
community’s recovery. For example, disarmament alone populates a community with socially 
stigmatized individuals who may still with to pursue organized violence.  (Diehl, 2013) 
Alternatively, implementing planned social and economic reintegration but failing to disarm, 
may result in short lived peace, since small skirmishes may escalate quickly if many people are 
armed (Jackson, 2015).  
History of DDR. 
DDR programs have become a popular approach to addressing intra-state conflict, 
especially in the case of civil war.  The need for a unified approach to internal conflict was 
evident in the late 1980s as states in both Africa and Central America experienced internal 
conflicts. The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), operating in 
Nicaragua, was the first peacekeeping mission whose mandate included the DDR process in 
1990. (UN DPKO, 2010)  DDR quickly became a fixture in peacekeeping. Although a number of 
regional and international organizations have operated DDR programs, the United Nations 
continues to coordinate and fund most DDR operations around the world. In 2007, the Office of 
Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) was established in the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) located in New York. This office was charged 
with strengthening and coordinating DPKO’s activities in the areas of SSR, mine action, and 
DDR. The Office is headed by Assistant Secretary-General Dmitry Titov who reports to the 
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous. 
Approaches to DDR following the cessation of violent conflict have become diverse. In 
the case of Mozambique, for example, when the two conflicting parties decided to reconcile in 
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1992, the DDR program took effect and a small new national army consisting of volunteers from 
both parties was established. In Uganda, the armed conflict had dissipated several years before 
DDR programs were initiated. A large number of soldiers of the previous regime in Uganda were 
absorbed in the National Resistance Army that had newly been formed. (Ojeleye, 2010) 
 In 2006, the UN adopted a rights-based approach to DDR as part of the larger liberal 
peace building agenda. This rights-based approach is intended to address problems of the armed 
groups and their participation in the social rebuilding of war torn areas. It also calls for the 
release of children from armed groups, regardless of the situation and time (Civic and Miklaucic, 
2011). One of the most significant changes to DDR was the shift towards a human rights-based 
approach. The Brahimi report viewed the human rights as being very critical to effective peace 
building. So, expectations were emerging in 2006 around rights-based development in the UN 
system (Peou, 2010). DDR programs were modified to address the seeming incompatibility of 
DDR and the human rights agenda. The DDR programs began to emphasize not only security 
and restoration of order, but also concern for victims of the conflict and support for 
accountability (United Nations, 2010). The justice versus peace dichotomy was, thus, partially 
reconciled by incorporating concern for human rights into the agenda.  
 In the mid-90s a holistic approach to DDR was developed. This approach encapsulated 
mid- and long-term planning as well as concern for the effective transition of the ex-combatants. 
Since DDR projects happen as part of a fixed UN or organizational mandate, planning for the 
future is difficult. Thus, DDR can be viewed as part of the peacekeeping system, which exists in 
the larger system of UN-based economic development. Normally, DDR emerges as a solution it 
the context of a peacekeeping system and it has the capacity to try and provide both negative and 
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positive feedback into the system. Positive feedback results from building confidence between 
the parties, and addressing their interests.  
Currently, most practitioners and donors have viewed the DDR programs as a short term 
technical exercise typified by counting weapons, handing out packages of reinsertions as well as 
establishing the demobilization camps (United Nations, 2010). The emphasis of DDR programs 
has been to prevent individuals or ex-combatants from being spoilers of peace. However, a 
shortcoming is that DDR programs often lack the resources to pay attention to community needs 
in locations where the ex-combatants are being reinserted.  
Peacekeeping Process and its Relation to DDR 
DDR is a formal part of the peace-building process in the countries that have experienced 
armed internal conflicts. The armed combatants as well as both state and non-state armed forces 
can help establish a climate of security and confidence, which is crucial for the start of process 
(McMullin, 2012). The DDR process is highly structured and works towards the goal of ending 
hostilities and enhancing any comprehensive peace agreement reached by the parties. In many 
cases, the parties who accept a ceasefire and start peace agreement negotiations face two 
challenges: they do not trust each other, and they do not have the capacity to implement a DDR 
program (Baas, 2012). Thus, a third party, like the UN, is needed to interject and broker a peace 
agreement. Furthermore, assistance from the third party is needed for the planning and 
implementation of the peace-building process. DDR is an initial step in a series of peace-building 
measures. DDR normally focuses on immediate management of the people who previously 
associated with armed groups or forces; lay the framework for sustaining and safeguarding the 
community where these individuals will live as law-abiding citizens and build national capacity 
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for long –term security, peace and development (McMullin, 2012). Even though DDR does not 
usually fully resolve conflicts, it can help in establishing a secure environment where other 
peace-building strategies such as security sector reform or weapon management be implemented 
(Levely, 2014).  
Theoretical assumptions on which DDR is based. 
A review of the research literature identifies six assumptions which underlie DDR:  
1. Ex-combatants will cause future conflict in the absence of an intervention that 
satisfies their interests. (Mcmullin, 2012) 
2. Ex-combatants will want to continue sustaining the legacy of war if they continue 
interacting with their colleagues (Mcmullin, 2012; Planta & Dudouet, 2015). 
3. If ex-combatants are unemployed, they will revert to violence. (Annan & Aryemo, 
2009; Munive & Jakosben, 2012; Wilén, 2012) 
4. Ex-combatants do and will commit crimes (Baas, 2012; Ojeleye, 2010) 
5. The community deserves to benefit from DDR. (Baas, 2012; Levely, 2014) 
6. Community-based approaches are superior for the reintegration phase of DDR. 
(Civic & Miklaucic, 2011; Mcmullin, 2012) 
Each of these assumptions shape the decision making process at all stages of DDR. The basis in 
reality for these assumptions and the implications of each should be examined.  
The first assumption holds that ex-combatants are likely to return to war if they are 
dissatisfied or are not offered alternate opportunities (McMullin, 2012). In the absence of 
intervention, ex-combatants may engage in criminal activities in order to earn a living and this 
can cause political conflict and instability (Munive & Jakosben, 2012). Thus, offering ex-
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combatants employment opportunities may help them to cut ties with other ex-combatants. 
Furthermore, the ex-combatants can protest violently if they do not have the means to support 
their livelihoods (Annan & Aryemo, 2009). Although policymakers and academics perceive war 
to be a complex phenomenon that normally results from both deep-rooted and proximate causes, 
the DDR process tends emphasize the potential resurgence of conflict from ex-combatants as a 
major potential cause of war (Brincat, Lima & Nunes, 2012). Thus, ex-combatants are 
disproportionately perceived as destabilizing citizens with the potential to opportunistically 
undermine the peace. 
The second assumption on which DDR is based is that ex-combatants can continue 
sustaining the legacy of civil war if they continue interacting with each other (McMullin, 2012; 
Planta & Dudouet, 2015). There is the fear that the young combatants can be forced by their 
former commanders either to work for them or pay bribes. Furthermore, the group of ex-
combatants can intimidate the local community in order to make them consolidate the 
commanders’ political and economic status after the war is over (Wilén, 2012). There is a 
possibility that the ex-combatants’ chain of command will remain intact even after the war is 
over. The commanders can maintain contact with their former subordinates along political, 
personal, and economic lines (Brincat, Lima & Nunes, 2012).  Additionally, even if the ex-
combatants’ associations are non-violent, such as engagement in collective economic ventures or 
social interaction, they are still considered as threatening to the peace process. This is because 
such associations are considered to be sufficient evidence of residual chains of command 
continuing to exist post-conflict (Lidegran, 2014). The ex-combatants are considered to be the 
source of instability in some cases even if they are engaged in conflict management and 
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resolution (Levely, 2014). In situations where the ex-combatants are incorporated into civil 
society groups, these groups are also considered as a threat.  It is argued that any group which 
includes ex-combatants as their members can cause future threats. 
Third, the unemployment of the ex-combatants is assumed to be a threat because they are 
likely to revert to criminal activity (McMullin, 2012). The ex-combatants are presumed to be 
volatile, unless they are proven otherwise over time. The ex-combatants that lack employment 
opportunities after being reintegrated into the community are assumed to be likely to cause 
another civil conflict, hold protests against the government and continue maintaining ties with 
their former colleagues. Unemployment and idleness of working-aged populations are 
considered major factors behind the occurrence of civil war (Ojeleye, 2010; Wilén, 2012). In 
some instances, employment can also be considered a security threat (Wilén, 2012). The ex-
combatants who are employed can engage in massive protests in order to present issues or 
grievances that relate to working conditions (Jackson, 2015). 
The fourth assumption behind DDR is that ex-combatants are perpetrators of crime 
(Baas, 2012). Society perceives these people as perpetrators and a burden on the community 
instead of an asset. The community is likely to resent these people because they are a perceived 
or real cause of past conflict and are receiving benefits over others in society. To others in 
society this may seem like a reward for bad behavior (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011). Societies are 
destabilized by the fact that unemployed youths can easily be absorbed into the violence either as 
participants in rebel militias, urban gangs, or illicit business dealings, even if they have never 
been involved in the civil war in their lives.  
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Fifth is the assumption that the community deserves to benefit from post-conflict 
reconstruction. This means that ex-offenders should not be the only parties to benefit, but rather, 
the community is entitled to some of the benefits of DDR as well. According to Baas (2012), 
offering too much assistance to one group is considered to be unfair and can fuel tension. The 
costs incurred by communities include the loss of lives, destruction of property, and loss 
associated with forced evacuation. These costs are pervasive and it is therefore fair to prioritize 
the community as a whole over any particular group (Levely, 2014). Including the community in 
the DDR process may lessen feelings of resentment harbored by its members.  
The last assumption is that community-based approaches are superior to others for the 
reintegration phase of DDR (Munive & Jakosben, 2012; McMullin, 2012). From a social justice 
standpoint, communities are entitled to participation because they should be empowered to move 
beyond past trauma and to set the agenda for themselves.  However, not only is it fair to include 
the community, it is also more efficient and more likely to be effective in the long run 
The implementation of programs that do not target or involve the community are unlikely 
to yield the intended results (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011). Furthermore, non-community based 
programs are more likely to fail, since the support of the community is paramount for long-term 
success (Baas, 2012; Ojeleye, 2010). So, there are several advantages that are characterized by 
adoption of community-based approaches during the reintegration process. These advantages 
include, the reduction of costs associated with project implementation and, that it makes it easier 
to force ex-combatants stop identifying themselves as special groups, since the community 
knows the history of each person. Thus, the design of DDR projects should focus on 
reconciliation between community members and the ex-combatants (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011; 
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Levely, 2014). So, while providing employment opportunities is important (as discussed above), 
it is equally important to focus on the interests of the communities into which they will be 
reintegrated (Baas, 2012).  
 Current context of DDR. The demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process 
have become integral to peacekeeping operations as well as post-conflict reconstruction. The 
long-term peace building prospects in any society often hinges on the success or failure of a 
DDR program (Fineman & Thomason, 2013). However, despite the increased experience with 
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration over the years, program implementation still 
remains a challenge.   
This has, therefore, led to initiatives on effective implementation. The United Nations has 
developed an integrated set of DDR standards. One of DDR’s key mechanisms for demilitarizing 
both the official and unofficial armed groups is through the reduction of arms possession and use 
(Bryden, et al., 2012). This is achieved through ensuring sufficient state security services, 
disbanding the non-state armed groups, and trying to assist ex-combatants as they re-enter 
civilian life. (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations) The DDR process creates 
an environment where there will be an overall process of peace and a long term development 
through political, social reconciliation and economic and social rehabilitation. This is achieved 
through a myriad of strategies. For instance, states provide mechanisms that will help disarm ex-
combatants. The rebel groups must be provided with opportunities to lay down their weapons 
without creating a perception that they are surrendering. This will enable the state to move 
forward with peace building and to return to status quo political operations by having elections 
and providing social services. (Lebow, 2014). 
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 However, while DDR is an imperative part of the peace process, it only has the capacity 
to influence a narrow range of security and political objectives. In addition, DDR tends to be 
limited in duration. It is, therefore, important to limit expectations about the potential outcomes 
of DDR. For instance, DDR may lack the capacity to overcome major obstacles, such as the 
parties having inadequate will to participate in the process (Curtis and Dzinesa, 2012; Levely, 
2014). Though the process of DDR can be helpful in mitigating conflict; it cannot unilaterally 
prevent conflict from recurring. Similarly, DDR can only have a limited impact on economic 
development and long-term outcomes. So, DDR should be coupled with programs that have 
long-term goals, such as a small arms nonproliferation program. 
 DDR programs have broadening mandates that move beyond promoting stability and are 
beginning to address political mechanisms for consolidating peace. DDR must, therefore, be 
tailored to local political contexts since there is variety in post-conflict political conditions 
(Cohn, 2013). The state guides the development of a comprehensive DDR framework that 
ensures the enhancement of security, economic recovery, and peace consolidation. Having the 
state involved helps make the goals and assessments of DDR more realistic and provides 
opportunities for early implementation. Usually, the state helps clearly define appropriate target 
groups, eligibility criteria, and types of benefits that are being offered (United Nations, 2010).  
 In the current context, DDR programs have been used in both short-term and long-term 
capacities. The short-term priority is to restore stability and security which is achieved through 
disarming the warring parties. The demobilization of armed groups, on the other hand, tends to 
happen over the long-term. Though a short-term DDR program can initiate the process of 
demobilization, it is likely to require protracted political effort to fully execute.  
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It is important to be mindful of the limitations of DDR. DDR programs have the long-
term goals of ensuring sustained economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants into a 
peaceful society. DDR programs, however, are not comprehensive development projects and 
often fall short of this goal. Normally, DDR imposes temporary measures to facilitate a transition 
from war to peace. For a DDR program to be successful in the long run, it needs to be integrated 
as well as be supported by post-conflict reconstruction and economic interventions. 
 DDR program targets. DDR processes are usually planned and implemented in 
conjunction with stakeholders in the conflict and external actors. For instance, in South Sudan, 
the most crucial stakeholders in the DDR program are government ministries and commissions, 
armed factions, international organizations including United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), funding partners, and national civil 
organizations.  
Successful DDR programs recognize that not all the ex-combatants usually have the same 
needs. Effective programs are flexible; they also tend to adapt interventions to specific needs of 
different target groups. Programs try to balance the needs of the larger community and those of 
the ex-combatants. They carefully approach the process of resettlement, since providing ex-
soldiers with assistance is likely to foster resentment in the community (Von, 2011). Effective 
DDR also tries to provide specific programs aiming at the most vulnerable groups within the 
category of ex-combatant, including child soldiers and women as well.  
 The practice of using child soldiers tends to be more pervasive in poor countries. 
Children are likely to enroll in the armed groups that are engaged in internal conflict. In most 
cases, child soldiers are neglected. DDR programs must, therefore, take their special 
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vulnerability into account. The child soldiers are the most difficult ex-combatant group to 
reintegrate in the society. From past DDR programs and experience, it has been suggested that 
child soldiers ought to receive services separately from other ex-combatants. This allows for 
safeguards against abuse from military authorities (Martz, 2010). This also increases the chance 
that they are easily and quickly demobilized and reintegrated. DDR programs also tends to offer 
long term psychological support to these children. This normally helps them in recovering from 
negative war experiences and reduces their propensity for aggressive behaviors (Scheffer, 2012). 
 DDR programs have not yet adapted to adequately meet the needs of women. Families of 
the female ex-combatants as well as abducted women tend not to be reached by DDR programs 
(Wilén, 2012). Female combatants can easily be discriminated against, especially by their male 
counterparts. This is even most likely to happen when they lack an official rank and are relying 
on men to confirm their status and grade. Many of the women that are abducted by groups of 
combatants during war are used for sexual services. These women are likely to be left out of the 
DDR process since they are not technically ex- combatants. Their families also in most cases 
were directly involved in the conflict, so addressing the post-conflict needs of their female 
family members is difficult. Thus, the needs of female ex-combatants and abductees should be 
addressed by DDR programs (Bouta, 2005; Otega, 2010; Wilén, 2012). 
DDR in Haiti 
A History of Instability. Haiti has been characterized by outsiders as a fragile, failing, or 
failed state since at least the 1980s. It has experienced considerable political volatility over the 
past two centuries, with more than 30 coups since independence in 1804 and no fewer than nine 
UN missions since 1990. While geopolitical interference in Haiti has played a significant role, 
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particularly since the 1990s, certain analysts point to the country’s extreme concentration of 
authority and wealth in the hands of the elite—elected and otherwise—as a source of persistent 
instability (Muggah, 2008; Maguire, 2009). 
For some of Haiti’s diaspora and certain foreign governments, the heavy-handed 
dictatorships and associated paramilitary rule from the 1950s to the 1980s afforded a degree of 
stability. Yet, from the perspective of the vast majority of Haitians, especially those eking out an 
existence in the country’s popular zones (shantytowns) in and around Port-au-Prince and other 
major cities, the Duvaliers—father and son—terrorized the population into submission. They did 
this both through the arming of the so-called Tonton Macoute militia and by empowering Haiti’s 
police force, then part of the Haitian armed forces, to use indiscriminate killings, torture, and 
arbitrary detention to enforce their power.(Lundahl,1989) 
In the latter half of the 1980s, the country experienced a rocky transition to democracy 
during which President Jean-Bertrand Aristide became the country’s first democratically elected 
leader in 1991. In addition to promoting political participation by the impoverished majority of 
the population—a first in the country’s history, which won him supporters and critics both in 
Haiti and abroad—Aristide demobilized the Haitian armed forces by presidential decree in 1994 
and created the country’s first civilian national police force, the Haitian National Police (HNP). 
Haitians were initially hopeful that this new body, the HNP, would effectively control 
crime and increase safety, especially in the larger cities. During the 1990s, property crime and 
violence were widespread, in sharp contrast to Haiti’s historically low crime rates. Business 
owners and the wealthy relied on privately hired armed guards—who were frequently implicated 
in vigilante-style violence—to provide basic security. Despite considerable investments in 
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capacity development and training of the nascent force, the HNP was unable to address 
community-level criminal violence adequately during its early years (Hayes and Wheatley, 
1996). 
Insurgent Activity. The political and economic situation in Haiti began to deteriorate 
dramatically during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Growing instability tested the HNP’s ability 
to fight criminal violence and respond to organized armed violence committed by insurgent 
groups. Trafficking in persons, weapons, and drugs, reportedly connected to Haiti’s business 
elite, and continued unabated, bringing financial support to the few while generating political 
unrest. As tensions mounted between the Haitian government and certain members of the 
international donor community, such as the United States and France, former members of the 
disbanded Haitian armed forces created the ‘rebel army’, also known as the National 
Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti (Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction 
Nationales). The rebel army was Haiti’s largest insurgent group; it was composed of paramilitary 
thugs active during the 1991–94 military coup. It was most active beginning in 2001 through 
demobilization (2005-2007) and it continues to exist is a modified form in some parts of rural 
Haiti today. With foreign backing and support from the national elite, as well as supporters in 
key positions within the HNP itself, the rebel army proved to be a surprisingly resilient 
opponent. Heavily armed with assault rifles and a firm supply network, the force began 
launching quiet but efficient attacks against border towns and urban centers between 2000 and 
2004, with the goal of overthrowing the elected Haitian government. HNP officers struggled to 
respond. International and US-led restrictions against arms sales to the government since the 
early 1990s had never been fully lifted, effectively prohibiting the HNP from legally purchasing 
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weapons. HNP officers who remained committed to upholding the rule of law had few arms and 
little chance of surviving direct armed conflict with the rebel army. 
By 2004, following successful insurgent attacks by the rebel army and allied insurgent 
groups in the towns of St. Marc and Gonaïves, the HNP was overcome and scattered. The 
insurgents rapidly advanced on the capital. With Aristide removed from power by foreign 
diplomats and with US marines occupying the National Palace, the insurgents were free to take 
the capital. Indeed, one of the insurgents’ first actions after entering Port-au-Prince was to march 
two blocks past the National Palace to the National Penitentiary, where they freed hundreds of 
convicts. 
International Intervention in the Interim Haitian Government Period. Despite the 
circumstances surrounding the interim government’s establishment, the international community 
stepped in to support it with a stated goal of reshaping the fragile security sector. Much like the 
US-led de-Baathization process in Iraq, the HNP was purged of 60 per cent of its officers, many 
of whom fled to other areas of the country or to the Dominican Republic, fearing that remnants 
of the rebel army might exact revenge. Some 540 members of the rebel army, many of whom 
had been soldiers in Haiti’s long demobilized armed forces, were integrated into the ‘new’ HNP 
during demobilization. Few of them, if any, were required to undergo the formal training and 
graduation from the police academy required of new recruits (Hallward, 2010, p. 128; ICG, 
2005; Mendelson-Forman, 2006). 
At the request of the new interim government, the United Nations Security Council 
established the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in June 2004.  Led by Brazil, 
Canada, the European Union, and the United States and involving more than 40 countries, the 
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large-scale deployment of international peacekeepers and police support marked an important 
turning point. With nearly 9,000 blue helmets and 3,000 international police deployed, the 
mission focused on ensuring stability by enhancing HNP capacities, extending the rule of law 
through improved delivery of justice services, and rebuilding the country’s dilapidated judicial 
system (Muggah, 2010).  
Though initially formed to uphold a coup government widely viewed by Haitians as 
illegitimate and repressive, MINUSTAH was successful in establishing strong support among 
both Haitian policy-makers and segments of the general population. Thus, MINUSTAH was able 
to maintain its presence even after the transition to a democratically elected president was made 
in late 2006. Many international organizations and institutions—from the UN to the Organization 
of American States and the International Organisation of La Francophonie—devoted 
considerable energy to the reform and strengthening of Haiti’s security and judicial system, an 
important step related to Haiti’s DDR process. Support ranged from financial assistance to the 
provision of technical expertise in policing, investigation, customs, and corrections reform.  
Security Sector Reform. Donor-supported efforts to promote judicial reform since the 
mid-1990s have included the restructuring and revision of judicial procedures, legal codes, and 
protocols. Since 1998, efforts to codify and implement improved criminal and corrections laws 
have yielded few returns. The most significant development in reforming the judicial sector 
during the past decade was arguably the passage of laws by Parliament in 2007 to create the 
Superior Judicial Council, mandated to devise rules for the training, recruiting, and disciplining 
of magistrates and the regulation of Haiti’s magistrates school. In 2007, the Ministry of Justice 
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and Public Security published a ‘roadmap’ identifying a range of key priorities to enhance the 
quality and quantity of justice, and, in particular, service delivery (UNDP, 2009).  
To enhance implementation and improve access to justice for the population, an approach 
to justice reform emerged, focusing on simultaneous reforms across the judicial, policing, and 
corrections sectors and linking these to enhanced accountability. For example, a Citizen’s Forum 
(Comité Coordonnateur du Forum Citoyen) was created both to enhance citizen engagement and 
to monitor government transparency. Nevertheless, the country continued to feature outdated and 
disregarded laws, weak human resources, and practically non-existent infrastructure to manage 
cases. Citizens continued to turn to insurgent groups to provide both policing and to resolve 
problems normally handle by the courts including business disputes and the investigation and 
punishment of crimes. 
Challenges to Policing. Many international organizations have been involved in 
reforming Haiti’s security and judicial system.  Over the past two decades, a major obstacle to 
high-quality judicial, police, and corrections service delivery was their illegitimacy in the eyes of 
Haitian civilians. This was particularly true during the years when unelected governments were 
in power. For instance, during the military dictatorship (1991–94), police officers were 
frequently implicated in the illegal arrest and torture of ordinary citizens (O’Neill, 1995). This 
changed from October 1994 to February 2004, as the country was in a period of struggling 
democratic governance, and state leaders rejected the use of the police force to exert political 
control. However, the post-coup interim government of President Boniface Alexandre and Prime 
Minister Gérard Latortue (2004–06) flirted with using the police as a tool to suppress popular 
dissent and punish political opponents (Dupuy, 2005). 
  
 
94 
As a result of the HNP’s inefficiency and susceptibility to corruption, but also, in many 
cases, officer involvement in a wide range of human rights violations during the 2004 coup and 
its two-year aftermath, both international donors and local populations lost faith in the police 
force’s capacity and willingness to deliver services. It was challenging to convince citizens to 
support disarmament when the police were unable to provide the security they were given by 
insurgent groups and private militatias. To bridge this legitimacy gap, donors invested heavily in 
police reform, recruitment, and human rights training, as well as community policing from 2004 
onwards (CIGI, 2009).  
The HNP from 2004-2009. Although the 1987 Haitian Constitution sets out the terms for 
a national police force—including provisions for its composition and purpose—the official HNP 
force was not established until the mid-1990s. Formally launched by President Aristide in 1995, 
the HNP was intended to serve as the exclusive armed entity responsible for maintaining law and 
order and protecting the life and property of citizens. Following the dissolution of the armed 
forces (the Forces Armées d’Haïti) in 1994, the HNP enjoyed wide jurisdiction. Haitians initially 
greeted the formation of the HNP with considerable enthusiasm. Despite investment from the 
United States and Canada and two UN missions (MIPONUH I and II), however, popular support 
for the police began to erode between 1996 and 2003 (Muggah, 2005). 
Administratively, the HNP is overseen by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. 
Similarly, the Prisons Administration Directorate and the emergency fire brigade (sapeurs 
pompiers) fall under the jurisdiction of the HNP. According to an internal review led by the 
Haitian authorities, the HNP has faced a host of inadequacies and problems since 1995, including 
limited staff, weak training, unpredictable funding, limited senior personnel, systemic corruption, 
  
 
95 
poor inspection capacities, and a history of violating human rights. To the average Haitian, the 
police were seen as having limited effectiveness at best. Armed groups – including urban gangs – 
were relied on for day-to-day security provision in place of the ineffective police force. 
With assistance from the UN and bilateral donors, the institutional infrastructure of the 
HNP experienced considerable reforms beginning in the mid-1990s. By 2009, there were more 
than 236 HNP facilities throughout the country. Yet an estimated 39 of these—including seven 
precincts and 32 sub-precincts—were still considered non-operational prior to the January 2010 
earthquake. Moreover, the overall size and configuration of the country’s motor fleet was 
limited—with an estimated 600 vehicles of varying make and quality—resulting in major 
maintenance challenges. The HNP was physically unable to reach some areas of the country 
which were controlled by rebel groups, other than by traveling on foot. 
Some international organizations credit MINUSTAH with having improved security 
across Haiti, particularly between 2007 and 2009 (Muggah, 2010). However, human rights 
groups and researchers also heavily criticized MINUSTAH’s early tactics, particularly its 
repressive handling of gangs (Hallward, 2010; Kolbe & Hutson, 2006). Specifically, between 
2004 and 2006, heavy-handed interventions pursued by the HNP with support from MINUSTAH 
were designed specifically to arrest and neutralize armed elements which had been excluded 
from the DDR process. In some cases, these activities—described bluntly as ‘disarm or die’ 
campaigns—resulted in the accidental shooting deaths of dozens of citizens, including children.  
Against a backdrop of MINUSTAH-led stabilization efforts, UN civilian agencies were 
busy crafting a reform plan for the HNP with local counterparts in 2006. In view of the 
frequency of natural disasters and the legacy of political unrest in Haiti, donors placed an 
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emphasis on improving HNP capacity to counter floods, fires, and hurricanes throughout the 
country.  By 2009, there was growing confidence among international actors in the potential of 
the HNP to provide security, with the UN Security Council acknowledging key gaps but also 
citing real improvements. 
The HNP since 2010. The impact of the earthquake on the human and physical 
infrastructure of the justice and security sector—and particularly the HNP— was extensive. 
Almost 80 HNP personnel were killed and another 253 injured directly by the earthquake. By 
UN estimates, almost one quarter of Haiti’s police capacity was rendered non-operational. 
MINUSTAH records show that 55 buildings used by the HNP were affected, including some 28 
facilities suffering ‘major damages’, such as collapse, and another 27 experiencing ‘minor 
damages’.  If these structures are added to the 39 facilities that were already non-operational at 
the time of the earthquake, almost 40 per cent of HNP capacities could not be used after the 
January 2010 earthquake. 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the focus of the UN and international 
donor community was on rapidly ensuring the delivery of life-saving supplies, personnel, and 
equipment and restoring police communication, coordination, and response capabilities, 
particularly in anticipation of increased violence by armed gangs and insurgent groups. The rebel 
army experienced a strong comeback, establishing a base just a few miles outside of Port-au-
Prince and holding a publically viewable boot camp for new recruits. By mid-2010 the rebel 
army was holding marches through parts of Port-au-Prince.  
International observers were concerned that damage and displacement generated by the 
earthquake—coupled with the impact of the global fiscal crisis on food prices—could generate a 
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humanitarian disaster and an upswing of crimes against property and violence. In the first six 
months after the natural disaster, fears that escapees from prisons (some of whom were high 
level insurgent leaders) would perpetrate targeted attacks, extortion, and kidnappings were 
commonplace among NGOs and international organizations working in Haiti (Muggah, 2010). 
International aid providers were worried that, if such violence were to occur, it would hamper 
relief efforts in Haiti and exacerbate instability if humanitarian assistance did not successfully 
reach affected populations. In certain cases, US officials turned away flights delivering supplies 
and medical personnel so that planes with US combat troops could land instead.  
Throughout this period, MINUSTAH military and police personnel supported domestic 
efforts alongside US and Canadian troops. Fears of food riots, fleeing prisoners, and growing 
disorder were matched with massive investments in restoring public security. The so-called 
‘security umbrella’ generated by this international presence was credited by some with 
enhancing humanitarian aid distribution, search and rescue operations, and the gradual return of 
national police to challenging areas. Meanwhile, a growing number of large, foreign private 
security companies began to explore opportunities in the country. However, the HNP, which for 
years had recruited politically motivated insurgents into their ranks, continued to struggle to 
replace the armed groups as the country’s main security provider. 
From DDR to CVR. The traditional DDR intervention included in this study were part 
of the larger community violence reduction effort in Haiti. As not all DDR programs targeted 
insurgents and members of armed groups, only participants from identified projects to serve 
members and former members of armed groups or the disbanded Haitian army were included in 
the study. The current focus on DDR in Haiti has evolved to the CVR, or second generation 
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DDR model. DDR in Haiti is operated by MINUSTAH, the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti 
which has been in place since June 2004. The transition from traditional DDR to CVR began in 
2007.  
The MINUSTAH CVR program has accomplished an impressive and diverse array of 
activities since 2007. Many CVR interventions have received internal and external press 
coverage, particularly in wake of the January 2010 earthquake. The scale and breadth of its 
interventions and the flexibility and resourcefulness it displayed in the aftermath of the 
earthquake was impressive and led to increased resources to support to aid the CVR effort. 
Within MINUSTAH, CVR is widely acknowledged as an important contributor to development 
and reconstruction efforts. The program’s tangible contributions to post-earthquake relief 
provide visible evidence of investment; these include, for example, the restoration of transport, 
watershed and canal infrastructure), education and vocational programs, and provision of 
filtration units for improved access to potable water. There are also less visible, but no less 
crucial, outputs from CVR’s efforts in the last five years such as the temporary work 
opportunities for thousands of Haitians, psychological support services for women and children 
surviving sexual and gender-based violence, and events to promote community cohesion and 
solidarity. As an example of an innovative financial disbursement mechanism for rapid support 
to local partners it is without peer in the UN system in Haiti (and possibly globally), particularly 
since 2010. (Molloy, 2010; Muggah, 2010) 
In functional terms, the CVR program operates as a strategic coordinator and funder of a 
portfolio of interventions. The key comparative advantage is the speed with which CVR 
identifies partners and disburses resources. The CVR program thus coordinates selected 
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interventions though actual implementation is undertaken by sub-contracted partners. The CVR 
program is organized thematically around five declared core “pillars” of mandated activities with 
attention to gender equality treated as a transversal or cross-cutting priority.  Organizationally, 
and in theory, the CVR section is staffed by a centralized core of roughly 40 personnel that are 
expected to work closely with communities to accompany projects, solicit partnerships and 
provide direction, and ensure oversight and monitoring of discrete activities.  Since the 2007 
transition from traditional DDR to CVR, the institution has supported more than 500 discrete 
projects throughout the country including in Cap Haïtien, Gonaives, Jacmel and Les Cayes, 
though the vast majority of its operations are in violence-affected neighborhoods of Port-au-
Prince.   
Rather than invest only in traditional, individual level interventions common with the 
DDR programs of the 1980s and 90s, the MINUSTAH CVR program has emphasized a 
community-based approach toward reducing violence in Haiti´s most marginalized urban areas.  
Demobilized individuals from armed groups received the same vocationally focused services 
they did in the past, but the agency also invests a great deal of money and time in efforts to 
improve the neighborhoods where violence most frequently occurs. By improving the 
community to which demobilized men are returning the hope is that individuals will be able to 
integrate into lawful employment and that communities will be addressing neighborhood and 
state level problems such as lack of employment, social marginalization, and political 
disenfranchisement which may have previously prevented demobilized individuals from 
successfully reintegrating. (Muggah, et al., 2009) 
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This focus emerged on the basis of trial and error. CVR antecedents can be traced to an 
earlier ill-fated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) effort and collaboration 
with the Haitian government's National Commission for Disarmament (CNDR and later 
CNDDR) which occurred between 2004 and 2006.  The Haitian government's National 
Commission for Disarmament’s efforts were absorbed into programs operated by a Viva Rio, a 
Brazilian nongovernmental organization which is supported today by CVR. Early efforts were 
viewed as ineffective or exclusionary. Groups from some political parties and movements argued 
that the early DDR efforts extended the discrimination they experienced after the 2004 coup and 
unfairly excluded or targeted particular political organizations. (Hertz, Kolbe, Hutson, Miles & 
Trzcinski, 2010; MINUSTAH, 2005; Mobekk, 2006) 
CVR represents a departure from these earlier efforts in its focus away from what could 
be described as first generation DDR to something approximating stabilization or second 
generation DDR.  And while adapting between 2007 and 2010, CVR purposefully maintained an 
emphasis on the city and neighborhood – or community - scale. After the January 2010 
earthquake, CVR dramatically scaled-up its activities more than fourfold (despite losing some 
personnel in the earthquake) and while continuing to focus on core priorities in affected 
communities, CVR also expanded its portfolio to account for additional short-term (post-quake) 
priorities that were not necessarily oriented-toward violence reduction per se.  
Theory of Change. An underlying assumption guiding CVR activities is that certain 
urban communities of Haiti – and in particular the quartiers défavorisés of Port-au-Prince – 
exhibit a high degree of social disorganization.  Social disorganization theory posits that rapid 
urbanization and urban living can unsettle social ties resulting in communal relationships that are 
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temporary, transitory and instrumental. These newly configured relationships can, it is argued, 
give rise to more violent social interactions. As such, an underlying, if unstated, expectation of 
CVR is that efforts to promote social organization can reduce the incentive of young males from 
joining gangs and stem the onset, duration and intensity of urban violence. In this way, CVR also 
borrows from conventional criminological and sociological approaches to reducing violent 
crime, including so-called broken-window theory.  
In advancing the five pillar approach, the CVR program has adopted a number of 
strategies to strengthen the social organization of violence-affected communities. While not 
explicitly stated as such, CVR has promoted an approach that focuses on minimizing risk factors 
giving rise to violence and promoting protective factors amongst key population groups. Imputed 
risk factors include youth unemployment, limited skills amongst youth, psychological trauma, 
physical and economic vulnerability of women, and weak community institutions. Practically, 
then, CVR has advanced several operational priorities to address these risks and thus strengthen 
the protection of targeted communities. Key areas of intervention include the promotion of 
economic opportunities for youth (18-25), training for youth, physical and psychosocial 
protection for women and girls, psychosocial and medical support, and community outreach.  
It is also worth emphasizing that the CVR program is also intended to strengthen the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of state authorities and MINUSTAH more generally. Specifically, 
CVR was intended to create a positive interaction and engagement between local nodes of 
authority in poorer areas and law enforcement entities (including the Haitian National Police, UN 
peacekeepers and UN police). The CVR approach, then, was intended not just to reduce 
recruitment into gangs and armed groups and mitigate community violence, but also to create a 
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more positive dynamic between citizens and the state. This is not to suggest that CVR was 
intended to serve as a development program. Rather, that CVR was expected to enable more 
positive state-society bargaining so that security and development could proceed.   
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Review 
The questions posed in this dissertation touch on diverse bodies of literature from 
political science, social work, psychology, and the other social sciences. While a complete 
elucidation of each frame of research is beyond the scope of this dissertation, a review and 
synthesis of some of the relevant literature and theoretical work is provided here to contextualize 
the questions being posed, the way in which I am posing them, and the placement of these 
particular research findings within existing social science and social work knowledge. The 
theories reviewed in this chapter are frequently cited in the literature as explanatory when 
exploring the intersections of rehabilitation success with war-time experiences, political 
behaviors, engagement in crime, prosocial behavior, and attitudinal change. They are important 
because theoretical positions, both implicit and explicit, shape the decision to engage in DDR, 
the character of DDR interventions, the services offered, the populations targeted, and the 
assessment of program success. 
I begin with a discussion of trauma. It is impossible to separate out the traumatic 
experiences of engaging in armed conflict from the rehabilitation process. I look at the impact 
that trauma has on perception, beliefs, thinking, and behavior. Then I move to a theoretical 
discussion of criminality and political behavior. I look at two loosely formed bodies of ideas: 
first, the idea people engage in crime and political behaviors because of who they are, and 
second, that people engage in crime and/or political behaviors because of the situation in which 
they find themselves. Embedded in this section is a discussion of sometimes overlapping theories 
and concepts which can be used to explain part, but not all, of the reasons why DDR participants 
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might succeed remaining crime-free during after reintegration. Relatedly I discuss the concepts 
of locus of control and self-efficacy, which may be used to help understand the impact that 
program interventions had on the individual participants.  
The Common Experience of Trauma 
 It would be impossible to review literature related to the success or failure of a DDR 
intervention without discussing trauma. War is traumatic. Whether a person is engaged in 
combat or not, violence scars the psyche. Traumatic experiences reported by study participants 
included not only war-time events but they also included interpersonal relationship conflict, the 
natural and accidental deaths of family members and friends, hospitalizations, street violence, 
illness, vehicle accidents, and more. 
 Trauma influences an individual’s current psychological, social, educational and 
vocational functioning. It also influences how they view their place within the DDR process, 
engagement or lack of engagement in the intervention, their beliefs about change and their own 
efficacy in making personal changes, and their political behavior. To retain participants, DDR 
programs must avoid re-traumatizing victims and must serve as an encouraging space for those 
wanting to move past traumatic experiences. Thus, the task- and skill-focused intervention form 
of the interventions included in this study provide a much needed opportunity for future-oriented 
rehabilitation. 
In this section I review some of the theoretical concepts and how they are tied to trauma 
and political behavior. These theories help us understand the processes that undergird the process 
of identity formation. Ultimately, reviewing this literature helps us understand the mechanisms 
through which DDR programs can shift someone’s outlook on life. Examining the links in the 
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literature between trauma and concepts measured in this study such as locus of control, self-
efficacy, political behavior, and engagement in crime help contextualize some of the analysis 
conducted as part of this study. 
Personality and Trauma. 
The Big Five. One of the most helpful developments in recent years, vis-à-vis the 
relationship between personal experiences (such as trauma) and behavior (political and 
otherwise) is attention to the “Big Five” personality variables. These personality variables 
provide a useful metric for assessing those undergoing personality change and identity formation 
as a result of trauma. Though much of this literature, particularly the early research, focuses 
heavily on workplace applications of this construct there is an emerging attention to applications 
in the realm of political behavior. The big five include: 1) openness to new experiences, 2) 
conscientiousness, 3) extraversion, 4) agreeableness, and 5) emotional stability.  
The Big Five – also known as the Five Factor Model (FFM) – have roots in the research 
of Goldberg (1990; 1993) and McCrae and Costa (2003; 2008). The FFM has been particularly 
useful in identifying common patterns in human behavior including reactions to significant 
events in ones’ life and subsequent behaviors. And, rather than focusing exclusively on 
tolerance, ideological beliefs, or authoritarianism, the Big Five takes a holistic approach, 
recognizing that a person’s personality – that which makes them unique – is shaped by (at least) 
all five factors and that all are important for understanding and predicting political behavior, 
predispositions, political attitudes, and participation.  (Gerber, A, Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; 
Mondak, 2010)  
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Control & Perceived Control. 
Locus of Control. Locus of Control, the sense that one is able to influence outcomes in 
their own personal life – was introduced by Rotter in the mid-1960s as a personality variable. It 
has since been used extensively to explain a host of phenomenon, including both post-traumatic 
growth and active political behaviors.  The LOC construct views the traumatized individual as 
falling on a scale from internally to externally controlled (so, from feeling that one has total 
control over their life and what happens to them to the other extreme of thinking that everything 
is determined by God or fate and that they have little influence personally on the events in their 
life). (Bandura, 1982; 1989; 1990)  
Self-efficacy as a cognitive aspect of perceived control. Closely related to the Locus of 
Control construct is the idea of self-efficacy which Bandura (1982; 1990) identified as one of the 
cognitive aspects of perceived control by an individual over their circumstances and events in 
their life. While having an internal locus of control may make people more likely to take an 
active role in their recovery from PTSD or to engage in political action, simply perceiving the 
source of control as internal may not be enough on its own to spur actions. Bandura argued that a 
person also needs to have a sense that their actions will be successful and to have confidence in 
their ability to act.  (Bandura, 1990) 
A person’s sense of their self-efficacy influences behavior through four processes: 
cognitive, motivational, affective, and selection processes. The end result of these processes are 
individual beliefs that a person develops about the own competencies, the probability of their 
success, their sense of their own importance in the political process (or the process of recovering 
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from trauma) and the like.  The beliefs the individual adopts in turn influences their levels of 
motivation, choice of behaviors and their actual efficacy at regulating themselves and their 
environment as they engage in personal or social change. Self-efficacy can work to determine 
what activities people engage in, how much effort they put forward to try to achieve their goals, 
and how long they continue to persevere in when faced with adversity (Bandura, 1982). 
Like Bandura, psychologists Solomon and Mikulincer (1988) used Rotter’s 
conceptualization as LOC to determine that not only was external control associated with 
increased post-traumatic symptomology, but also that internal LOC was associated with the 
identification, seeking out of, and use of supportive resources post-trauma (something that we 
usually associate with higher self-efficacy).  Other studies have similar findings. (Bleich, 
Gelkopf, & Solomon, 2003; Brown, 2002; Cukor, Spitalnick, Difede, Rizzo, & Rothbaum, 2009; 
Kleiber, Veldman, & Menaker, 1973; Mikulincer & Solomon, 1988; Mikulincer, Solomon, & 
Benbenishty, 1988; Solomon, Benbenishty, & Mikulincer, 1988; Solomon, Mikulincer, & 
Avitzur, 1988; Solomon, Schwarzwald, Weisenberg, & Mikulincer, 1988) 
The dual influence of LOC and self-efficacy as moderators can be seen as two related by 
parallel scales: 1) from internal to external locus of control; and 2) from low to high perception 
of self –efficacy. A model representing this conception as gleaned from existing research is 
below; though this theory of change is not clearly articulated in the literature, it appears to be the 
basis for much of the LOC and self-efficacy literature relating to political trauma and to the 
relationship between trauma and behavior. It is important to note that although self-efficacy and 
internal locus of control often appear to be related, there are some cultures where one may be 
more likely to have an external LOC but a high sense of self-efficacy (CIDA, 2006; de 
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Watteville, 2002). Although more research is needed in this area, preliminary studies indicate 
that for external LOC people with high self-efficacy, the process of meaning-making, whereby 
the person “fits” the traumatic experiences into his/her own cultural understanding of hardship, 
plays a role that is perhaps more significant than for other Western cultures in mediating the 
relationship between trauma recovery and political behavior.  
Motivational aspects of perceived control. White (1959) describes a motivation aspect of 
perceived control, effectance motivation, which is the motivation a person has to master or 
control their environment after the basic human needs for food, shelter, etc. have been met. 
White argued since effectance motivation is driven by an inherent need to influence the 
environment, the behavior it prompts tends to be directed, selective, and persistent. By 
controlling their environment, a person is rewarded with a sense of confidence and satisfaction.   
The work of De Charms (1968) is based on the same basic model saying that just knowing you 
are an agent of change in your environment is inherently satisfying.  This construct has been 
examined (though it is not very popular) in political science using a 20 question clinical measure 
developed by Burger and Cooper (1979). Research, though limited, supports the notion that 
victims of violence find satisfaction in both the process of controlling their environment and 
knowing the impact that they have on reducing social injustice and advocating for others. 
(Freedy, & Hobfoll, 2005; Veale, & Savrou, 2007) 
Life course/individual development and socialization. Despite the presence of research 
in political science addressing the relationship of traumatic experiences and political 
socialization, there is still a lot discord regarding the paradigmatic assumptions of the rational 
choice political science literature and the findings of the political psychology community on 
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political socialization. Rational choice assumes that utility maximization determines individual 
behavior.  
But as we see from everything else we have been looking at individuals have both 
limitations and things that help them have good outcomes. So, unlike that advocated by rational 
choice theorists, people do not always do what’s in their long-term self-interest. Political 
scientists often refer to these limitations as contextual effects (situational theories) and cognitive 
orientations (dispositional theories). The concept of socialization is generally used to explain 
either coping with trauma or political behavior, but not usually both at the same time. Within 
political psychology this research tradition has its roots in Erikson’s theoretical framework of 
identity and political socialization (Erikson, 1968). Socialization happens as a child interacts 
with the world, through education, parenting, peer relations and interactions with strangers. 
Researchers tend to focus on late adolescence as the pivotal period during which political 
socialization occurs. However, traumatic experiences, particularly for children, are critical in 
shaping those whom DDR programs are trying to reach. Trauma, and in particular that associated 
with political events such as war or displacement, can also contribute to the process of political 
socialization. (Adams, 1985; Campbell, 2006; Erikson, 1968; Gallatin, 1986)  
This is of particular interest – and concern – as adolescents have unique vulnerabilities 
regarding their reactions to traumatic events. Adolescents are developmentally and emotionally 
different from both children and adults; physically though some may appear to be adults, they 
may not have developed the cognitive capacity to fully process cope with the traumatic event. 
Indeed, impulsivity, risk taking and irritability are often found to be more common among 
adolescent survivors of violence and trauma than among adults, perhaps in part because the 
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neurological processes related to controlling behavior and thoughts are still developing in 
adolescent brains. Experiences of childhood and/or adolescent trauma have been reported as 
being more common among DDR participants than other community members in some small 
research studies. (AAPSS, 2005; Annan, Blattman, & Horton, 2006; Settle, Dawes, Christakis, & 
Fowler, 2010) 
In conflict and post-conflict situations -- where trauma is systematic and pervasive -- 
adolescents may respond to political stimuli in very different ways than non-traumatized 
adolescents. For instance, in Uganda, teens who had been abducted and forced to fight during 
childhood were more politically involved and were stronger advocates for peace and the 
democratic process than theirs peers (Annan, et al, 2006). But as traumatic experiences can force 
young people to mature faster than peer or can otherwise alter their normal developmental 
course, they can also leave adolescents with a burden. Other research on the same adolescent 
group in Uganda revealed that many former-child soldiers felt compelled to avoid confrontation 
or to let themselves be victimized to demonstrate to the community that they were not a threat, 
even when defending oneself was justified  (Veale & Stavrou, 2007). 
Adolescents also differ in their reactions when compared to traumatized adults. Research 
has shown that adolescents exposed to political violence are more likely than adults to engage in 
risk-taking behaviors, embrace extreme political ideologies, engage in anti-social or addictive 
behaviors as a form of coping, and to choose passive rather than active political activity and to 
seek out information. While some of these aspects of difference with adolescents can be 
harnessed to create positive political change; they can also put young people at risk in situations 
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where certain political groups or activities are dangerous.  (Dubow, Huesmann, & Boxer, 2009; 
Gallatin., 1986; Koopman, 1997; Laor, Wolmer, Alon, Siev, Samuel, & Toren, 2006) 
Personal Change and DDR-based Trauma. Trauma can serve as a catalyst for personal 
changes, and can ultimately redefine who a person is. Furthermore, a DDR-intervention 
happening soon after an intervention can play a crucial role in further changing the personal 
characteristics of a person. The literatures on the Big Five, Locus of Control (LOC), self-
efficacy, and perceived control all serve as useful metrics for assessing how someone changes 
during trauma. This study employs instruments on Locus of Control and self-efficacy, which 
both offer incredible insight into personality change and identity formation pre- and post-
intervention. Further research is needed to understand how DDR-intervention participants 
experience personal change according to the other metrics discussed.  
Using Theories on Criminality and Crime Reduction to Understand DDR 
The literature on criminality and crime reduction, like the personal change literature, is 
essential to understanding how DDR-interventions impact the long-term prospects of 
participants. Members of armed groups who are participating in a DDR process are treated as ex-
soldiers by the international community. This is despite the fact that many of the behaviors these 
individuals engaged in during the period of the armed conflict were illegal or at the very least, 
deviant from the social norms of Haitian culture and society. The status of individuals DDR 
participants as criminals is complicated by a number of things; (1) lack of laws in the Haitian 
justice system prohibiting specific behaviors; (2) social acceptance of some illegal behaviors; 
and (3) the powerful hand of the international community which intervenes to re-label the 
behavior and the individuals as part of its peacemaking and peacekeeping missions. 
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In the context of crime research, deviance is used to describe behavior which violates 
social norms. Particularly serious social norms are codified in laws. Those who fail to comply 
with these serious social norms are considered criminals (Palmer, 2013). Societies respond to 
criminals by punishing them, rehabilitating them, or both. Societies further respond to the serious 
violation of social norms by establishing other social controls to prevent lawbreaking. This 
typical process is subverted when an individual’s behavior is redefined as an act of war, even in 
cases like Haiti where a war was never declared and when the armed conflict between gangs and 
other paramilitary groups is not recognized by the international community as an act of war. A 
gang member shooting another gang member then becomes neither an act governed by the laws 
of war (as war was not declared) nor an act which is considered criminal under Haitian law (as 
the international community redefined the conflict to label gangs as insurgent groups to be 
targeted for DDR).  
Despite this complication, the behaviors in which former members of armed groups have 
engaged are those most would consider to be criminal. They have engaged in trafficking of 
people, arms, drugs, and stolen or prohibited goods. They have raped, pillaged, threatened 
uninvolved bystanders with bodily harm, kidnapped, extorted money or goods, burned fields and 
orchards, killed livestock, tortured, and assaulted people. Some acts by individuals in Haiti’s 
armed groups could be considered terrorism. Many activities, such as trafficking in prohibited 
merchandise (including Styrofoam take-out containers, which were banned by the government 
for environmental reasons) and burning the fields of wealthy families funding opposition groups 
or enemy gangs do not fit the typical definition of combat nor are they typically prosecuted as 
war crimes.  
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To understand criminality and the individuals propensity to crime is a complex task, this 
is due to the complication of getting to the root of what makes some criminals and others 
innocent. Criminality is the state of being a criminal while crime can be broadly defined as acts 
or omission forbidden by law and are subject to imprisonment or fine when done (Rothe, 2009).  
The complex part of humanity is what makes people behave differently more so as pertains to 
crime (Palmer, 2013). 
Early Perspectives on Criminology 
Classical school. Early ideas about crime were heavily influenced by the Classical 
School, a body of ideas put forth during the 18th century by social-contract philosophers, notably 
Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria. As utilitarian philosophers, Bentham and Beccaria argued 
that people are “calculating” (thinking) beings and that as man has free will, he can choose to not 
engage in crime. Therefore, they argued, punishment can be a deterrent form crime as long as it 
is proportional and prompt. Bentham posited the idea that people weigh the pros and cons of 
their actions before acting; if the individual expects the punishment for a crime to outweigh the 
gains, he will be deterred from committed the crime. In Bentham’s rational system based on 
producing maximum social utility, punishments much match the crimes and not be vengeful 
(Bentham, Lafleur, 1948). Beccaria’s 1764 work Dei Delitti e Delle Pene (On Crimes and 
Punishments) advocated for reforms in the criminal justice system to reduce harm caused to 
society by criminals (Beccaria, Thomas, Parze, 2008). Crime could be prevented, he argued, if 
the punishments for crime were proportional and clear to all citizens. His work led to the creation 
of the first sentencing guidelines and the codification of laws to assure swift trial.  
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A classical school approach provides a somewhat optimistic take on the prospects of 
DDR-intervention participants to reintegrate into society. If an individual chooses to commit a 
crime, then it is possible to change one’s mind. However, this perspective would be critical of 
the fact that the DDR-approach fails to punish ex-combatants. Rather than punish offenders, 
DDR programs often provide positive incentives for participation. Therefore, the failure to 
provide punishments may undermine effectiveness.  
Biological perspective. The biological perspective puts forth the idea that people engage 
in crime because of who they are. The biological theory of crime emerged from the work of 
Cesare Lombroso, a 19th century Italian physician and founder of the Italian School of Positivist 
Criminology who rejected the established classical school, which held that crime was a 
characteristic trait of human nature which could be reined in with laws and established rules. 
Instead, using concepts drawn from early eugenics, Lombroso argued that criminality was 
inherited, and that person who was born to be a criminal could be identified by physical defects. 
Lombroso's general theory suggested that criminals are distinguished from non-criminals by 
multiple physical anomalies. (Lombroso, & Horton, 1968) 
In Lombroso’s view, the person does not choose to do the crime, the crime chooses him. 
Lombroso’s criminals were a step back to primitive impulse-driven man, a subhuman type of 
creature characterized by physical features reminiscent of lower primates, and that such people 
were simply unable to live in society without behaving as savages. Lombroso’s conclusions were 
based on years of autopsies and physical examinations of criminals, people with mental illness, 
disabled people, and individuals with no known criminal history or disabilities. In addition to 
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physical abnormalities Lombroso also argued that criminals had less sensibility to pain and 
touch, better eyesight and hearing, and, interestingly, excessive tattooing. 
Lombroso's theories were disapproved of throughout Europe, but not so much in the 
United States, where sociological studies of crime and the criminal predominated at the time. His 
research was eventually challenged and disproved by Charles Goring (DiLalla & Gottesman, 
1989). However, Lombroso did not argue just for people being born as criminals. He also 
acknowledged the existence of “occasional criminals”, those who were driven to crime by 
passion, poverty, cognitive disability, or other circumstances seemingly beyond their control. 
Though Lombroso’s obsession with genetic predisposing factors was inaccurate and is offensive 
to our modern sensibilities, his acknowledgement of precipitating factors such as environment, 
opportunity, or poverty, was tied to a larger movement within criminology to recognize that 
simplistic understandings of cold logical choice based on fear of punishment were inadequate in 
understanding why people commit crimes. 
The biological perspective provides a pessimistic view of the potential impacts of DDR 
on changing ex-combatant behavior. If people who commit deviant behaviors do so for inherent 
biological reasons, attempts to change them would be fruitless. An underlying assumption of all 
DDR programs is that it is possible to change ex-combatants for the better. Thus, the biological 
perspective is fundamentally incompatible with the logic of demobilizing, disarming, and 
reintegrating ex-combatants.  
Positivism. Lombroso’s contemporaries included Henry Mayhew, Émile Durkheim, and 
Lambert Adolphe Jacques Quetelet. Quetelet, in addition to the coming up with the concept of 
the body mass index, also argued that crime is tied to sociological factors including poverty, 
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gender, and education. (Quetlet, 1984)  Meanwhile journalist/ethnographer Mayhew wrote 
detailed descriptions of an urban underclass forced to survive by any means necessary, whose 
members adopted criminal behaviors in response to their own needs to survive (Mayhew, 1968). 
Émile Durkheim posited that crime was an inevitable outcome of the unequal distribution of 
wealth in society. However, crime does have purpose, he argued. Reactions to deviance help us 
clarify moral boundaries while deviance itself promotes conformity and solidarity among the 
non-deviant members of society. Deviance has other functions as well such as promoting social 
change (e.g. through civil disobedience). Durkheim (1982) 
According the positivist approach, DDR-programs would need to be cognizant of the 
sociological factors that influence the lives of participants. A DDR program would need to 
promote stable economic and social environment to effectively promote rehabilitation. Thus, 
DDR would need to incorporate some of the traditional goals of development, like poverty-
reduction, in order to effectively rehabilitate ex-combatants.   
Chicago School 
In the early 20th century the work of urban sociologists at the University of Chicago 
created a dialogue regarding social structure and conflict of out which much of our contemporary 
understanding of criminality has emerged. Theories from the Chicago school underpin much of 
the current DDR work in Haiti. In particular, social strain theory lays the foundation for the TAU 
(intervention A) approach while the faith-based program (intervention B) is grounded in social 
control theory, and the education based program (intervention C) is guided by theories of social 
disorganization and social ecology. Though not stated as such, the concept of differential 
association is also embedded in the approach taken by interventions B and C, which hope to 
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decrease contact with crime involved peers and increase contact with law-abiding Christians 
(intervention B) and people who value education (intervention C).  
Social strain theory. Robert Merton argued that in every society there are culturally 
defined goals and a socially approved means for reaching those goals. Though primarily 
referencing economic and class-based goals, these ideas could apply to other social goals as well 
such as prestige, power, and respect, among others (Thornberry, 2014).  Merton – whose work 
was based on research in the United States, noted that American culture positions economic 
success at the apex of social desirability. The emphasis on the attainment of economic success is 
omnipresent. However, this goal is out of reach for some who are hindered by socioeconomic 
class structures, such as education, employment opportunities, limited legitimate means of 
achieving economic success, and social marginalization. This disconnect between goals ascribed 
by ones culture and the availability of legitimate, socially approved means to achieve those goals 
creates an imbalance Merton called anomie. 
The weakening of social norms occurs as the person struggles to accept or reject 
culturally defined goals and socially approved means to reach those goals. Once anomie sets in, 
success is no longer guided by societal norms of right or wrong. While not all adaptations to 
anomie are deviant, Merton posited that deviant adaptations were most often adopted when 
anomie level is high and blocked opportunities are the greatest; that is, when the person accepts 
the culturally defined goals but has no way to reach them (Thornberry, 2014). 
Differential association. This theory was developed by Edwin Sutherland who argued 
that deviance is learned the same way humans learn other things: by modeling, small group 
interaction, and intercommunication. He gave the suggestion that via interaction, people absorb 
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beliefs, views, motivations and techniques that facilitate the committing of crime. As the 
individual learns the techniques of deviance, they also absorb attitudes and motivations justifying 
their deviant behavior (Kornhauser, 1978).  
Differential association refers to the differing amounts and types of involvement 
including different frequencies of interactions, intensity of interactions, and duration of 
interactions. Generally, he argued, longer lasting associations, associations early in life, and 
interactions with people who are held in higher esteem are more influential on learned deviance. 
Sutherland’s notion of cultural deviance was based on research on socially disorganized, poverty 
stricken areas of Chicago formerly described as Transition zones. Nurture, not nature, he argued, 
was the determining factor of the likelihood of an individual being delinquent. Differential 
association theory answers some questions left by strain theory, such as why not all poor people 
turn to crime, but it does not explain how people who are not poor and do not come from a 
crime-involve background can become criminals.  
Social ecology and disorganization. In social disorganization theory, place matters. 
Crime is linked to ecological deficits in one’s school, neighborhood, area, or zone. Where you 
live helps determine if you grow up to be a criminal; the characteristics of the place where you 
live are as important or perhaps more important than other factors such as ethnicity, religiosity, 
biology, and economic class. The adoption of attitudes and norms prohibiting or embracing 
criminal activity happens through acculturation. Young people from poor urban neighborhoods 
are part of subculture, this theory argues, which approves of delinquency and which introduces 
them to crimes and enables them to perfect and justify their engagement in crime. Crime is also 
linked to place because other socioeconomic factors such as concentrated high poverty rates, 
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poor schools, lack of employment opportunities, poor infrastructure and political and social 
marginalization are also linked to specific neighborhoods with a low socioeconomic status. 
(Thomas, Znaniecki, & Zaretsky 1984). Park and Burgess (1969) expanded this theory to argue 
that growth of the urban environment and competition for scarce resources concentrates residents 
into distinct niches with other residents who experiences the same social pressures; during the 
early stages of this process there is social disorganization as the normative structure of the 
community is disrupted and reorganizes.  
Social control theory. This theory suggests that bonds between individuals are 
compelling reasons for human action. The need to belong and be attached to others is a key 
human motivation that influences emotional, cognitive and behavioral processes. One can apply 
this theoretical perspective to the study of crime when asking why criminals commit crimes 
while other people do not. Social control theory uses the idea of social bonds to respond to this 
question. When the bonds of an individual to the society are strong, the bonds actually deter 
crime and other deviant behaviors. The probability of deviance is, however, increased when 
bonds are weak. Broken or weak bonds are not causes of delinquency but they rather they create 
conditions in which it can occur (Wiatrowski, Griswold & Roberts, 1981). There are four 
significant social bonds between people and society (Hirschi, 1969): 
1. Attachments – Concern about the opinions of others makes people crime- and 
deviance- avoidant.  
2. Commitments – When people commit time, energy, or other resources to something 
(like a career), they are less likely to engage in deviant behavior and risk losing the 
thing they invested in. 
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3. Involvements – Energy and time spent on activities leaves less for deviant behavior. 
4. Beliefs – Socialization leads to the acceptance of a popular belief system and makes it 
less likely that an individual will behave in ways that counter prevailing views. 
So, the strength of social bonds between an individual and other members of society 
lessens the propensity of deviant behavior or criminal. As the social bonds get to be internalized, 
they strengthen social control which prevents persons from engaging in unlawful acts.    
Prospects of DDR according to the Chicago School. The Chicago school can offer a 
great deal of insight into the prospects for change of DDR participants. There are three strategies 
for re-socialization according to these theoretical perspectives. First, according to social strain 
theory, which holds that there are culturally defined goals and prescribed means to these goals, a 
DDR-participant may be re-socialized to conform to these society-wide aims.  Second, 
differential association also implies the need for re-socialization, since deviant behaviors are 
learned. Prosocial behaviors can be learned through practice in DDR programs. Lastly, according 
to social control theory, DDR programs should foster bonds between ex-combatants and other 
members of society.  
Social ecology theory argues that where one lives can have a very powerful impact on 
behavior. This idea poses a significant challenge to those who design DDR programs, since this 
is a factor that they have little control over. Proponents of social ecology theory may try to 
relocate program participants to more suitable environments through, for example, an internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camp resettlement program. They may also attempt to disrupt 
geographically-based social networks in DDR interventions.  
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Psychological Theories 
 While sociological theories tend to concentrate on environmental and cultural factors, 
psychological theories of crime emphasize personality, dispositions, cognition, and 
understanding of one’s current and past experiences, emotions, and beliefs. While DDR 
programs frequently refer to psychological theories in their program plans, their formal response 
to the Request for Proposals (RFP) in which they apply for funding, and in other program 
documents, in practice their activities are more clearly embedded in the sociological literature on 
crime and deviance. However, it is still important to be familiar with the psychological theories 
of crime as they relate to some of the clinical measures used in this study. The decision of which 
clinical measures to use for baseline and follow up interviews was heavily influenced by 
program funding institutions, who have, in the past, favored psychological theories of crime over 
sociological ones. 
Dispositional theory. In a nutshell, dispositional theories focus on the internal, 
individual mental process by which a person understands and copes with the world around them 
and by which they (later or simultaneously) choose to engage or not engage in various actions. 
While many earlier theorists (e.g., Rotter) focused on this internal predisposition that influences 
ones behavior, more recent theorists (e.g.: Stenner, Krampen, Osgood)  have come to embrace 
dispositional theories as explaining some, but perhaps not all, aspects of coping and behavior.   
Intuitively, there is an aspect of dispositional theories that makes a lot of sense. Human 
beings are not born as empty vessels shaped only by information they learn in school or the 
nurturing received from their parents. There is an aspect of what makes us individuals that comes 
from our nature, our genetic make-up, or some undefined other thing, which is inherent to who 
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we are as human beings and separates one person from another. Even twins, who share the same 
genetic origins, are often reported by their parents to have been “born” with different 
personalities. These differences (in personality, traits, temperament, and the like) shape us as 
people for many years before we are actively socialized into political beings or engage in the 
political world. (Hardy-Vallae, 2008; Robert, 2010; Smith, et al., 2012) 
Dispositional theory stands in contrast to that posited by the Chicago School. This theory 
argues that if people are each uniquely different, experiencing the same situation will not always 
produce the same result. For instance, two children can grow up in the same apartment building, 
go to the same schools, have very similar life experiences, and then experience the same 
traumatic event. The reactions to this event can easily vary, as can their long term impact and the 
behavior and attitudes of these two friends years after the fact.   
To take this analogy one big step further, two children, twins, can be born into the same 
family, be raised by the same parents and go to the same schools. One might react to living 
through a bombing very differently, by becoming withdrawn, disengaging in the political process 
and avoiding discussions of politics or news reports. The other twin may react oppositely, 
throwing themselves into activity as a way of coping with the event, joining community groups, 
marching for peace and actively engaging in conversations with people about political events and 
news.  Indeed, many researchers have found studies of twin pairs to be a fruitful method for 
exploring the inherent differences in individual disposition that influence political behavior. 
(Hatemi, et al., 2007; Funk, Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Hatemi, & Hibbing, 2010) 
According to dispositional theories, the process of developing meaning or understanding 
about the event and its place in one’s life, (hereafter referred to as “processed” for the sake of 
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brevity) it both active and cognitive. Processing is influenced by beliefs about control (see, for 
instance, Rotter, 1966; Solomon, Mikulincer, & Avitzur, 1988), by one’s sense of self-efficacy 
(see, for instance Bandura, 1990), cognitive appraisals (see for instance, Foa, Zinbarg, & 
Rothbaum, 1992), and by other specific personality traits.  
One assumption of dispositional theorists is that attitudes and ideology influence 
behavior. Therefore, certain behaviors may be more, or less, tied to certain ideologies and vice 
versa. It is important to remember that the existing literature is rather myopic in focus, often 
addressing only single traits and their relationship to attitudes and behaviors. One assumption in 
research on individual personality variables is that a particular personality variable is related to 
how well one responds to life; that shapes their political attitudes, which leads to behaviors such 
as seeking out political information, becoming an insurgent, joining community associations, 
voting, protesting, engaging in torture during war, and the like. As Mondak and colleagues 
(2010, p.85) put it: “people’s enduring psychological tendencies are always reflected in their 
traits,” making the integration of trait structure necessary into any holistic model of human 
behavior.   
Dispositional theory lends credence to the idea that some people are innately more 
disposed to criminal behavior than others. Thus, DDR programs are limited in the impact they 
can play in affecting personal change in ex-combatants. However, if a DDR program recognizes 
that some people have a disposition towards deviant behavior, perhaps it can provide individuals 
with alternative outlets. For example, if a participant is predisposed to risk-taking behavior, it 
may be useful to foster entrepreneurial skills as a potential avenue to channel this behavior.  
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Personality theory. The psychological aspect of personality has been explained as stable 
behavioral patterns, actions or thoughts which differentiate one person from the other (Eaves, 
Eysenck, & Martin, 1989). Researchers have linked violent behaviors to characteristics such as 
egoism, hostility, self-centeredness, jealousy, spitefulness and indifference. Some researchers 
have argued that there is a strong relationship between criminality and the lack of perseverance 
or ambition, an inability to control ones temper, poor impulse regulation (in general), and the 
adoption of unconventional beliefs. Personality characteristics can be assessed using measures 
such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) or the Multidimensional 
Personality Questionnaire (MPQ). Using these scales, those researching adolescents and young 
adults have found notable links such as the relationship between adolescent violence and 
irritability, anxiety and unfavorable social conditions, and the influence of stress on poor impulse 
control. Other adolescents who are subject to violence have a typical response of reacting to 
events that are frustrating with strong emotions that are negative. In many a times they feel 
stressed irritable and anxious before unfavorable social conditions. Criminality in this age group 
has also been linked through psychological testing to hostile attitudes, approval of 
aggressiveness, and paranoid ideation. (Brees, Mackey, Martinko, & Harvey, 2014; Boduszek, 
Shevlin, Adamson, & Hyland, 2013; Eichelsheim, Nieuwbeerta, Dirkzwager, Reef & De Cuyper, 
2015; Eysenck, 2003).   
Even though personality research was not historically concerned with criminal conduct, it 
can add to our understanding of criminal behavior. A short review concerning the historical 
development of this area’s constructs as well as the varied methods in which it is quantified are 
crucial to situating its position in the criminology discourse. Research on personality began in 
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earnest in the 1930s with the research work of Henry Murray and Gordon Allport. Allport’s 
(1937) ‘Personality: A Psychological Interpretation,’ provided a working definition and structure 
for the emerging field of personality research. Allport criticized a focus on generalized human 
behavior, which he argued, ignored the person’s uniqueness, their thinking, and the personality 
with which they emerged in the situation. Allport rejected the idea that all behaviors are 
comprised of simple, inborn habits, arguing that personality plays a fundamental role in shaping 
our understandings, beliefs, and behaviors. Personality helps determine how an individual 
interacts with the social environment and that is it what drives behavior and behavior choices, 
including the decision to engage in socially deviant activities.  (Eichelsheim, et al, 2015) 
Allport determined that personality at early life stages is effected environmental aspects. 
According to Allport, personality starts taking shape from about four months of age, and grows 
progressively while simultaneously influencing behavior. Contrary to criminologists like Hirschi 
and Gottfredson (1990), Allport noted that personality at the age of four does not signify that 
personality is fixed in the first year of life. Rather, later interventions or circumstances may have 
a great impact. This idea is particularly relevant for those who go through the traumatic event of 
fighting in war, and is therefore relevant to DDR programs. If personality can shift as a result of 
war, DDR programs should account for these personality shifts as they determine which services 
are appropriate.   
Allport’s research was at this time paralleled by the work of Henry Murray. Murray 
(1938) agreed with Allport’s fundamental conjecture and argued that individuals have been 
ignored by psychologists in their analyses. Murray advocated for the uncovering of determinants 
of the single behavioral events. He viewed an individual’ experiences as an “infinitely 
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complicated series of the temporally associated activities which extend from birth to death.” 
Thus, Murray recognized that there is some static personality consistency while at the same time 
recognizing that personality is exposed to maturation. In other words, individuals do display a 
tendency to react consistently, although fluctuations in personality over time can occur. 
(Eichelsheim, et al, 2015) 
Measurement of personality trait. Personality study gained popularity throughout the 
1930s and 1940s. However, the optimal measurement for personality traits measurement has 
lacked scholarly consensus. Strictly speaking, there exist no two individuals having an identical 
array of personality traits, but rather, personality attributes are manifested differently in every 
individual. Assuming that individual personality can be labeled, choosing labels is a complex 
endeavor. For instance, Allport (1937) identified 18,000 terms (which are chiefly adjectives) in 
English language designating behavior forms. With these groups of behavior, he theorized that 
some represent the major or cardinal traits as well as other secondary or minor traits.  
The work of Cattell in 1950 set the platform for measuring and developing a taxonomy 
personality variables. He criticized past psychologists for failing to develop an objective 
framework for describing and also measuring personality attributes. Cattell believed 
psychologists depended on clinical guesswork in their attempts to identify the personality 
structure. Thus, he advocated for factor analysis as a method of developing personality 
taxonomy. The process entails presenting hundreds (and eventually thousands) of carefully 
selected items of large sets of psychologically normal persons. Every item is then correlated with 
every other item to determine which sets tend to occur together.  
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After the development of taxonomy, psychologists started constructing questionnaires. In 
addition, after the first and second world wars there was a sudden demand for mass standardized 
personality testing of soldiers. This led to the development and extensive usage of MMPI, which 
is a pencil and paper instrument comprising of 566 statements. This instrument became the basis 
for many future instruments.  
Personality research based on measurements arose in the 1930s and is still used heavily in 
contemporary research. Even though the feasibility of personality measurement has been 
criticized in the past, the increasing development of reliable tools now offers support for the 
continuation of this research. In addition, factor analysis has proven to be a dependable tool for 
the construction of the personality scales. Now, most psychologists hold tempered views of 
personality. For example, the idea that people react to their surroundings but also they also make 
deliberate choices about their behaviors.   
Eysenck’s approach to personality and crime. Many personality and behavioral studies 
depend on a descriptive model comprised of traits and super factors. Personality traits are 
defined as the enduring characteristics in an individual that determine his/her conduct. On the 
other hand, a super factor or type is defined as a set of correlated traits. The term “type” is 
evident in the in the modern personality theory and is considered superordinate to that of a trait. 
One’s personality type corresponds to what others, employing factor analysis, have called the 
second order types or super factors. Therefore, super factor determines personality type based on 
a constellation of individual personality traits. (Boduszek, Adamson, Shevlin & Hyland, 2012; 
Boduszek, Shevlin, Adamson, & Hyland, 2013) 
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The work of Eysenck arose from his exploration of personality traits amongst 700 male 
service patients in the year 1940s. Eysenck finished a large factorial study that came up with 
three main types including psychoticism, extroversion-introversion, and neuroticism. At a later 
time, Eysenck (1952) developed the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) which measured 
psychoticism. The traits associated with psychoticism are egocentrism, impersonal behavior, 
antisocial behavior, creativity, tough-mindedness, impulsiveness, aggression, unpathetic 
behavior, and cold behavior. Next, traits that create the type neuroticism entail: depression, 
anxiety, guilt feelings, tension, emotion, low self-esteem, shyness, irrationality, and moodiness. 
Lastly, traits associated with extraversion type are sociability, assertiveness, liveliness, sensation 
seeking behavior, dominant behavior, active behavior, carefree, and venturesome. Researchers 
have also noted that many a lot of people are characterized by equilibrium between the types. 
(Brees, Mackey, Martinko, & Harvey, 2014; Boduszek, Adamson, Shevlin & Hyland, 2012; 
Ireland & Power, 2013)  
Eysenck also gives us insight on the personality-based causes of crime of crime. He 
maintained his original typology, comprising of neuroticism, psychoticism, and extraversion to 
describe crime. He further theorized that psychoticism was more often linked to crime, and that 
extroversion was associated with younger samples, and the neuroticism in the older samples. 
Thus, neuroticism is more important in older samples and adds to stronger antisocial habits in the 
adults. He viewed the personality study as containing two interlocking aspects of environment 
and genetics. These two aspects combined explain the dynamics of personality. (Boduszek & 
Hyland, 2012) 
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Eysenck’s theory entails a line of factors that start with genetics and finishes with the 
criminal behavior. He theorized that an individual’s unique genetic structure is the initial link in 
the causal chain. DNA is not responsible for conduct, but a person’s DNA affects what Eysenck 
terms as biological intermediaries like cortical arousal and as a result condition ability and 
conscience. Cortical arousal is a brain state marked by being both alert and attentive. Low 
cortical arousal is linked with both extraversion and psychoticism. Particularly, he theorized that 
persons with low cortical arousal seek out arousing and often risky acts, sometimes engaging in 
criminal acts. (Boduszek, Adamson, Shevlin & Hyland, 2012; Boduszek & Hyland, 2012) 
Eysenck also sought a description not only of antisocial conduct, but also why people 
behave in ways which are socially desirable. He argues that criminals can identify right from 
wrong, and that they prefer the wrong to the right. To be specific, he theorized that criminal 
behavior is not a matter of conscience, but rather, its causes are found in operant and also 
classical conditioning. For example, the child being punished repeatedly for an antisocial act 
does not develop the suitable response (that is, fear of repeated punishment) will not learn from 
the punishment. The possibility of developing moral conscience relies on several factors, 
entailing whether conditioning experiences are absent, whether the wrong experiences are 
emphasized, and whether an individual has low cortical arousal. Eysenck conceded that the 
process of learning, or the breakdown of this procedure, adds to the possibility of criminal 
behavior. The causal chain completes here with the possibility of criminal conduct being 
forecasted from the genetic make-up of the person. (Boduszek, Adamson, Shevlin & Hyland, 
2012; Boduszek & Hyland, 2012; Ireland & Power, 2013) 
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The tie of personality to criminal behavior gets clearer as he describes that both 
psychoticism and extroversion are associated with low cortical arousal that has influence on 
condition ability, conscience, and lastly behavior. With regard to neurotics, anxiety can act as the 
motivation or drive for criminal behavior. In this scenario, emotions can override the reason 
resulting to aggressive and impulse behavior. In conclusion, according Eysenck (1983), the three 
personality traits are involved in antisocial behavior, and extroversion, emotional instability, and 
psychoticism are all risk factors (Boduszek & Hyland, 2012). 
Situational perspectives. Central to theories of situated and social cognition is that 
attitudes and beliefs are shaped by events that individuals experience – the duration of the event, 
the level of trauma (if any), their evaluation of the event and how that fits with previously held 
beliefs, the ambiguity of the event, all of these shape the way in which the person processes the 
event, leading to attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. (Gallatin, 2006; Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001, 
Campbell, 2006; Wagner, Forstmeier & Maercker, 2007). This process of meaning-making and 
understanding traumatic events happens in a social context because people are social beings.  
Within political science this is often examined in the realm of political information.  
Ex-combatants make meaning of their experiences in conjunction with their peers and 
their social surroundings. DDR programs have a unique opportunity to participate in the 
meaning-making process. By providing a supportive forum for ex-combatants to process events, 
DDR programs can facilitate positive personal change. 
Political engagement & disengagement. Writing in the Federalist Papers about what 
motivates people to engage in political activities, James Madison argued that it was all about 
human discord and the desire to take a side, saying that “frivolous and fanciful distinctions have 
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been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts” 
(Madison, n.d.). Those taking the situational perspective would argue that James Madison was 
certainly in the dispositional camp, especially since he had such a dim view of human nature 
arguing that individuals’ predisposed drive for conflict and the need to compete to serve one’s 
own interest are the primary motivating factor in political participation.  
Modern proponents of the situational perspective would be more apt to embrace another 
political theorist, Tocqueville, who maintained that citizens are socialized into a sense of 
obligation to engage in the political process and this “duty” is what motivates them to act. 
Though his perspective is not all positive or benign (he argued that instilling political obligation 
was a useful social tool with which to control and influence citizens), he does discuss at length 
the role of socialization in shaping political behavior , writing “it is the duty as well as the 
interest of men to be useful to their fellow men… [by] working for the good of his fellow 
citizens, he in the end acquires a habit and taste for serving them” (2005, p. 318).  
Socialization is often cited as a protective factor for guard against poor post-trauma 
outcomes; it both shapes a person’s values and morals, but also can instill a drive to learn, 
change or improve oneself and the world. And, of course, socialization teaches adolescents 
which political behaviors are productive (voting, writing a letter to the editor) and which will get 
you arrested (rioting, terrorism). (Sears & Valentino, 1997)  
Information seeking and use. Earlier I discussed the importance of information seeking 
in the political process. But simply having information does not mean that a person will accept it 
or act on it. The tendency of humans to face difficulties in engaging in rational political thought 
can be traced back to the time of Plato who proposes a metaphoric story of men in a cave. In the 
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story, prisoners are shackled to the wall of a cave. They pass their days watching the play of 
shadows on the wall of the cave, mistaking the shades for reality. The prisoners, when told that 
their reality is false, are unable to accept that a sunny world exists above the cave. Plato uses this 
to demonstrate that social context can have limiting effects on the ability of people to 
comprehend and integrate new information.  The assent from the cave is something that requires 
the ability to break with learned social realities (Plato, 1974). 
The existing research lends credence to this. To cope with trauma, some people turn away 
from information, avoid it, do not trust it, or reject it entirely. Since information seeking is a 
foundational aspect of political behavior, avoiding accurate information fosters hatred and 
“hardened” attitudes towards political opposition and facilitates political violence against ones 
real or perceived enemies. (Bar-Tal, 2001; Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Gayer, Landman, Halperin, 
& Bar-Tal, 2009; Beber, Rossler, & Sacco, 2012) 
One of the other risks for political violence is the lack of dense social networks and social 
cohesion. Social networks are a protective factor against engagement in abusive or unnecessarily 
violent acts against community members as they reinforce cultural norms and provide natural 
sanctions for norm-violators. If a person decides to hurt another person, everyone will know 
about it and will respond accordingly. However, in situations where violence is viewed as 
necessary or obligatory (such as a war of liberation, self-protection, etc.) dense social networks 
are associated with increased, rather than decreased involvement in the use of violence. (Allodi 
& Stiansy, 1990; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Weinstein, 2007) 
Situational approach and political behavior. Situational approaches focus on trauma 
survivors as social beings who are in a constant interaction with their environment; thus, the 
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primary influence on behavior and attitudes occurs through this interactive process, both 
historical experiences (e.g. what happened when they were a child) and current or ongoing 
experiences. (Sears, 1997; Sears & Valentino, 1997; Bourchard, Guillemette, & Lanry-Léger, 
2004; AAPSS, 2005)  As a person processes their experiences they do not do so in a vacuum, but 
rather are influenced by other people’s interpretations of their experiences, expressed thoughts 
and behaviors as well as by their cultural, societal norms, and the like.   
Situational approaches assume that one’s political behavior emerges in reaction to their 
interaction with their environment; so, a person experiences oppression or violence differently 
based on how they were raised (values transmitted from parents and peers, etc.) and what their 
life situation is at the time and thus will react to that traumatic experience differently. This 
explains why some African-Americans in the South reacted to Jim Crow laws with rebellion and 
protest while others avoided the conflict or actively worked against the civil rights movement. 
(Sears, & Valentino, 1997; Jones, 2002)  
Recognizing the importance of politics as an inherently social process and people as 
social beings, a repeated theme in the situational literature is the importance of social support. 
The lack of social support is often used as predictor variable for poor post-trauma outcomes (see 
table 3) and for political information seeking, engagement, attitudes and behaviors (see table 4). 
While it is usually used as predictor variable it is also (rarely) used as an outcome. For instance, 
(Boscarino, 1995) argues that when controlling for past combat experience in a study of Vietnam 
veterans, childhood delinquency, socioeconomic status and military adjustment could be used to 
predict poor social support and PTSD in later adulthood.  Social support before and/or during the 
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trauma is protective as it seems to both help people cope and to normalize the trauma experience. 
(Brune, Haasen, Krausz, Yagdiran, Bustos, & Eisenman, 2003; Marshall, et al., 2007)  
Concluding Thoughts. 
I began this chapter with a discussion of trauma, an important and often overlooked 
influence on behavior. The individuals who participate in DDR programs may have survived 
traumatic events in both their early years as well as during the armed conflict. As I noted in this 
chapter, the literature clearly demonstrates the link between trauma and poor individual 
outcomes. Based on the influence which trauma can have on behavior, attitudes, and 
development, it essential that a measure of trauma be included in an evaluation of individual-
level DDR outcomes.   
I reviewed Locus of Control and Self-Efficacy, key concepts in some of the clinical 
measures used in this dissertation research study. The literature on these concepts highlighted the 
importance of a sense of being able to influence or control one’s future through engagement in 
efficacious activities as a key aspect of success in the process of personal change. These concepts 
may be used to help understand the impact that program interventions had on the individual 
participants.I also looked at the historical context for the development of ideas about crime and 
political behavior. The placement of strain theory (which underpins the efforts of intervention 
A), social control theory (adopted by intervention B) and theories of social ecology and 
disorganization (espoused by intervention C) within the social science literature were reviewed. 
The relationship and historic emergence of these theories was also discussed. 
In the next section I turn to a discussion of DDR interventions. I review the literature 
related to successful intervention components and I discuss the three interventions examined in 
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this study. I discuss the theory of change employed by each program. And I discuss the 
intervention components as those components relate to both the existing research literature and 
the program’s theory of change. 
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Chapter 5: Rehabilitation Interventions 
In this chapter I continue reviewing relevant literature to contextualize this dissertation 
research study. First, I discuss some of the research that has been done on interventions with 
crime-involved and post-conflict populations. I review intervention components whose success 
in the rehabilitation process has been empirically supported. Next, I discuss the three 
interventions examined in this study. I examine the theory of change employed by each program. 
And I discuss the intervention components as those components relate to both the existing 
research literature and the program’s theory of change. 
Role of education-based interventions in ex-offender rehabilitation 
Education is one of the most popular types of rehabilitative programs for people 
preparing to re-enter society after criminal activities. This review of the literature demonstrates 
that education is not only a popular intervention in this setting, but also a generally effective one. 
Education-based interventions ex-offenders and at-risk individuals do more good than harm. 
(Vacca, 2008; Bhatti, 2010; Taylor, 2013) However, the literature is still in debate over why 
educational programs work in criminal rehabilitation.  Education helps reshape ones self-image 
and makes an individual see themselves as a capable person. This section of the literature review 
is organized around describing prevailing theories related to education and identifying 
unanswered questions. I will examine specific components of education interventions related to 
rehabilitation of crime-involved individuals. This will lead into a discussion on perspectives 
about why education works.  
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Risk factors for criminal activity targeted by educational interventions.  As intuition 
would suggest, those who are most marginalized in society tend to be the most vulnerable to 
crime. Early prevention program interventions can be helpful for positive childhood 
development, but there is no compelling evidence that they actually prevent the participants from 
participating in crime as adults (Deković, et al., 2011) Thus, some children are seemingly 
doomed to a life of crime due to environmental and social factors. Serin et al. (2013) indicate 
that risk factors for recidivism include: antisocial attitudes, antisocial beliefs, antisocial 
associations, antisocial personality, social support, and substance abuse.  
As an added complication, there are risk factors that make offenders more vulnerable, 
including substance abuse, mental illness, and disability. First, offenders with substance abuse 
practices benefit less from programs targeted at risk and protective factors for recidivism than 
their non-substance abusing counterparts (van der Putt, Creemers, & Hoeve, 2014). Those who 
use substances tend to be most responsive to interventions that include substance rehabilitation 
services coupled with more traditional interventions (Krebs, Lattimore, Cowell, & Graham, 
2010; Nissen, 2011). 
Second, with respect to mental illness, Baron, Draine, & Salzer (2013) macro-level 
factors are the biggest impediment to employment of mentally ill individuals with jail industries. 
Educational programs both before and after incarceration were only minimally effective at 
improving employment prospects for this demographic. Reasons cited are: a lack of training on 
what steps to take, employer exclusion of ex-prisoners, and the lack of legal action to remove 
screening questions from applications. Another study shows that those with psychopathic 
personality traits are less achieve high reading achievement, which serves as a proxy for 
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educational success (Vaughn, et al., 2011). Lastly, people with disabilities tend to be 
disproportionately present in the justice system and are more likely to be repeat offenders 
(Zhang, Barrett, Katsiyannis, & Yoon, 2011). 
 The literature on gender differences in recidivism is underdeveloped and most of the 
conclusions made in research are based on samples of entirely male offenders. In a meta-analysis 
of fifty-seven articles that examine differential gender differences, Collins (2010) finds many 
homogeneous effects across gender, such as criminal history, substance use, and mental health. 
Interestingly, however, she finds that violent criminal history increases the chance of violent 
criminal recidivism in men but not women. Another observed gender effect is pro-social 
behavior was a key indicator of likability in female offenders, which suggests that harnessing 
this proclivity to gain favor in prison governance may be an effective strategy (Goldweber, 
Cauffman, & Cillessen, 2013). Better understanding potential gender effects may help service 
providers adapt the programs based on male-only research to better fit the needs of women.  
Designing Impactful Interventions.  
Though much of the reintegration literature focuses on those exiting prison, the lessons 
learned are applicable to DDR. The rehabilitation of ex-offenders is crucial for reducing 
recidivism and decreasing crime rates (Someda, 2009). The majority of offenders feel as if they 
will be integrated into the community after being released and that they do not expect to be 
stigmatized (Benson, Alarid, Burton, & Cullen, 2011). However, the needs of offenders upon re-
entry are complex. We can organize these needs into five main categories according to Anthony 
et al. (2010):  
1. Social and community 
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2. Educational 
3. Occupational 
4. Independent living  
5. Health (including substance abuse and mental health) 
Though it would be ideal for programs to focus on all of these aspects, programs tend to 
either specialize in one category or to attempt to address all categories superficially.  
Impactful interventions come in a variety of forms. For example, Tarolla, Wagner, 
Rabinowitz, & Tubman (2002) evaluates treatment approaches for juvenile offenders including: 
family/systems therapy, parent and social skills training, cognitive-behavioral treatment (CBT), 
peer group counseling, a therapeutic wilderness program, and boot camps. Each of these 
approaches have advantages and limitations, though the literature suggests that each of them tend 
to do more good than harm. 
 Reentry and aftercare programs generally reduce recidivism rates (James, Stams, 
Asscher, De Roo, & van der Laan, 2013). Two of the most popular intervention-based 
approaches tend to focus on employment as an end goal. The two types of employment are 
interventions: Supported Employment (SE)/Individual Placement and Support (SP) and 
traditional vocational rehabilitation programs. Both types of programs have elements of 
education, though the traditional vocational rehabilitation programs tend to be more education-
focused. The literature suggests that SE/IPS tends to be most effective, though the 
implementation of such programs require considerably more funds than the traditional vocational 
rehabilitation (“Supported Employment”, 2015). 
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Supported employment/individual placement support. There is evidence that 
employment-based interventions are effective, (Graffam, Shinkfield, & Lavelle, 2014) and also 
contradictory evidence that suggests employment-related service intervention does not have a 
significant impact (Farabee, Zhang, & Wright, 2014). However, the literature focuses on the 
merits on employment support programs and encourage their expansion and enhancement.  
The Individual Placement and Support (IPS) model is an evidence-based intervention typically 
targeted at those with severe mental illness and disabilities. The intervention is based on the 
following principles (“Supported Employment,”2015).  
1. Zero-Exclusion Policy 
2. Integration of both mental health and employment services 
3. Participation in the competitive job market 
4. Rapid job search 
5. Systematic job development between employment professionals and employers  
6. Time- Unlimited Support 
7. Attention to the preferences of the individual seeking employment 
8. Help with benefits planning 
Researchers have demonstrated that this set of ISP factors have tended to perform better 
than other vocational programs. This model has been adapted to ex-offender vocational 
programs, but little is known about its true impact since research exists on ISP impacts on this 
population. Bond (2013) identifies several ways to improve the IPS model as it applied to people 
transitioning out of prison. First, IPS teams specializing in the needs of former prison 
populations should be formed since this population faces unique issues. Second, provide 
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treatment for people with dual disorders, particularly substance abuse. Third, follow the advice 
of employers who have decided to hire people with records in the past. Together, these 
recommendations can make the IPS model more responsive to the needs of the former prison 
populations.  
The Reintegration of Ex-Offenders (RExO) is a grant program that fund initiatives that 
support employment-focused programs in high levels of ex-offender reentry. The communities 
with focus of the RExO programs focused on the core services of: case management, 
employment-related services, and mentoring. To incentivize participation, the program 
administrators would offer small incentives like bus tokens and gift cards.  This model was found 
to be effective in reintegrating ex-offenders, though similar alternatives often proved to be 
effective or slightly less effective as well (Leshnick, Geckeler, Wiegand, Nicholson, & Foley, 
2012).  
Another example is the STRIVE program is very similar in structure to ISP and RExO, as 
it focuses on attitudinal and job readiness, skills training, support services, job placement, and 
follow-up. The program operates in over 20 communities and serves over 60,000 clients. 
(Leshnick, et al., 2012) Ultimately, these large multi-faceted interventions warrant heavy 
scholarly attention since they have the potential to empower ex-offenders as the reintegrate into 
society.  
Vocational educational programs. Education is an incredibly powerful intervention. 
Simply managing to do something as simple as achieving basic literacy has the potential to 
reduce the probability of recidivism in offenders (Vacca, 2008). It serves as a turning point in the 
life of a young person, particularly a young person who has been involved in crime or violence 
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(Blomberg, Bales, Mann, Piquero, & Berk, 2011). The literature makes a distinction between the 
impact of traditional education and vocational education. In one study, individuals randomized 
into CRAFT (a construction-based vocational program) had better outcomes for employment and 
GED completion than those in traditional education programs. (Schaeffer, Henggeler, Ford, 
Mann, & Chapman, 2014) 
Government institutions often face logistical struggle to provide appropriate education to 
those involved in crime (Geib, Chapman, D'Amaddio, & Grigorenko, 2011). Barriers to quality 
education include the lack of information provided from previous schools, lack of opportunities 
for practical training due institutional confinement, and too many interruptions to the young 
person’s schooling for legal and disciplinary matters (Smeets, 2013). Researchers find that 
interventions for criminal offenders can have a somewhat positive impact on their future 
academic success and prospects. By correcting delinquent behavior early on, youthful offenders 
have a better chance of avoiding criminal charges as adults (Sander, Patall, Amoscato, Fisher, & 
Funk, 2012). 
 Adult education programs can act as powerful change agents for incarcerated 
participants, thus reducing the risk of recidivism. (Gordon & Weldon, 2003) Keena and 
Simmons (2014) discuss the impact the Ice House Entrepreneurship Program had on inmates in a 
maximum-security Mississippi prison. The 12-week program taught a curriculum that focuses on 
a book (Who Owns the Ice House?—Eight Life-Lessons from an Unlikely Entrepreneur) and the 
life lessons contained within. The lessons included in this program are focused on the idea 
developing entrepreneurial skills. The lessons included: 
1. Everyone has the power of choice.  
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2. Recognizing problems and solutions is important for entrepreneurship.  
3. Take action to change the things you can change.  
4. Effort combined with knowledge is powerful.  
5. Save and invest your money.  
6. Build your brand.  
7. Create community. 
8. Be persistent.  
Participants in this program tended to be better at identifying opportunities, communicating their 
abilities, utilizing mentors and advisors, and having a persistent attitude. This study give initial 
evidence that an educational program targeted at changing mindset and locus of control can have 
a positive impact.  Based on this evidence, we can see that educational programs that promote 
pro-social behavior while focusing on improving post-training prospects have been well received 
by participants.  
Ameen and Lee (2012) discuss the logic of social cognitive career theory (SCCT) as it 
relates to vocational training. According to SCCT, an individual’s career self-efficacy is 
dependent on prior experiences and expectations. The role of a vocational training program is to 
evaluate an offender’s career self-efficacy and to give them training and encouragement to 
improve their career ambitions. Life skills, in addition to vocational skills, are important for 
those reintegrating into society. Buston et al. (2012) suggest that parenting interventions along 
with vocational education interventions are effective and well-received by young fathers; though 
more research is needed to understand the long-term impacts their children.  
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The literature on education interventions for those involved in crime highlights the value 
that education can have on shaping attitudes and behavior. Some of the programs examined in 
this part of the literature review are targeting towards those involved in the criminal justice 
system. However, the studies examined offer important insights into what works. Vocational 
education is shown to improve post-intervention employment prospects. Non-vocational 
education improves outcomes as well; it is associated with increased self-esteem, improved 
employment outcomes, and a reduction in crime. This points to the impact that education can 
serve in the life of an individual who has been involved in crime and/or violence.  
Another important aspect of this literature on education and recidivism among criminals 
is related to the role that auxiliary services play in supporting the individual to participate in 
education and to use their education during and after the intervention. Supported Employment, 
case management, vocational placement, and other services facilitated opportunities to use 
vocational or non-vocational employment skills and knowledge in the real world. Auxiliary 
services offered along with the educational intervention, such as parent training, social skills 
workshops, substance abuse treatment, mental health counseling, peer support groups and health 
services helped participants overcome barriers to participation in the programs and addressed 
risk factors which may have hindered post-program success. 
The Role of Sports and Recreation in DDR. 
Post-conflict societies grapple with the issue of how to transition people from armed 
insurgency to a life of normalcy. The Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) approach has 
gained a quite a bit of traction in the United Nations system and in the international community. 
(Right to Play, 2013; Cárdenas, 2013; United Nations, 2015) The litterature supporting the SDP 
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approach has argued that it is particularly well-suited for troubled or underdeveloped contect. 
Though unconventional, sport-based rehabilitation programs in post-conflict settings have 
proven to be a viable option. This is supported in the literature on youth programs (Andrews & 
Andrews, 2003; Naughton, 2011; Schrag, 2012).  
SDP-based interventions purport to facillitate the process of Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) (Dyck, 2011) and to promote resiliancy (Kvalsund, 
2012). However, critics note that scholars should be careful not to overstate the power of sport 
and avoid viewing the role of sport in development as a pancea. (Bellotti, 2012; Donnelly, 
Atkinson, Boyle, & Szto, 2011; Kitchin , 2012) 
United Nations Framework: Sport for Development and Peace. 
The United Nations subsidiary bodies often provide a venue for innovation in 
development programs. The Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group 
(SDP IWG) was established to promote the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and peace through sports (United Nations, 2015). The Sports Development and Peace 
approach has been adopted by many projects inside both the UN system, and the broader 
community of NGOs.  
The SDP framework has five sub-areas:   
1. Sport and Health 
2. Sport and Child & Youth Development 
3. Sport and Gender 
4. Sport with Persons with Disabilities 
5. Sport and Peace 
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Though there is often overlap between these categories, the sport and peace category is often 
most relevant to the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process. However, 
it is also the area in which it is most difficult to achieve and measure success according to Schrag 
(2012). He identifies two reasons for this. First, compared to the other categories, sport and 
peace do not go together easily. The precedent has been set for sport being a component of youth 
development, for example, and the concepts of sport and peace being tied together is relatively 
new. Second, the meaning of peace is not definitive, which poses project design, implantation, 
and evaluation challenges.  
The Right to Play project organizes itself around the SDP framework. The project focuses 
on five factors of sport-based programs that promote behavior change. First, sport puts children 
in a supportive environment with role models, coaches, and peers. Second, the sport helps 
children learn essential live skills like stress management, decision making, and leadership. 
Third, play repetition allows children to practice new skills and change behavior gradually. 
Fourth, sport promotes healthy attitudes about self and society. Lastly, sport can be used as a 
vehicle for information, for example, HIV and AIDS risk reduction. (Right to Play, 2013)  
Rehabilitation through SDP. 
The SDP approach identifies features of sport that make sport a good fit development 
projects. First, sport is a universal concept that transcends cultural contexts. Second, sport can 
connect people with different viewpoints by proving a forum for interaction. Third, sport can 
inspire and motivate those who are otherwise lacking in self-esteem, or struggling with mental 
health. Fourth, sport can divert violent behavior by giving people a physical outlet for their 
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disagreements. Lastly, initial evidence suggests that sport can contribute to peace by 
strengthening society (Cárdenas, 2013). 
These features make SDP a viable approach for sport in conflictual contexts. Galtung’s 
proposes a 3R (reconstruction, reconciliation, and resolution) approach for understanding the 
power of this approach. Sport can play an integral role in accomplishing these goals, since it 
serves as a relatively neutral forum to work through and move past societal grievances. (as cited 
in Cárdenas, 1998) The 3R approach can be used to complement DDR as a popular intervention 
to both integrate former combatants into society and to prevent others who might be recruited 
from joining the insurgency. Sport was used in a DDR intervention with youth combatants in 
Sierra Leonne. The intervention had three phases. First, the combatants were registered, given 
medical support, and discharged from their combatant roles. Second, they were treated at interim 
care centers where they received psychological care and participated in educational programs. 
Lastly, the ex-combatants were relocated with family and community. Sport was used alongside 
the educational programs in phase two in an effort to channel wartime aggression. Furthermore, 
administrators believed it was a program was an opportunity to escape psychology wartime 
trauma, albeit in the short-term (Dyck, 2011). 
Furthermore, Giulianotti and Armstrong (2014) suggest that there may be opportunities 
for the sport-based infrastructure of the SDP programs to be adapted by peacekeepers, thus 
keeping up their moral and professional engagement. They identify the International Council of 
Military Sports (Conseil Internationale du Sport Militaire: CISM), which is a competition 
between peacekeepers working in conflicted areas around the world that happens every four 
years. This offers a new strategy for building positive relationships with the population, by 
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creating a common group over love of sports. Given the dysfunctional relationship between 
peacekeepers and societies in most contexts, this common interest can be leveraged.  
SDP Promoting Youth Recovery. 
In post-disaster and post-conflict settings, the role sport should play is often quite tenuous 
and often up for debate, since there are often very immediate survival needs that may warrant 
more attention. Kvalsund (2012) argues that resilience is a skill that, when taught to children in a 
post-disaster setting, can help with short-term and long-term coping. (Kvalsund, 2012) This 
emphasis on resilience and the necessity of coping skills can be applied across social 
demographics.  Three cases studies, in particular, illustrate the potential for sport to promote 
resilience and recovery in young people.   
First, in qualitative participant-observation based study, researchers explored the strategy 
of sporting and recreation activity as a primary rehabilitative strategy for criminally delinquent 
youth. The researchers found that interviews often produced fairly static results, and that the 
kinesiology of sports required more casual conversation and activity in research. Through their 
interactions with the participants, they found evidence that suggests that sports are useful to 
many (but not all) residents. Furthermore, we must take a thoughtful approach to the types of 
sports we use in rehabilitative activities, though the research does not draw definitive 
prescriptive conclusions. (Andrews & Andrews, 2003) 
Second, Naughton offers another in-depth case study as a piece of evidence for the 
success of SDP. He explores the role of football in both a short- and long-term context. He 
studies the Millennium Stars in Liberia, a football league that started as a reintegration program 
for child soldiers and has evolved into a program with the broader goal of helping vulnerable 
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children build self-esteem. Former participants are now leaders in the project and have lives as 
meaningful contributors to their communities (Naughton, 2011). 
 Third, an intervention focused on rehabilitating child sex offenders through a 12-step 
program called Fight with Insight (FWI). The South African program is sponsored by an 
organization called the Support Programme for Abuse Reactive Children (SPARC) which 
recognizes that abused children often lack positive adult role models for law-abiding behaviors. 
The program incorporates elements of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) into regular program. 
The FWI program also offers the option of participating in both a boxing program and CBT. 
Though researchers were hesitant to speak to the long-term impacts of the program, they found 
the impact of the boxing program to be generally positive and advocated for its expansion 
(Draper, Errington, & Makhita, 2013). 
 These case studies illustrate the potential sport has for youth rehabilitation. Sport is often 
unintimidating and offers an opportunity to connect with children on their level. The hybrid 
intervention FWI by SPARC married a traditional intervention with a sport-based intervention, a 
combination which makes traditional therapy more palatable. Ultimately, sport has the potential 
to introduce social work and social service interventions to those who would refuse them 
otherwise.  
Critical approaches to SDP. Researchers have advocated for the improvement of 
research in sports. Kitchin (2012) suggests that concept of the “power of sport” must be coupled 
with independent evaluation, since those inside organizations tend to overestimate their own 
impact. To improve research, he suggests an ethnographic to program evaluation, where 
independent researchers immerse themselves in programs. Similarly, Donnelly et al. (2011) gives 
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advice on how to overcome challenges to those researching SDP from a public sociology 
perspective.  
We should be careful to note that it is easy to be overly optimistic about the power of 
sports in development. Some authors take a critical approach to the rising SDP framework. 
Colter suggests that researchers should be careful not to confuse micro-level individual outcomes 
with macro-level development goals, and cautions us of potential mission drift (Coalter, 2010). 
Darnell and Black (2011) raise two important critical points sport on development goals 
quite effectively. First, we have the functionalist argument, where one thinks to simply “add 
sport and stir” to achieve their development goal in a given program (regardless of true impact). 
Under the functionalist view, an organization may lose sight of its original purpose and may 
become less responsive to its creators/funders. Second, though sport has the ability to empower 
vulnerable people, it also has the capacity marginalize people on the basis of race, gender, and 
geographic location (Darnell & Black, 2011). 
Ultimately, there are more questions than answers on the true impact of sports. Though 
the intuition behind SDP is quite solid and organizations have been singing its praises for more 
than two decades, the question of efficient aid allocation remains. Some may ask if money spent 
on sport-related programs the best possible use of development funds and limited DDR-specific 
funding. While researchers have contributed dramatically to our understanding of the true impact 
of SDP, additional research is needed to help us understand of sport really can make meaningful 
strides towards development and DDR goals (Kidd, 2011). 
Study Interventions 
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 Three interventions were included in this research study. In this section, I review the 
components and background of each. I look at their theory of change and I discuss the 
integration of education (both vocational and non-vocational), sports, and auxiliary support 
services in their programming. 
Intervention A: Treatment as Usual (TAU). The TAU intervention was comprised of a 
traditional, individually focused DDR intervention. Participants aged 18 and older had a non-
residential intake period in which they completed paperwork, were assessed by a nurse or other 
medical professional, took an educational and vocational assessment examination, and met with 
project staff members. Men in this intervention were expected to attend group classes 4-7 hours 
per day, five days a week, for a minimum of 60 days and a maximum of 180 days. Classes were 
taught by Haitian educational professionals or project staff members which included both Haitian 
and foreign workers.  
The primary focus of the intervention was on providing vocational education and training 
in work skills so that program completers could obtain gainful employment. The theory of 
change supported by the program was grounded in strain theory. According to this theory, strain 
occurs when people are exposed to cultural values and goals which they are unable to achieve 
through culturally-appropriate methods. In this case, program leaders argued that combatants had 
embraced values which emphasized the importance of material possessions as a tangible 
demonstration of economic security in a turbulent social and economically changing society.  As 
one coordinator said, “they see wealth on TV and among those who work for the government, 
business owners, the elite, and they want to look rich with fancy shoes and a car, because those 
outward trappings of wealth communicate something to the community.”  
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During armed conflict members of gangs and other armed groups were able to improve 
their social position by taking items of value from businesses and community members. These 
stolen goods gave combatants a sense of economic stability. Program leaders argued that lack of 
employment in the post-conflict era left former combatants with no option but crime to support 
themselves. They hoped that by providing vocational education and work skills courses the men 
would obtain lawful work and have no need to turn to crime to support themselves. Social work 
services provided by this intervention were limited but focused the goal of future employment; 
thus, they typically included case management, assistance finding housing, and help obtaining 
government documents needed for employment such as a NIF (social security number) or a birth 
certificate.  
Program staff described participants in Intervention A as successful if they were 
employed or looking for employment after the program ended, if they had abstained from 
criminal behavior, and if they reduced or eliminated social contact with friends in armed groups. 
Post program employment was identified as a challenge by program staff and so the intervention 
had been modified several months before the study cohort entered to include additional 
workshops on entrepreneurship, soft work skills (e.g., being on time, managing conflict with a 
supervisor), and self-employment business management. Program participants were given 
several options for vocational training and work such as masonry, construction work, selling cell 
phone credit on the street, and making charcoal briquettes.  
All men who applied to participate in this program and who met the qualifications of 
being a demobilizing member of a recognized armed group were given a place in the program. 
For this study, two thirds of the men in one cohort were randomly chosen to be interviewed and 
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participate in a longitudinal study as part of a program evaluation. It should be noted that the 
men were randomly chosen for the study but they were not randomly chosen for the intervention. 
Every man who entered the DDR program was given the option of doing intervention A. Those 
who did not decide to do this program were then given the option of participating in a lottery for 
the limited slots available in interventions B and C.  
One challenge encountered by the research team at the time was the poor record keeping 
of the implementing partners, the funders (which included two UN agencies as well as several 
foreign government aid organizations), and the overseeing DDR agency. Of the 61 men from the 
TAU program who were randomly chosen to participate in the study, only 50 could be located. 
For the rest of the participants, it appeared that the records were either riddled with errors or 
included deliberate falsifications as the identification numbers and photocopied identification 
cards were tracked to people who did not participate in the program (and in some cases were the 
wrong age, combatant status, and/or geographic location for the program population). The 50 
men who did participate in the invention were interviewed at baseline (within a week of applying 
to be in the program) and followed for the entire duration of the study.  
Intervention B: Faith-Based Program. Intervention B was conducted by a faith-based 
NGO based in Port-au-Prince. The organization was founded in the 1990s and is directed by a 
leadership team comprised of both Haitian and foreign staff members. The organization has six 
main programs, two of which are focused on meeting the needs of at-risk youth and young 
adults. The DDR intervention began within one of these programs (the vocational training 
center) and was moved due to funding concerns to the other program which focuses on life skills 
and substance abuse treatment.  
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Funding and leadership was stable throughout the life of the intervention and follow up. 
The organization moved from seeking funding through foreign aid and international organization 
sources to a financial strategy that focused on cultivating church sponsorship, seeking large cash 
grants from Christian individuals and businesses in the United States and Canada, and other 
forms of unrestricted aid which would allow the organization to actively evangelize its program 
participants. Some intervention completers later participated in fundraising for the program with 
a handful traveling abroad to speak at Christian conferences and churches about the changes the 
program had helped them make in their lives. 
The theory of change espoused by the implementing partner organization of Intervention 
B is predicated on Christian theological beliefs pertaining to the nature of sin. In short, according 
to their program mission statement, they believe that members of armed groups engage in 
conflict because they have failed to embrace a Christian lifestyle and have not come to a saving 
knowledge of Jesus Christ. However, on further examination of the intervention itself, and 
through discussion with staff, it is clear that the program’s theory of individual change emerges 
from social control theory.  
Social control theory focuses on the durability or strength of the commitments or bonds 
an individual has to other individuals, his or her family or group, and society in general. This 
theory focuses on the human need to belong as a key motivation influencing the individual’s 
emotions, thinking, beliefs, and behavior. In the field of criminology, one foundational 
application of this theory is in answering the question: why do some people commit crimes while 
others abstain? Social control theorists answer this question by explaining that when social bonds 
are strong and the individual feels connected to society, deviant behaviors are limited. The 
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probability of deviance is however increased the moment the bonds are weak. Broken or weak 
bonds are not causes of delinquency, but they rather allow it to occur (Wiatrowski, Griswold & 
Roberts, 1981). The bonds which connect a person to society or a group include: (1) attachments 
(e.g., an expression of concern that that motivates the person to avoid or decrease crime to avoid 
frustrating a respected person or the group as a whole; (2) commitments (e.g., the investment of 
time, energy, or oneself which could be placed at risk by deviant behavior); (3) involvements 
(e.g., becoming so consumed by other activities that there is less time or energy for delinquent 
pastimes); and (4) beliefs (e.g. being socialized into and internalizing the value system of a group 
or society).  
Services offered within Intervention B included six core components: spiritual growth; 
personal development; life skills; education foundations; professional exploration; training, and 
development; and community integration. Each of these components focus on aspects of 
introducing, promoting, teaching, internalizing, and strengthening beliefs and behaviors tied to 
social bonds, which ultimately creates a situation in which the program participant responds to 
social controls and refrains from criminal behaviors.  
Sports and organized recreation were emphasized has a key part of facilitating 
community integration (through organized football play in neighborhood leagues as well as free 
play in participant’s own neighborhood). Sports and organized recreation activities were used to 
teach life skills. In one activity participants went horseback riding and were coached on how to 
interact with the horse in a way that was respectful, calming, and which met the horse’s needs to 
food, water, rest, and affection. Participants had to delay meeting their own needs until after 
caring for the horse and had to control their voices and actions to avoid startling the animal or 
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causing it anxiety. Sports were used as daily or every other day afternoon break during classes 
and meetings. They were frequently used in metaphors and analogies. Sports were even 
integrated into bible study lessons and math tutoring. Intervention C staff highlighted the 
usefulness of sports and recreational activities in venting aggression, teaching cooperation, 
promoting teamwork, and developing friendships with non-crime involved men. 
Intervention C: Education Focused Intervention. Intervention C was a sustained effort 
by four NGOs to promote professional and classical education opportunities to violence-involved 
youth and young adults throughout Haiti. The initiative underwent a number of changes during 
its tenure with multiple administrators, erratic funding patterns, and frequent changes in service 
locations. Despite these challenges, during the duration of the period studied, as well as for 
several years before and since, the program was able to consistently provide educational, 
vocational, social work and medical services to more than a dozen participant cohorts.  
Services provided as part of Intervention C can be roughly categorized into seven service 
areas: (1) Educational assessment, case management, and support including workshops and 
disability services; (2) Education provision including individual and small group tutoring, 
classical school, high school completion, vocational school, philo and post-secondary academic 
learning; (3) Direct services and coordination of services related to housing, medical/dental care, 
mental health care, obtaining documents, substance abuse treatment, accessing food aid, low-cost 
and free child care options, and transportation; (4) Life skills training; (5) pro-social political 
involvement opportunities and coaching including public advocacy, service learning and 
community service; (6) vocational skills and practical experience including workshops, 
internship placement and supervision, and vocational mentorship; and (7) sports and recreation. 
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Intervention C’s theory of change emerged from the founding NGO’s focus on social 
ecology and reduction of social disorganization. Social ecology emphasizes the importance of 
place. Crime is linked to deficits in the participant’s neighborhood and it was these deficits that 
made participants more vulnerable to engaging in crime and joining armed groups. Recognizing 
that members of armed groups have been socialized into the adoption of values that embrace 
crime, Intervention C’s leadership theorizes that group members can, through a process of 
education and resocialization, transform their values and adopt the values of those who 
participate in education (who are a distinct group within Haitian society). Participants thus move 
from being insurgents to being scholars. 
Intervention C’s theory of change takes this one step farther. Not only are participants 
changing their views and values through the process of resocialization into a new (educationally 
focused) community while at school (where they frequently lived in dormitory housing during 
the school week, an element of place-changing intentionally included in the intervention), when 
home in their communities participants were expected to engage in pro-social political 
organizing to change and challenge the marginalization experienced by their communities.   In 
this way, participants can disrupt the normative structure of the own community to argue for and 
promote other values while also advocating for changes in social structures that belittle, 
marginalize and oppress residents of poor zones. 
At the micro-level, staff emphasized how this works because, they argue, an individual’s 
self-perceptions and identity can have a significant impact on their potential for success post-
demobilization. Job readiness training increases the tenacity of participants or builds on tenacity 
that participants possess prior to the program, in spite of challenges. Furthermore, it can improve 
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an individuals’ ability to cope with difficult life situations. Ultimately, these factors empower 
individuals and enable them to approach post-intervention life with more confidence. This is 
grounded in the literature which argues that though stigma and limitations on agency exist, 
empowerment through education or job skills training reduces a propensity towards recidivism 
(Jackson, 2013).  Ellison (2012) offers support to this perspective of the role of education in the 
peacebuilding process. He offers five strong theoretical viewpoints. First, skills training provides 
opportunities for employment and make violence a less attractive option. Second, education 
protects participants by promoting disaster survival and preparedness skills. Third, education 
helps re-establish ‘normality’ for young people.  Fourth, education helps make up lost ground 
and helps deter future violence. By raising the opportunity cost of going to war for a now-
educated individual, people are less likely to take risks with violence. Lastly, education 
contributes to social transformation by infusing various social sectors with more human capital.  
Each of these aspects of education is touched on in the programmatic content of Intervention C’s 
activities.  
Intervention C’s theory of change also takes into account the attitudes an individual holds 
which may have an impact on their propensity for crime. A pro-criminal attitude (PCAs) include 
such things as, guilt attribution, shame versus pride orientation, attitudes towards and plans to 
reoffend, attitudes toward the law, cognitive distortions, and pro-criminal orientation. Though 
the concept of PCA means different things in different studies, Banse et al. (2013) demonstrate 
that pro-criminal attitudes are generally significant in a person’s likelihood of recidivism. 
However, they also find that we know little about how to curb pro-criminal attitudes and that 
more research is needed on effective interventions focused on this issue. Similarly, Addo (2014) 
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argue that work programs that are designed to improve the cognitive skills improve a prisoner's 
self-esteem and job prospects upon release. This study is limited by its small sample size (n=2), 
though it offers a deep and thoughtful case study of the situation of particular Ghanaian 
prisoners. 
In the intervention C program, this attitudinal-based argument can be conceptualized 
through a theory of cognitive transformation. Group discussions and mentoring focused on an 
individual’s perception of how life would be after program completion and the amount of control 
they felt over their lives. Social workers and program staff facilitated encouragement by family 
and friends and their involvement in planning, undertaking, and celebrating educational and 
vocational achievement as program staffers believe this both helped improve an individual’s 
perception of control and as well as their self-efficacy in achieving crime-free self-sufficiency 
after program completion. These attitudes are found to be key in easing the transition from 
institutional care and decreasing the chance of future criminal involvement (Forste, Clarke, & 
Bahr, 2010). 
Concluding Thoughts 
This chapter completed a review of the relevant literature which contextualized this 
dissertation research study. I focused on education and sports related components of the 
rehabilitation process; both of which whose success has been empirically supported. Though 
much of the existing literature on these types of rehabilitation interventions has been outside of 
the DDR context, it highlights findings which are relevant to the population served by DDR. In 
particular, the need for auxiliary services to support educational programming was illuminated in 
the literature. Next, I reviewed the three interventions examined in this study, including their 
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theories of change and their intervention components. In the next chapter I research methods 
used for this study. 
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Chapter 6: Research Methods 
The research poses the question: which intervention is the most successful at reducing 
post-intervention criminal involvement of participants in three different types of DDR programs? 
To answer this larger question we must also determine how the three interventions differed from 
each other. What services did each provide? Was there fidelity in the way that the interventions 
were implemented or did some participants receive a different intervention than others within the 
same program? We also need to look at how we measure success for the men who participated in 
these interventions. And we need to examine the longitudinal data to see if there were any other 
factors related to the success or failure of the individual participants in the three DDR 
interventions. 
I begin this section by describing the study design. Next I turn to the data: what it 
includes and when it was collected as well as the storage, cleaning, and coding of the data. Lastly 
I will explain the particular clinical measures used and how they relate to the primary research 
question being posed in this dissertation. 
The data set includes information on 741 men (aged 18-31 at baseline) in three treatment 
groups and two non-treatment groups. The treatment groups included: Intervention A, a 
traditional, “treatment as usual” approach, which included 50 men (6.7 percent of the study 
participants); Intervention B, a faith based intervention, which included 150 men (20.2 of the 
study participants); and Intervention C, an education focused program, which included 252 (34 
percent of the study participants). The two non-treatment groups were comprised on men who 
were eligible and were offered the opportunity to participate but refused to do so (n=45; 6.1 
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percent of the study participants) and men who were eligible to participate but were not selected 
to do so (n=244; 32.9 percent of the study participants).  
Figure 6.1 
Individual Selection into Intervention Programs 
 
Not all applicants for Intervention B and C were accepted into the program. Men 
interested in participating could apply, but they were subjected to a lottery and randomized into 
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either Intervention B or C, or not offered a spot in the program at all (those not offered a spot 
were placed in program A). There were limited places in the intervention B and C programs 
while intervention A accepted all who applied for the program. For this study, two thirds of the 
participants (n=252) were randomly chosen from among all intervention participants to be in the 
longitudinal program evaluation. See figure 6.1 for a visual representation of selection into the 
three interventions. 
Study Design 
This study compares two experimental conditions (intervention B and intervention C) 
with treatment as usual (intervention A), a group of individuals who were eligible to participate 
in DDR but chose not to participate, and a group ex-combatants randomly chosen from the 
general population who did not participate in DDR (all of whom were eligible, some of whom 
applied for DDR but did not get selected and some of whom did not apply for DDR programs). 
The three intervention groups included in the study are TAU (intervention A), the faith-based 
program (intervention B), and the education focused program (intervention C). 
The three intervention groups were comprised of randomly chosen participants (2/3 from 
each program cohort) to be interviewed and participate in long series of follow up interviews. It 
should be noted that though the individuals were randomly chosen from the list of participants, 
they were not all randomized into the intervention in which they participated (see figure 6.1). All 
men who volunteered to participate in DDR were given the option of being in Intervention A. Of 
those who did, 2/3 were randomly chosen for this follow up study. Those who did not decide to 
do Intervention A were given the option of entering a lottery for Interventions B or C. Two thirds 
of those who participated in interventions B and C were selected from each of the two 
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interventions to participate in this follow up study. Selection and inclusion criteria for the 
remaining two study groups are discussed below. No incentives were offered for any 
participants. 
Non-Treatment: “Eligible but declined” to participate in DDR. Not all men who were 
offered a place in one of the three interventions decided to participate. In total, 92 men who were 
offered a spot in one of three interventions decided to forgo the opportunity. Of these, 64 
declined to participate in DDR during their initial screening interview when they were given the 
option of either doing the TAU (intervention A) program or participating in a lottery to get into 
one of the other two programs. Sixteen decided not to participate after being chosen by lottery 
for the faith-based program (intervention B). Another dozen decided not to participate in DDR 
after being offered a space through the lottery in the education-focused program (intervention C). 
Of these, half were randomly chosen using a Tisch number table and asked to participate in a 
longitudinal program evaluation. One declined, but 45 men agreed to participate in regular 
interviews about themselves on the same schedule as the intervention group participants, for the 
next eight years.  This group comprised 6.1 percent of the research study participants.  
Non-Treatment: “Eligible but not selected”. A fifth group of men were included in 
study. These men were eligible to participate in DDR did not participated in any DDR program. 
Some never applied for DDR because they did not know it was an option, they did not know how 
to apply, they were not interested in applying, or they experienced some barrier(s) preventing 
application such as lack of transportation to the DDR office for the required application 
interview. Others applied but didn’t apply on time or were not selected for a DDR program. 
These men form a control group for this study. However, unlike a traditional control group in 
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which individualized are randomized into either treatment or control, this group includes 244 
men (32.9 percent of the study participants) drawn from a national survey of the general 
population. Each man was between 18 and 31 years of age, was an active member of recognized 
armed group or had recently (within the last six months) been demobilized from an armed group, 
and was a Haitian citizen eligible to participate in DDR. Each man either did not apply for DDR 
or applied but was not given the option to participate (due to program size limitations, 
geographic distance to the program site, or another reason). 
Sampling for general population comparison participant. A multistage process was 
used to sample communal sections, households, and respondents. The sample was drawn from all 
ten of Haiti’s geographic departments with representation of both urban and rural areas. The 
most recent estimated population figures for Haiti nationally in 2007 (baseline) were based on 
projections from the national census and published IHSI (IHSI, 2007). These figures were used 
to calculate sample size. Each communal section was labeled as “very violent”, “moderately 
violent”, or “mildly violent” based on crime rates provided by the Haitian National Police. First, 
the sample size for each of Haiti’s ten geographic departments was calculated. In calculating the 
sample size, a 1.96 level of confidence measure was assumed (for a 95% confidence interval); 
the value of the margin of error was set at 0.05, the baseline level of the indicators was assumed 
to be 0.5 (this was a conservative value as no previous data was available to estimate the 
percentage of men eligible for DDR at the communal section level), the design effect was 2.5, 
and the expected response rate was 90%. 
The sample size was calculated using the formula   where Z equals the 
level of confidence measure, P equals the baseline level of the indicators, and e equals the 
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margin of error ( ). The initial calculation was 384.16. However 
this number must always be adjusted to account for the design effect of the sample design, the 
number of Communal Section types (in this case, three: very violent, moderately violent, and 
mildly violent), estimates to be reported, and the anticipated non-response. Finite population 
correction was unnecessary as the initial n calculated was 10% or more of the size of the 
majority of the communal section types. Next, the n was multiplied by the design effect and the 
number of population density types ( ). Lastly, an adjustment 
was made for expected non-response ( ).  
The next element in the sampling process was determining the number of households 
who would be selected from each department by communal section type. First a determination 
was made of the proportion of the target population present in each communal section type by 
department. The proportion was multiplied by the total sample size and rounded to the nearest 
whole number to determine the minimum number of individuals to be surveyed in each 
department by communal section type. This number was divided by 20 (the cluster size) and 
rounded up to the nearest whole number to determine the number of clusters per department. 
The basic probability weight for each of the sampled clusters was calculated by 
multiplying the cluster population by the number of violent crimes recorded in the previous 
calendar year and by the number of clusters and then dividing by the total population to get the 
probability of each cluster being sampled (prob1). Next, the cluster population was divided by 
the number of individuals to be sampled in each cluster to get the probability of each individual 
being sampled in each cluster (prob2). The basic weight is the inverse of the probability of 
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selection: .  A weighted simple random sample of communal sections was 
generated in SPSS.  
The second phase of sampling involved the random selection of houses within each 
communal section. Survey sampling in rural Haiti is challenging; there are few marked roads and 
most homes have no address or house number. There are no set lists of residents from which to 
draw a sample. The lack of roads or paved paths in rural areas inhibits the possibility of sampling 
roads and crossroads. Instead, RGCS (Random GPS Coordinate Sampling) was used to generate 
coordinates in the selected areas. Invalid coordinates (those landing on water or on impassible 
areas) were eliminated using satellite photographs and additional coordinates were generated to 
replace these. 
A rectangular GPS strategy was used for RGCS. This method allows the researcher to 
restrict the points that are randomly generated to a rectangular area on the earth's surface that the 
researcher defines. To do this, the research team specified the latitudes for the north and south 
sides of the rectangle, and longitudes for the west and east sides of the rectangle. The rectangle 
covers the entire area being surveyed, including, in some cases, bodies of water and parts of the 
Dominican Republic. This first step in this process is to map the boundaries of the communal 
section or obtain the shape file of the communal section. The farthest northern, southern, eastern, 
and western borders were then marked by pinning in Google Earth.  The longitude and latitude 
of each pin was converted from Google Earth to MatLab and a rectangle was created.  
It should be noted that this is never a true rectangle because the earth is curved, so 
longitude lines also curve to converge at the north and south poles. In addition, the earth is 
almost spherical but not completely. There is a tiny equatorial bulge which makes the radius at 
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the equator approximately a third of 1% bigger than the radius at the north and south poles. The 
earth also has mountains and valleys which could be taken into account when generating a list of 
survey locations (adding a third dimension and perhaps giving large mountain ranges a greater 
probability of being selected than flat plains).  
However for household surveys, in practice, researchers treat the earth as it appears on a 
two-dimensional map. Because household survey researchers are selecting people in homes that 
live on the surface of the earth (rather than, say, people living underground in caves which could 
be of varying depth or height from the surface in addition to varying in latitude and longitude), 
rectangles are a convenient way to define regions. And, for this purposes it provides a way to 
generate random coordinates on a somewhat spherical but mostly biaxial ellipsoid-shaped planet. 
When calculating the random coordinates in a rectangle the fact that latitude lines vary in 
length was taken into account, with the understanding that the longest latitude is the equator and 
the other latitude lines diminish in length according to a trigonometric function until the poles 
are reached. The north and south poles have a zero length latitude line. The random longitude 
was more easily calculated; all longitudinal lines in a rectangular region had an equal probability 
of being chosen.  
The steps for completing the calculations used for this study are listed below. Initial 
values are (northern latitude of the rectangle),  (southern latitude of the 
rectangle),  (western longitude of the rectangle), and  (eastern longitude of 
the rectangle) with  and  as unique random numbers between 0-1.   
1. Convert the GPS coordinates to radians.  
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2. Compute a random latitude ( ) such that points on longer latitude lines in the rectangle 
are more likely to be chosen than points on shorter latitude lines. 
 
3. Find the width of the rectangle.   
4. If  is less than 0, then  
5. Compute the random longitude ( ) between  and  with all 
longitudes having equal probability of being chosen. 
 
6. Evaluate longitude. 
 
 
There were several additional steps which were taken after the initial list of GPS 
coordinates was created and plotted on the map. Each site was examined individually to assure 
that it is within the boundaries of the shapefile for the communal section. In some cases a point 
landed on or near a border and particular care needed to be taken to inform the enumerator and 
their supervisor about the situation so that they know how far to travel after spinning the pen 
before they hit the edge of the communal section.  
Coordinates were evaluated individually by a human using Google Earth and ArcGIS in 
the order in which they were generated. Those falling outside the area were eliminated and the 
research assistant continued down the list until the maximum number of coordinates was 
reached. Because the rectangle covered a larger area than the communal section itself, no areas 
were excluded and each location had an equal probability of being selected for inclusion in the 
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study. For this reason rectangular GPS sampling was used during the survey; it was the best fit 
for the geographic boundaries of the surveyed areas and it reduced the possibility of bias of 
circular overlap presented by alternative methods.  
During the next phase of sampling, the research team visited the GPS coordinate in 
person. After arriving at the coordinate, the direction in which to travel was chosen using the 
spin the pen method. Spin the pen is a standard approach adopted in multi-stage cluster 
sampling. It involves enumerators standing in the center of a given cluster and choosing a 
direction randomly, e.g. by spinning a pen. “All dwellings from the center to the edge of a given 
cluster in the chosen direction are counted, one is chosen at random and interviews are 
conducted. Additional houses are selected along the line away from the center.” Shannon et al 
(2012). The enumerator then walked in that direction until he or she reaches the nth home (the 
number of households was randomly chosen using a Kish number table and provided to the 
enumerator). This method of selection overcomes some difficulties in sampling rural Haitian 
communities; it lacks the likelihood of circular overlap which can occur with a simple random 
sample of GPS coordinates weighted by the number of homes with x meters. See Shannon et al 
(2012) and Kondo (2014). 
However, this method does not overcome another important limitation, the possibility 
that the boundary of the cluster may be reached before the number of homes being selected has 
been identified. Shannon et al (2012) recommends that if the cluster edge is reached before the 
sample size is achieved; the interviewers move clockwise to the next house and then go back 
towards the original GPS starting point, conducting interviews along the way. However this has 
not worked well in practice in Haiti as it necessitates that enumerators each having a GPS 
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locator, being familiar enough with its use to read it as it scrolls through a dynamic format listing 
locations (rather than the static single location when identifying the GPS starting point), and 
having enough battery power to use the locator throughout much of the day. Instead, the number 
of sampled households per cluster was reduced (and the number of clusters was correspondingly 
increased) to tighten the geographic area surveyed and thus lessen the possibility that a given 
enumerator may stray towards the border of a communal section.  
Selected households were visited up to four times before the house was labeled a non-
responder. An adult household member completed a short informed consent process and then 
answered a series of screening questions to determine if a DDR eligible individual lived in the 
household. In cases where more than one DDR eligible individual lived in the household, the 
eligible adult with the most recent birthday was the primary respondent and was invited to 
participate in the study. This was the final phase of sampling. In the event that the selected adult 
refused to participate, the home was labeled a “non-responder”; no other individual in the home 
was selected in that individual’s place.  
 Of the 2912 households visited by the research team, 265 had a positive screener. In the 
end, 244 men agreed to participate in the study. The response rate of 92.0 percent, which may be 
high in other countries, is typical for household survey research in Haiti.  All men in this group 
agreed to participate in regular interviews about themselves on the same schedule as the 
intervention group participants, for the next eight years.   
Data Collection and Management 
A comprehensive interview lasting several hours was conducted at each point of contact 
with the study participant (see Figure 6.2 for the interview schedules) . The interview included 
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clinical measures, surveys, assessment tests, and open-ended qualitative interview questions. In 
addition, each participant completed a medical examination and was tested for drugs and alcohol. 
Interviews were completed at a place of the participant’s choosing including the program site, a 
school or workplace, home, a friend’s home, a community location, or a clinic. Medical 
examinations and substance use tests were commonly conducted at the office of the 
implementing partner or a local clinic, though in some cases, particularly for non-intervention 
study participants, these occurred at the individual’s home.  
Figure 6.2 
Interview Schedule by Cohort and Program 
 A: TAU B: Faith C: 
Education 
Not 
Selected 
 Cohort   
 One Two Three   
T1 Baseline  Sep. 2008 Jul. 2007 Dec. 2007 Sep. 2008 Dec. 2007 Jul. 2007 
T2 6 Months  Feb. 2009 Dec. 2007 Jul. 2008 Feb. 2009 Jul. 2008 Dec. 2007 
T3 12 Months Feb. 2010 Jan. 2009 Aug. 2009 Feb. 2010 Aug. 2009 Jan. 2009 
T4 24 Months Feb. 2011 Feb. 2010 Aug. 2010 Feb. 2011 Aug. 2010 Feb. 2010 
T5 36 Months Mar. 2012 Mar. 2011 Aug. 2011 Mar. 2012 Aug. 2011 Mar. 2011 
T6 48 Months Mar. 2013 Feb. 2012 Aug. 2012 Mar. 2013 Aug. 2012 Feb. 2012 
T7 60 Months Mar. 2014 Jan. 2013 Aug. 2013 Mar. 2014 Aug. 2013 Jan. 2013 
T8 72 Months Mar. 2015 Jan. 2014 Aug. 2014 Mar. 2015 Aug. 2014 Jan. 2014 
 
All interviews were conducted in Haitian Creole by trained, experienced researchers. 
Most questions were asked orally and the information was recorded by the researcher using a 
paper and pencil or computer program. For non-clinical information, data was recorded on paper 
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and computer files and stored in the participant’s dossier. This included observational data from 
program staff, family members, teachers, and work supervisors, as well as medical, vocational, 
educational, social, and psychological assessments. Also included in the dossier was a record of 
services received and the dates such services were delivered including the number of hours or 
person days of service, the provider, and the content of the services. 
Figure 6.3 
Percentage of study participants interviewed at each interaction by group 
 
A: TAU B: Faith C: Education 
Not Selected 
for DDR 
Declined 
DDR 
T1 Baseline  100% (50) 100% (150) 100% (252) 100% (244) 100% (45) 
T2 6 Months  86% (43) 99% (149) 97% (245) 99% (242) 100% (45) 
T3 12 Months 86% (43) 99% (149) 94% (238) 98% (240) 100% (45) 
T4 24 Months 86% (43) 99% (149) 91% (230) 97% (237) 100% (45) 
T5 36 Months 86% (43) 99% (149) 89% (225) 97% (236) 97% (44) 
T6 48 Months 86% (43) 98% (148) 89% (225) 96% (234) 100% (45) 
T7 60 Months 86% (43) 98% (148) 88% (222) 95% (232) 100% (45) 
T8 72 Months 84% (42) 96% (144) 87% (219) 94% (230) 97% (44) 
 
For clinical measures, the respondent was given an answer sheet with clip art of neutral 
pictures and asked to circle or mark the one that corresponded with his or her response while the 
researcher read the question. For instance, when completing the Center for Epidemiological 
Studies Short Depression Scale (CES-D 10), the respondent was given a piece of paper with a 
code that corresponded to the item number of the measure. On the paper were four pictures: a 
purple circle, the ocean, a bayawonn tree, and a pile of furniture. The researcher read a prompt to 
the respondent: “The next item is: I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. If that 
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was true for you rarely or none of the time, so a day or less, mark the purple circle. If that was 
true that you had trouble keeping your mind on what you were doing some or a little of the time, 
so one or two days, mark the picture of the ocean. If that was true occasionally or a moderate 
amount of time, so 3 or 4 days in the past week, mark the picture of the bayawonn tree. And if 
that was true for you all of the time, so 5, 6, or all of the last seven days, you’ll see a picture of a 
pile of furniture with a bed and a table, go ahead and mark that picture. Remember, you can only 
mark one picture. Do you want me to read the options again?”  Respondents marked the picture 
privately and then placed their response papers in an envelope that they sealed and which was 
returned to the researcher to be later opened and entered by a third party. This was done to 
reduce the possibility of response bias. 
Data Cleaning, Coding and Storage. 
 Data for this study was obtained from the paper copies of the study materials in the 
program records or individual dossier as well as from the paper copies of the individual surveys 
and assessments. Information was entered into an excel spreadsheet in the field, translated into 
English if needed, and then double checked with a second data set of the same material to 
identify data entry errors. These were corrected. Some data was recorded. For instance, the final 
scores for some clinical measures such as the Levenson Locus of Control Scales were entered 
along with the interpretation of the score, rather than the responses for individual measures 
items. Demographic information was obtained from both forms and from narrative notes from 
intake and subsequent case management sessions and then was coded using common labels (for 
instance, years of education was converted to the highest level of education completed).  
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Clinical Measures 
A number of clinical measures were included in the study. These included the McMaster 
Family Assessment Device, the Generalized Self-Efficacy (GSE) scale, and the Levenson Locus 
of Control (LOC) scale, among others. Each measure and its use will be explained in detail in 
this section.  Figure 6.4 lists the measures used at each interaction. 
Figure 6.4 
Study Measures Used During Interviews 
 Measures Used 
T1 Baseline  AUDIT, CCA, Crime questionnaire, Demographic and program questionnaire, 
CESD-10, Job Readiness Checklist, Employer/supervisor evaluation, GSE, 
Levenson LOC, McMaster FAD, MOAS, PCE, PCWO, PV, Short Hardiness 
Scale, SRRS 
T2 6 Months  
T3 12 Months 
AUDIT, CCA, Crime questionnaire, Demographic and program questionnaire, 
CESD-10, Employer/supervisor evaluation, GSE, Levenson LOC, McMaster 
FAD, MOAS, PCE, PCWO, PV, Short Hardiness Scale, SRRS 
T4 24 Months 
T5 36 Months 
AUDIT, CCA, Crime questionnaire, Decision Making Skills, Demographic 
and program questionnaire, CESD-10, Employer/supervisor evaluation, GSE, 
Levenson LOC, McMaster FAD, MOAS, PCE, PCWO, PV, Short Hardiness 
Scale, SRRS 
T6 48 Months 
T7 60 Months 
T8 72 Months 
 
McMaster Model of Family Functioning (MMFF) Family Assessment Device (FAD). 
The McMaster Family Assessment Device (FAD) is a questionnaire developed by Epstein, 
Baldwin and Bishop in 1983 at a time when interest in family therapy and family systems was 
rapidly growing (Epstein, Baldwin, & Bishop, 1983). Epstein et al. (1983) developed the FAD in 
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order to aid clinicians in the identification of problematic areas of family functioning that 
necessitate investigation at the biological, sociological, and psychological level.  The FAD can 
also be used before and after an intervention in order to assess intervention efficacy (“Family 
Assessment Device”, 2013).  
According to Epstein et al. (1983) the FAD is to be distributed to each family member 
aged 12 and above because the differing perspectives offered by family members have the 
potential to yield vast amounts of clinically significant information. The FAD was created based 
on the responses of members of a group of 112 families, plus the responses of 209 individuals 
who were not interviewed together with their families. Of the family group, 93 families had an 
adult family member currently hospitalized as an inpatient on a psychiatric unit. Four families 
had a child in a psychiatric day program. Six families had a family member in a stroke 
rehabilitation unit, and nine families had a family member in an advanced psychology course. 
The 209 individuals who were interviewed without their families were students in an 
introductory college course in psychology. Practical considerations prevented their families from 
participating in the study (Epstein et al., 1983). Demographic details were not reported (“Family 
Assessment Device”, 2013). 
Research reveals an acceptable level of reliability for the FAD (test-retest alpha = 0.71, 
Chronbach’s alpha = .78) (“Family Assessment Device”, 2013). However, the FAD correlates 
poorly with social desirability (“Family Assessment Device”, 2013).  The FAD correlates 
moderately with other family functioning self-report assessment tools (Miller, Epstein, Bishop, 
& Keitner, 1985). Cut-off scores indicating healthy/unhealthy families show acceptable levels of 
sensitivity and specificity (Miller et al, 1985). The FAD contains 60 items and uses a 4-point 
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Likert scale (“Family Assessment Device, 2013). Possible responses are: Strongly agree, Agree, 
Disagree, and Strongly disagree. Higher scores indicate higher levels of family dysfunction 
(“Family Assessment Device”, 2013).   
The FAD is based on the McMaster Family Functioning Model (Epstein et al, 1983). The 
60-question FAD includes around seven scales including general communication, affective 
responsiveness, problem solving, behavior control, affective involvement, roles, and family 
functioning (Family Assessment Device, 2013). The first 6 subscales correspond with the 6 
dimensions of the McMaster Family Functioning Model. Subscales are scored by dividing the 
number of points associated with the responses selected by the number of items in each scale 
(“Family Assessment Device”, 2013), with a clinical cut-off score of 2.0 (Miller et al., 1985).The 
descriptions of each of these scales are included in the figure below. (Stevenson-Hinde & 
Akister, 1995) 
Figure 6.5 
Family Assessment Device (FAD) Scales 
Seven Scales of the FAD  
(adapted from Stevenson-Hinde & Akister, 1995) 
Communication Clear/direct exchange of information 
Affective Responsiveness Situationally appropriate expression of affect 
Problem Solving Familial capacity to function while solving problems 
Behavior Control Maintaining behavioral standards 
Affective Involvement Caring about each other’s activities and issues 
Roles Patterns of behavior for addressing family needs 
General Family Functioning General assessment of the other six FAD components 
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Though use of the entire FAD would be ideal in assessing a family’s functioning, often 
researchers opt to use the short-form General Family Functioning component of the FAD. This 
instrument has 12 questions that capture elements of all other components of the FAD. Research 
funding limitations, survey fatigue, and logistical constraints of research involving 
children/parents, all serve as legitimate reasons for not administering the entire FAD. The 
general family functioning portion of the scale has been highly effective in assessing the ability 
of a family to communicate and interact on a day-to-day basis, particularly in traumatic or crisis-
laden situations. It has been used and tested in numerous studies, demonstrating a high level of 
reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the replicability of results in repeated trials, while 
validity is the extent to which the instrument actually measures what it claims to measure. The 
60-item questionnaire requires the research subject to self-report their agreement according to a 
four-point Likert scale. The scores can be disaggregated into the seven subcomponents, or can be 
looked at holistically. A low sore on the FAD-General Family Functioning demonstrates a 
healthy family environment, whereas a high score demonstrates a dysfunctional family 
environment. (Akister & Sevenson-Hinde, 1991; Epstein, Baldwin, & Bishop, 1983; Miller, 
2003). The FAD-General Functioning Scale has been used across a number of different countries 
and cultural contexts including Australia (Renzaho, Kumanyika, Tucker, 2010), the UK 
(Goodyear, Nicol, Eavis, & Pollinger, 1982), the Netherlands (Wenniger, 1993), Jordan  (Al-
Krenawi, Graham, John R, & Al Gharaibeh, 2011),  Croatia (Maršanić, Margetić , Jukić, Matko, 
& Grgic, 2013), China (Ma, Yao, & Zhao, 2013), and Haiti (Kolbe & Jean, 2014).  
Levenson Multidimensional Locus of Control Scales. Since the introduction of the 
locus of control construct in the 1950s, it has been elaborated on and modified by researchers in 
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a variety of disciplines including psychology, sociology, political science, public health and 
social work (Lumpkin, 1985). The first two LOC measures to be widely used included Rotter’s 
Internal-External (I-E) scale which consisted of 23 forced choice items and six filler items and 
Bailer’s 23 question LOC scale that was designed for use with school aged children (Benham, 
1995). In addition, several additional measures have been created and Rotter’s I-E scale has been 
used in literally hundreds of research studies, some of which have also adapted the scale for 
specific contexts (Twenge, Zhang, & Im, 2004). In addition to Rotter’s I-E scale, two other 
alternative clinical measures for LOC have been developed and widely used in research. 
James developed an alternative LOC scale to that created by Rotter (his included five 
point Likert scale questions in contrast to Rotter’s forced choice questions). This new scale was 
based on his model positing that there were two distinct expectancy shifts at process in human 
decision making which underlie LOC: 1) typical expectancy shifts in which believe that a 
success or failure will be followed by a similar outcome, and 2) atypical expectancy shifts in 
which one believes that a success or failure will be followed by a dissimilar outcome (Kundi, 
2014). Subsequent research suggested that individual expectancy shifts were correlated with the 
decision to act or not, and the type of behavior in which an individual chooses to engage.  As 
expectancy concerns beliefs about future events, it is critical to understanding LOC. Expectancy-
value theory states that if an individual values a particular outcome and that individual believes 
that a specific action will produce that outcome then they are more likely to take that specific 
action (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). While Rotter (1990) viewed LOC as unidimensional (from an 
internal to an external control), Levenson (1973) argued that LOC was actually 
multidimensional, encompassing three completely independent dimensions of internality, chance 
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and “powerful others.” Levenson’s model allows for measurement on each independent 
dimension, as some may exert a more powerful influence on particular types of behavior than 
other dimensions. Levenson argued that rather than being unidimensional, locus of control is 
multidimensional concept with internal beliefs being orthogonal to external beliefs about control. 
Levenson argued that researchers could understand and even predict future behavior by studying 
the chance and fate constructs separately from beliefs about external control by powerful others.  
The Levenson Locus of Control scale was created with three subscales, each with eight 
items, to measure beliefs about internal control, powerful others, and chance. Together the scores 
measure a generalized locus of control (the subscale items are added together with 24 points 
added to each subscale to form the generalized locus of control score). This total or generalized 
LOC score has demonstrated initial evidence of discriminant validity. The subscales of powerful 
others and chance are moderately inter-correlated (r = .59) but are independent of scores on the 
internal LOC subscale. A higher score on the internal scale indicates greater internal locus of 
control while higher scores on the powerful others and chance subscales indicate a stronger 
belief that one’s fate is controlled respectively by powerful outside forces, people, or 
organizations, or by chance. 
General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE). This questionnaire was developed in Germany by 
Schwartzer and Jerusalem (1995) for purposes of assessing self-efficacy. The GSE has been 
tested in a wide age range and in populations around the world. It is unidimensional. The scale is 
available in numerous languages. The GSE enjoys high stability, reliability, and construct 
validity and has been demonstrated to be configurally equivalent across culture. The scale 
contains 10 items. Possible responses and associated values for the English version of the GSE 
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are: Not at all true = 1; Hardly true = 2; Moderately true = 3; and Exactly true = 4.  Higher scores 
indicate higher levels of self-efficacy. (“Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale”, 1995; Schwartzer & 
Jerusalem, 1995). 
Studies of cardiac patients have demonstrated a correlation between GSE scores pre-
surgery and post-surgery recovery (Schwartzer & Luszczynska, 2007). The Dutch version of the 
GSE was employed as an assessment tool in a 2013 study that revealed a link between self-
efficacy in chronically ill adolescents and their parents, and quality of life (Cramm, Strating, 
Roebroek, & Neiboer, 2013). Becker & Gable (2009) utilized an adapted version of the GSE in a 
study that found a positive correlation between self-efficacy and academic grades at an urban, 
for-profit career college. The GSE was used to assess self-efficacy in a 2010 Norwegian study 
examining interrelations between self-efficacy, life events, and psychosocial distress among 
substance abusers (Nordfjaern, Hole, & Rundmo, 2010). The study found self-efficacy to be 
associated with positive life events but not with substance abuse (Nordfjaern et al., 2010).  
American Institutes for Research (AIR) Self-Determination Assessment. The AIR 
Self-Determination Assessment is a questionnaire aimed at measuring students’ level of self-
determination while identifying student strengths and weaknesses and bringing to light explicit 
educational goals for purposes of incorporation into educational planning (“Air Self-
Determination Scales”, 2013). The tool can also be used to assess progress when administered at 
varying intervals (Wolman, Campeau, DuBois, Mithaug, Stolarski, 1994). Developed in 1993 by 
the American Institutes for Research together with Columbia Teachers’ College, the AIR Self- 
Determination Assessment is based on self-determined learning theory (Shogren, 2008).  
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The AIR Self-Determination Assessment includes subscales for capacity and opportunity 
(Shogren, 2008). There are three versions of the questionnaire. The first, aimed at students, 
contains 24 questions (12 questions relating to capacity and 12 questions on opportunity). The 
second version, for teachers, contains 30 questions (18 capacity-related questions and 12 
opportunity-related questions). The third version, which is intended for parents, contains 18 
questions (six related to capacity and twelve on opportunity) (Shogren, 2008).  In all three 
versions, there are five possible responses to each question (Wolman et al., 1994). Possible 
responses and corresponding values are: Never (=1), Almost Never (=2), Sometimes (=3), 
Almost Always (=4), and Always (=5). The final score equals the sum of the total number of 
points associated with the responses selected by the respondent. The creators of the AIR Self-
Determination Assessment do not offer explicit interpretation guidelines for scores; instead, they 
suggest that educators view scores as “springboards for discussion” (Wolman et al., 1994).  
Furthermore, educators can compare the scores of different students in order to receive an 
indication of where one student stands relative to the other. A 2012 study found that overall AIR 
scores predicted performance among adolescent students with emotional and behavioral 
disorders (Dempsey, M., 2012). During development, the AIR Self-Determination Assessment 
was tested on 450 students ranging from 6 to 25 years old. Of these, 72% came from 
economically disadvantaged backgrounds and 82% were enrolled in special education programs. 
An alternative items test of consistency revealed correlations of between .91 and .98. A split-half 
test for internal consistency yielded a correlation of .95. A 3-month test-retest revealed a 
correlation of .74. Validity was assessed by exploring the relationship between scores and the 
constructs of capacity-opportunity, home-school, and knowledge-ability-perception. Factor 
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analysis revealed results that were consistent with the conceptual nature of the scale (Wolman et 
al., 1994).  
The Modified Overt Aggression Scale (MOAS). The MOAS is a modified version of 
the Overt Aggression Scale (OAS). The OAS, introduced in 1986, was designed to measure 
changes in levels of aggression among people with mental illness (Oliver, Crawford, Rao, Reece, 
& Tyrer, 2007). The OAS contains subscales for four types of aggression: verbal aggression, 
aggression directed towards objects, aggression directed towards self, and aggression directed 
towards others. The Modified Overt Aggression Scale is a retrospective, modified version of the 
OAS and contains the same content but posed in a retrospective framework (Oliver et al., 2007).  
The MOAS was first tested in 2001 on chronic psychiatric patients during a multicenter 
drug trial relating to the treatment of aggression (Oliver et al., 2007). The study revealed good 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability (a= 0.75) and high inter-rater reliability (correlation 
coefficient = 0.96). A 1998 study involving patients in acute psychiatric wards revealed 
moderate inter-rater reliability. A 2006 study interviewed 23 carers of individuals with 
intellectual disabilities using the MOAS. The intellectually disabled individuals were being 
treated with neuroleptics at the time to control aggressive behavior. The study found the MOAS 
to be reliable in the measurement of verbal and physical aggression in individuals living in 
community settings (ICC for verbal aggression = 0.90., ICC for physical aggression = 0.90, ICC 
for overall MOAS = .93. According to Oliver et al. (2006), ICCs for other two sub scale were 
lower but still “acceptable”). The MOAS contains four items, valued at 0-4 (Kay, Wolkenfolf & 
Murril, 1998). There are five possible responses to each item, and multiple responses are 
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permitted. Item scores are multiplied by their designated weight and added together to obtain the 
final score (Sorgi et al. 1991). Higher scores indicate higher levels of aggression.  
In this study the MOAS was used to measure violence and threats by participants, a 
problem which was frequently complained about by staff interacting with new participants. The 
measure was completed by the participant’s school or program counselor based on information 
from staff and their own interactions. With non-participants, the instrument was completed by a 
teacher, head of the family, employer, village leader, or other authority figure with guidance 
from a social worker. 
Center for Epidemiological Studies Short Depression Scale (CES-D 10). This ten item 
screener is a short version of the 20-item CES-D developed in the 1970s by NIH researcher 
Lenore Radloff. It is scored by summing the points for all questions. A score of ten or higher is 
considered to demonstrate the symptomology of depression and further evaluation is 
recommended.  The CES-D-20 was developed by Radloff in 1977 for purposes of providing 
researchers in the field of depression epidemiology with a tool for assessing depression. Prior to 
its development, the only depression assessment tools available to researchers were oriented 
towards use in health care, rather than research, settings. Testing established the CES D-20 as a 
valid and reliable depression assessment tool (Radoff, 1997). Researchers however, discovered 
that many elderly found the questionnaire be confusing and time-consuming to fill out (Irwin, 
Artin, & Oxman, 1999). Using item-total correlations, a shorter and simpler version was 
developed as part of the Established Populations for Epidemiological Studies of the Elderly 
Project. Whereas the CES D-20 takes elderly respondents between 7-12 minutes to complete, the 
CES D-10 takes only an average of 2 minutes (Irwin et al, 1999).    
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The CES-10 has excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86) as well as 
excellent test-retest reliability (ICC = 0.85) (Irwin et al, 1999). Test-retest reliability for 
individual items is only poor to adequate (ICC = 0.36-0.68). Two studies, one involving middle-
ages participants (n=40) and a second involving older adults (n=68), found high levels of 
specificity and sensitivity. Positive predictor value was 85% in the former group and 35% in the 
latter (Irwin et al., 1999).  
The CES D-10 contains 10 items. Possible responses fall on a four point scale. Responses 
are divided into positive mood items (items 5 and 8) and negative mood items (items 
1,2,3,4,6,7,9, and 10). Points are as follows: Rarely or none of the time (= 0), Some or a little of 
the time (= 1), Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (=2), and Most or all of the time 
(= 3). Scores on positive items are reversed and final score reflects the sum of total item scores. 
Higher scores indicate greater number of depressive symptoms (Irwin et al., 1999).  
Crime Questionnaire. The crime questionnaire was created taking the draft 
classification of crimes recently finalized by UNODC (2014). For each crime an explanation of 
the crime was provided. The respondent was then asked on a Likert scale to indicate if they 
thought the crime was acceptable. Next the respondent was asked if they themselves had ever (at 
baseline) committed the crime and how frequently. During follow up interviews the respondent 
was asked if they had committed the crime “since the last time we talked, on DATE” and how 
frequently since that date. The researcher read the question and directed the respondent to 
answer, rereading the questions as needed.  The respondent marked their answers on a separate 
paper which was placed in an envelope and sealed by the respondent. It was opened and entered 
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into the data set by another researcher to reduce the possibility that respondents would shape 
their responses based on their interaction with the individual researcher conducting the interview.  
The crime questionnaire has subscales for property crimes, trafficking, harm or the threat 
of harm against another (crimes against people), and crimes involving sex or relationships. One 
Haiti-specific question was included in the “crimes against people” subsection. This question 
was: “Sometimes people will also threaten another person with a curse or will actually put a 
curse on another person in the hopes that it brings them bad luck, illness, financial ruin, or other 
calamities. In your lifetime, how often have you done this?” Placing a voodoo curse on another 
person, or threatening to do so, is not against the law in Haiti, though police will often take a 
written complaint (plent) from a person who says they have been victimized in this way, in an 
effort to record the interpersonal conflict or assuage the complainant.  This question was 
included to differentiate threats of voodoo curses from threats of violence or property damage; it 
was not included when calculating the final score of the instrument.  
When asked about each crime “if this has happened to you, think about how your reacted. 
If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone did this to you or a member of your household. 
Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, neutral, or good?” respondents answered on a 
four point Likert scale with one being very bad and four being good. When asked about each 
crime “In your lifetime, how often have you done this?” or “Since the last time we talked on 
[date], how often have you done this?” possible responses were “never” (0 points), “once” (1 
point), “twice” (2 points), and “three or more times” (3 points). Points were added for each 
subscale to create a subscale score for acceptability (how “okay” the person thought the crime 
was) and experience (the respondent’s personal involvement in that crime during their lifetime or 
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since the last interaction for data collection). The experience subscales were added together to 
create a total crime score. 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT). This brief questionnaire was 
developed in 1982 by the World Health Organization (WHO) for purposes of early identification 
of excessive drinking or potentially dangerous drinking patterns (Babor, Higgins-Biddle, 
Saunders, & Monteiro, 2001). The AUDIT is designed for administration by health-care workers 
and is available in a variety of languages, including Hindi, Bulgarian, Spanish, Greek, Turkish, 
Italian, Portuguese, and Chinese. It is the only alcohol-screening test developed for cross-
national use. Items are based on the responses of 2000 individuals living in health care facilities 
across six nations. Current drinkers comprised 64% of the sample. Of current drinkers, 25% had 
been diagnosed with alcohol dependency (Babor et al, 2001).  
According to Babor et al. (2001), studies involving different population samples 
worldwide support validity (“At the recommended cut-off of 8, most studies have found very 
favorable sensitivity and usually lower, but still acceptable, specificity, for current ICD-10 
alcohol use disorders as well as the risk of future harm”). A number of studies indicate high 
internal consistency, and a test-retest study involving cocaine abusers, alcoholics, and non-
hazardous drinkers yielded a reliability level of .86 (Babor et al., 2001). The AUDIT contains 10 
items, with values ranging from 0-4. Subscales exist for amount and frequency of drinking, 
problems relating to alcohol use, and alcohol dependence. Possible responses vary according to 
item. Points are added together to create the score. A score of 8 or above indicates hazardous and 
harmful use of alcohol. Barbor et al. (2001) suggests that health care workers respond to scores 
as follows: For scores between 8 and 15, health workers should offer respondent simple advice 
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regarding the dangers associated with excessive drinking. For scores between 16 and 19, health 
workers should recommend brief counseling as well as continued monitoring. For scores 20 and 
above, health workers should conduct further diagnostic evaluation for alcohol dependence 
(Barbor et al., 2001; Team, 2008).  
Short Hardiness Scale (SHS). The SHS, also known as Dispositional Resilience Scale 
(DRS-15) measures ability to cope with stresses. Published in 1995, the SHS was developed by 
Bartone (1995) for the purpose of measuring personality hardiness. Bartone defines 'personality 
hardiness' as "having a high sense of life and work commitment, greater sense of control", being 
"open to change and challenges of life", and "interpret[ing] stressful and painful experiences as a 
normal part of life". According to Bartone, significant research has established personality 
hardiness as a stress/heath moderator variable. The SHS is based on a revised version of a 
hardiness scale developed in the early 1980's by researchers and students at the University of 
Chicago. Item and reliability analyses were conducted with mixed-gender military samples 
(Bartone, 1995). 
The tool contains 15 items, 6 of which are negatively keyed, and includes subscales for 
commitment, control, and challenge (Bartone, 1995). Answers range from Completely True to 
Not At All True on a 4-pont Likert scale (Gilmore, 2014). Results fall within 1 of 5 scoring 
bands which are as follows: 39+ = Very High, 34-38 = High, 28-33 = Average, 22-27 = Low, 
and 22- = Very Low (Bartone, 2008). Research indicates high reliability- a study of 700 army 
reservists revealed an alpha coefficient of .83. Alpha coefficients for the subscales of 
commitment, control, and challenge were .77, .71, and .70, respectively (Bartone, 1995. 
According to Bartone, studies involving other samples have yielded comparable internal 
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consistency coefficients (Bartone, 1995). Three-week test-retest reliability is high, with a 
coefficient of .73, according to the results of a research project involving 104 West Point 
Freshmen that included the administration of the DRS-15 (Bartone, 2007). The same project 
revealed high three-week test-retest reliability with regards to the subscales of commitment (.75)  
and challenge (.81). Notably, reliability was much lower for control (.58) (Bartone, 1995). 
Studies involving several samples indicate high predictive and criterion-related validity with 
regards to health and ability to function in stressful situations (Bartone, 1995).The DRS-15 was 
recently used in a study aimed at identifying positive psychology variables predictive of 
hardiness among college-aged students (Gilmore, 2014). "Coping self-efficacy" was found to 
predict hardiness, as was wisdom and hope (Gilmore, 2014).   
Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS). The Social Readjustment Scale assesses 
susceptibility to illness or mental health issues as a result of stressful events. The scale was 
developed by Holmes and Rahe (1967), who had previously been involved in research 
demonstrating a positive correlation between stress events and illness (Hubbard & Workman, 
1997). The scale contains a list of 43 events believed by Holmes and Rahe to require 
readjustment. Holmes and Rahe assigned each event a value based on the responses of 394 
individuals who were asked to assign a weight, from 0-100, the extent to which 43 common 
events would require readjustment (Christie-Seely, 1983).  
The scale requires respondents to indicate which of the events on the list have transpired 
in their lives during the previous 12 months (Holmes & Rahe, 1997). Results are obtained by 
adding the sum of the weights associated with the events indicated by the respondent. Scoring is 
as follows: a score of < 149 indicates a low susceptibility to mental and physical illness, a score 
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of 150-200 indicates mild susceptibility to mental and physical illness, a score of 200-299 
suggests moderate susceptibility to mental and physical illness, and a score of >300 indicates 
major susceptibility to mental and physical illness (Holmes & Rahe, 1997). A number of studies 
indicate SSRS's predictive validity. According to Hubbard et al. (1997) researchers Rahe and 
Lind established a correlation between high SSRS scores and cardiac death while other 
researchers have demonstrated correlations between high SSRS scores and mental/physical 
illness among navy personnel.  High coefficients of correlation between discrete groups in the 
sample—all are above .90 with the exception of what between Caucasian and African American 
respondents which was .82 (Center for Mental Health Services Research at Brown, n.d.).  
Decision-Making Skills. This tool was included as a decision-making outcome measure 
in a survey employed in the longitudinal study “National Evaluation of Youth Corps: Findings at 
Follow-Up” (Price, Williams, Simpson, Jastrzab, & Markovitz, 2010). The instrument was 
specifically designed to be used in research with at-risk young adults aged 16-26 who were 
economically and educationally disadvantaged and/or had involvement in the criminal justice 
system or past gang membership. The purpose of the study was to evaluate Youth Corps’ impact 
on corps members in terms of educational achievements, employment levels, life skills and civic 
engagement, and involvement in risky behavior (Price et al., 2010).  Decision-Making Skills –
defined as the “ability to make sound decisions and judgments”—was one of many life-skills 
measures include in the study. Fifty-one percent of sample members were male. Approximately 
57% were between the ages of 18-24. Close to 30% were under the age of 18, and 13.5% were 
over age 24. Approximately 35% of participants were Caucasian, 33.7% were Hispanic, and 
21.7% were African-American. The remaining participants were recorded as Asian/Pacific 
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Islander, Native American, or Multi-racial/Other. Fifty-nine percent of sample members lacked a 
high school diploma, 16.2% had graduated high school or possessed a GED certificate but had 
never attended college, 13.2% had some college, and 11.6% were college graduates. 
Approximately 22% of sample members were currently receiving public assistance or had 
received public assistance in the past. Slightly more that 39% of sample members had a family 
income that was below federal poverty level. Eleven and a half percent of sample participants 
were currently involved in the court system or had been involved in the court system in the past. 
Almost 5% were currently involved in the foster care system or had been involved in the foster 
care system at a previous point.  (Price et al., 2010)Both the experimental and the control groups 
were comprised of applicants and both groups made significant strides in the areas of education 
and employment (Price et al., 2010).  
Grassroots Efficacy. This measure was included as a civic engagement outcome 
measure in a survey employed in the 2010 longitudinal study “National Evaluation of Youth 
Corps: Findings at Follow-Up”, the same study which also used the Decision Making Skills 
measure (Price, Williams, Simpson, Jastrzab, & Markovitz, 2010).  Price et al. define grassroots 
efficacy as “the respondent’s opinion about the feasibility of starting a grassroots effort to meet a 
range of community needs, such as starting an after-school program or organizing a park clean-
up campaign.” (p.12). 
Flanagan et al (2007) Civic Involvement Measures. Flanagan et al. (2007) combine use 
a set of self-assessed politics-based measures that are designed specifically for youth and young 
adults.  The measures enabled researchers to organize results into fourteen categories: civic 
behaviors, elected officials and government, conventional civic engagement, alternative civic 
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engagements, political efficacy, equality and injustice, citizenship types, parents’ civic 
engagement, political conversation with others, values, media consumption and perceptions, 
school climate, personal beliefs, and civic knowledge. The measures are based on a variety of 
pre-existing scales, including the California Civic Index, the Civic Engagement Questionnaire,     
Of the fourteen aspects included in the Civic measurement model, each one give us 
traction on civic issues. Furthermore, the aspects are robust to validity tests. The Cronbach’s 
alpha is in the acceptable range (α > .7) for categories at T1 and T2, with the exception of civic 
accountability at T1 (α = .69). Each of the categories are based on a different stem question and 
respondent can chose from a set of Likert-style options that are customized for each aspect. 
Competence for Civic Action (CCA). This tool is a self-report questionnaire aimed at 
assessing adolescents' perceived competency in affecting social change (Flanagan, Syvertsen & 
Stout, 2007). The tool was tested on 1,924 social studies students aged 12-18 living in the 
Northeastern United States. Males and females were evenly represented. 85% of the participants 
self-identified as White, 5% as Black, 3% as Native American, 3% as Hispanic, 2% as Asian, 
and 2% as Other. The surveys were conducted twice, first in September-October 2004 (prior to 
the presidential election of that year), and second in mid-November and December 2004 (post-
election) (Flanagan et al., 2007). 
The CCA contains subscales for civic behaviors, opinions, knowledge, and dispositions. 
The tool is comprised of 9 items. Scoring on each item ranges from 1 - 5. Possible responses and 
associated scores are: I Definitely Can = 5, I Probably Can = 4, Maybe = 3, I Probably Can't = 2, 
and I Definitely Can't = 1.  Higher scores indicate higher levels of perceived competence for 
civic action. The tool has a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .92. Flanagan, Syvertsen and Stout 
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(2007) suggest that the tool be used prior to, and later during, participation in programs 
promoting civic engagement in order to gauge program effectiveness and/or participant progress.  
Political Conversations with Others (PCWO).  The Political Conversations with Others 
(PCWO) aspect is adapted from the California Civic Index (Kahne, et al., 2005). The stem 
question for this measure asks, “Here are some questions about your political discussions with 
others. Indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.” The sub-questions in this 
measure focus on the communication that individuals have with their family members and the 
degree to which family members encourage political expression. In Haiti, where individual 
political beliefs and attitudes about the use of political violence are tied strongly to both family 
and community conversations about political issues, this is particularly relevant.  
Prospective Civic Engagement (PCE).  The Prospective Civic Engagement aspect is 
adapted from the California Civic Index (Khane et al., 2005), Civic Engagement Questionnaire 
(Keeter et al., 2002), and IEA Civic Education Study (Torney-Purta, et al., 2001). For this 
measure, the stem question is, “when you think about your life, how likely is it that you would 
do each of the following?” The respondents are asked how likely they are to vote on a regular 
basis, wear a campaign button to support a candidate or volunteer for a political party. 
Political Voice (PV).  The Political Voice aspect, adapted from the Civic Engagement 
Questionnaire (Ketter, 2002), asks, “When you think about your life, how likely is it that you 
would do each of the following?” The respondents are then asked about several specific aspects, 
including if they would, 1) contact or visit someone in the government who represents (their) 
community, 2) contact a newspaper, radio or TV talk show to expression your opinion on an 
issue, or 3) sign an e-mail or written petition. 
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Job Search Readiness Checklist. The job readiness checklist was adapted from existing 
job search tools and job training materials used by one of the programs. It includes 19 yes/no 
items in three sections: Motivation and Follow-Through; Job Search Preparation; and Interview 
Preparation. One of the implementing partner organizations used a checklist from the Jewish 
Vocational Services of Boston to create this measure; each of the “yes” responses is a point, a 
score of 15 or greater is considered to be “job search ready”. 
Supervisor Evaluation. The supervisor evaluation measures ten competencies on a four 
point Likert scale from “Poor (does not meet expectations) – 1 point” to “Excellent (always 
meets expectations) – 4 points”. Competencies include: Attendance, Punctuality, Quality of work 
produced, Quantity of work produced, Professionalism, Initiative, Communication Skills, 
Teamwork, Problem Solving, and Response to supervision. The origin of this measure is 
unknown though it was used by two of the implementing partners before the program evaluation 
began. It was commonly used to rank participants. When a limited number of slots were 
available in a special program or project (such as the opportunity to work at the annual Karnaval 
event) participants were chosen based on their supervisory evaluation ranking with the top 
scorers chosen first in order of ranking. 
Individual Protective Factors Index (IPFI). This tool is a self-report questionnaire that 
assesses conflict resolution ability of respondents by measuring levels of self-control and 
cooperation, two skills associated with conflict resolution ("Conflict Resolution: Individual 
Protective Factors", n. d.). The tool was created by Phillips and Springer (1992) as part of the 
Extended National Youth Sports Program 1991–92 Risk Assessment Study on behalf of the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association. The tool is intended for administration to children and 
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young adults; it is written at the 6th grade reading level in English and has been translated into 
several other languages, including Spanish, at a similar reading level for use in the United States. 
The tool contains subscales for self-control and cooperation skills. Each subscale contains 
six items on a four point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Items in 
the second subscale are reverse coded. A higher score indicates better self-control and 
cooperation. The tool has an internal consistency of .65 (Gabriel, 1994 in "Conflict Resolution: 
Individual Protective Factors", n. d.). Pierce and Shields (1998, in "Conflict Resolution", n. d.) 
reports alphas of .70 the first subscale and 68 for the second. 
Beck Depression Inventory. The BDI was developed in 1961 by Beck as a 21-item, 
administer-assisted questionnaire aimed at assessing the presence and intensity of depression-
related symptoms (Farinde, 2013).  The development of the BDI was remarkable in that its focus 
on symptoms represented a dramatic shift away from the dominant psychodynamic conception of 
depression of the time. The BDI has undergone several revisions to reflect the DSM’s changing 
diagnostic criteria for depression, with the most recent revision being the BDI-II (Farinde, 2013). 
Today the BDI-II is one of the most frequently-employed depression assessment tools in 
research and clinical settings (Grothe, et al., 2005). The BDI-II contains the same number of 
items as the original BDI but differs somewhat in item content (Farinde, 2013). Furthermore, the 
BDI-II is completely self-administered (Farinde, 2013). Norms was established based on a 
standardization sample comprised of 317 female outpatients and 183 male outpatients from 
urban and rural settings (Smith & Erford, 2001). Ages ranged from 13-86. Ninety-one percent of 
the outpatients in the sample were Caucasian. Four percent were African-American and 1% were 
Asian (Smith & Erford, 2001).  
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Research indicates that BDI-II scores correlates with those of other depression-
assessment measures, such as the Hamilton Psychiatric Rating for Depression and the Scale for 
Suicidal Ideation (Smith & Erford, 2001). Reliability is high, with research yielding an alpha 
level of 0.92 for outpatients and 0.93 for college students. A study of 26 of 26 outpatients 
referred for depression revealed a one-week test-retest correlation of .96 (Smith & Erford, 2001). 
A 2005 study demonstrated the validity of the BDI as a depression assessment measure among 
African-Americans in a clinical setting (Grothe et al., 2005). A study of Caucasian and Mexican 
American students found no difference in reliability between the groups (Smith & Efdord, 2001). 
The BDI-II contains 21 items (Grothe et al., 2005). Each item has four possible responses. Each 
response corresponds with a number ranging from 0-3. Respondents are to circle the number 
associated with their chosen response. Scores are obtained by summing the numbers circled.  
Scores range between 0-63 (Grothe et al., 2005). Interpretation is as follows: 14-19 = mild, 20-28 
= moderate, and 29-63 = severe (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 2005). 
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Chapter 7: Analysis 
 In this chapter I begin presenting the analysis of the data I have described. I start with 
providing a picture of the study participants at baseline including their demographics and a 
description of their socioeconomic indicators at baseline. Next I present information regarding 
the services received by participants in each of the three interventions. As noted earlier, not all 
services were provided each intervention and the same amount of services may not have been 
received by each participant as some dropped out early, failed to completed parts of the 
intervention, or did not fully participate for other reasons. In the following section I present 
results for each of the clinical measures. In addition to providing descriptive statistics, I compare 
the means by program type and test for statistical significance as appropriate. Tables and analysis 
not found in this chapter, along with all ANOVA tables, can be found in the appendix. 
 Lastly, I test each of the four hypothesis for my study: (1) receiving education increases 
an ex-combatant’s confidence in their own ability to make change as quantified by the 
participant’s scores on the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale and the internal locus of control 
score; (2) receiving education reduces the likelihood that the participant will engage in criminal 
or maladaptive behaviors including associating with armed peers, abusing alcohol, being violent, 
or engaging in crime; (3) participants who engaged in sports and recreation were less likely to 
revert to criminal behavior or interact with armed friends in the post-demobilization period; and 
(4) receiving education is associated with increased pro-social capacities and behaviors. 
Data Analysis Plan 
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 Analysis of the dataset began with a description of the study variables. Those of interest 
and which are relevant to contextualizing analysis of my hypotheses are presented in this 
chapter. Descriptive statistics allow us to see how the sample data is distributed over the sample 
as a whole as well as within groups. In examining the data I looked at measures of central 
tendency and dispersion. In addition to describing the data, I also compared baseline and 
descriptive data by group (intervention type and non-participants).  
 Dichotomous categorical variables were examined using a 2x2 table. A chi-square test 
was used to evaluate the association between the variables when the expected variables in each 
cell was greater than or equal to five in at least three cells. When the expected values were less 
than five in more than one cell I used a Fisher’s exact test. To obtain the expected frequency I 
multiplied the total count of each group divided by the overall total count. A similar process was 
used for analysis of two polychromous categorical variables. I used a Pearson’s chi-square test in 
cases where the expected frequency was greater than or equal to five in at least three quarters of 
the cells. In cases where this was not true, I used a Fisher’s exact test. 
 To examine the association between categorical variables (e.g. program type) and 
quantitative ones (e.g. locus of control scores), I compared the means of the quantitative variable 
distributions in the different groups. In cases where the categorical variable had only two 
categories (e.g., DDR participant/non-participant) I compared the means and used a Student’s t-
test to examine the association. However, in most cases the categorical variable used was 
program type which has more than two categories. In cases like this, where the categorical 
variable has three or more categories, I did a comparison of means through analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The requirements to for an ANOVA are: 1) each group must have a normal 
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distribution or have more than 30 cases; and 2) variances must be homogeneous in all of the 
groups. In cases where the variable doesn’t have a normal distribution a non-parametric test was 
used; I used a Kruskal-Wallis test in these cases as I had more than two groups and thus, could 
not use a Mann-Whitney U test. 
 To assess where there was an association between two quantitative variables I used a 
correlation analysis. In cases where the distribution was normal I used a Pearson’s correlation. 
When the distribution was not normal or there were extreme outliers, I used the Spearman’s 
correlation. The values of these (the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s rho) 
indicate how strong the relationship is between the variables with the sign (positive or negative) 
demonstrating the direction of the association.  
 My hypotheses included the following: (1) receiving education increases an ex-
combatant’s confidence in their own ability to make change as quantified by the participant’s 
scores on the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale and the internal locus of control score; (2) 
receiving education reduces the likelihood that the participant will engage in criminal or 
maladaptive behaviors including associating with armed peers, abusing alcohol, being violent, or 
engaging in crime; (3) participants who engaged in sports and recreation were less likely to 
revert to criminal behavior or interact with armed friends in the post-demobilization period; and 
(4) receiving education is associated with increased pro-social capacities and behaviors. In the 
analysis I present findings from the two experimental conditions (Interventions B and C), the 
treatment as usual (intervention A) condition, and the control group of those who qualified to be 
in the intervention but were not included.  
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To test my hypotheses I used a Linear Mixed Model (LMM) for much of my analysis 
because I assume that factors and covariates have a linear relationship to my dependent 
variables. The LMM was the best fit for several reasons. The LMM provides flexibility where 
the general linear model does not; in a LMM random effects and the error terms express 
correlated and nonconstant variability in their results. This was the best fit for my data because 
the model needed to be flexible and to model the covariance structure in addition to the response 
variable.  
One of the challenges of working with this data set is that the planned intervention 
services did not occur as they were intended. The amount of education, social services, 
internship days, and other services varied greatly from both participant to participant and from 
program to program. Had all participants in a given intervention received the same amount of 
intervention services (e.g. number of hours of vocational education), the categorical variable of 
program type could have been used to examine differences between interventions and the impact 
of, for example, vocationally focused versus classical education focused education on the study 
participant’s attitudes, behaviors, and accessed skills. 
However the amount of services varied wildly within programs. Participants dropped out 
of parts of the intervention, skipped classes, missed group counseling sessions, failed to follow 
through on attending their internship, and rejected their program assigned mentor. Informal 
education hours, which were supposed to include ten hours of HIV risk reduction programming 
and eight hours of life skills workshops within the first three months for each of the three 
interventions were vastly different in practice than was intended. By reviewing sign in/sign out 
sheets, data was obtained on how many hours of informal education each participant actually got.  
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For interventions A (TAU), participants received a mean of 12.22 (SD:12.47) hours of 
informal education, all during months four and five, rather than the 18 hours they were supposed 
to receive. Intervention B (Faith Based) received more informal education than required with a 
mean of 23.04 (SD: 14.87) hours and with more than half of the participants retaking a half day 
of the same HIV workshop twice.  While intervention B completed all informal education hours 
before the 90 day deadline; intervention C (Education-focused) did not begin informal education 
until the first week of month three and did not complete it until well into month five. Participants 
in Intervention C received a mean of 21.05 (SD: 15.510) hours of informal education (though the 
terms of reference for this program indicate that in addition to the other informal education they 
were also to include 25 hours of citizenship or civic responsibility workshops, which they 
included as informal education. Therefore their mean should have been significantly higher. It 
appears that most participants in this intervention did not receive HIV training).  
The LMM allowed me to account for the fact that the intervention participants did not 
receive the same number of hours of education as others in their own group. As the hours of 
education varied greatly within groups, I was obligated to treat the hours of education as a 
covariate. In an LMM the covariance structures available allow for residual terms with a lot of 
diversity in variances and covariances. The covariance structure specifies the relationship 
between levels of repeated effects. Although I did not have a lot of categorical predictors in the 
analysis that I did for this dissertation, the LMM did allow me to select categorical variables as 
predictors as factors in the model. Each level of a factor has a different linear effect on the value 
of my dependent variable. 
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Lastly, the LMM offered flexibility in regards to both repeated and random effects. The 
LMM lets me take into account the repeated effects of having multiple observations of the same 
person. Adding repeated effects variables lets me relax the assumption of independence of the 
error terms. Introducing random effects helps me understand and explain excess variability in the 
dependent variable. Given the intervention fidelity issues encountered with the difference 
between planned and received units of services in all three interventions and the repeated 
observations with the same subjects, this was the best option for testing the hypotheses. 
Figure 7.1 
Selected Demographics of Study Participants by Group at Baseline 
Program Age Years of 
Education 
Family Size  Years in 
Orphanage  
Intervention A: 
TAU 
Mean 23.90 6.58 5.60 9.40 
N 50 50 50 5 
SD 3.388 4.036 1.536 5.273 
      
Intervention B: 
Faith-Based  
Mean 24.23 7.33 5.01 5.60 
N 150 150 150 5 
SD 3.586 4.280 2.641 4.722 
      
Intervention C: 
Education Focused 
Mean 24.21 6.71 5.22 6.00 
N 252 252 252 11 
SD 3.846 4.236 2.972 5.138 
      
Eligible but not 
selected 
Mean 24.36 6.73 5.28 7.17 
N 244 244 244 12 
SD 3.959 4.123 3.112 4.218 
      
 
Individual Study Participants at Baseline 
The dataset includes longitudinal quantitative data on 741 male individuals who 
participated in or qualified for participation in DDR programs in Haiti in 2007 and 2008. Study 
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participants were born between 1977 and 1990; they ranged in age from 18-31 years with a mean 
of 24 years (SD: 3.83 years) at baseline (figure 7.1). All study participants were born in Haiti and 
lived in Haiti for 80% or more of their years. Eighteen lived in the Dominican Republic, which 
borders Haiti to the east, for six months or more, all while they were between the ages of two and 
15 years. All study participants were Creole-speaking Haitian citizens who were involved in 
armed groups including armed gangs for six months or longer between 2004 and 2007.  
Since one area of this study looked at family relationship outcomes, it is important to 
understand the family and living situation of the study participants. Most participants were raised 
by a parent or relative caregiver (figure 7.1). Nearly half (47.6%, n=353) were parented by both 
their mother and their father but only lived with one parent. A third (33.3%, n=247) were raised 
by a relative caregiver such as a grandparent, aunt or uncle, or cousin. Only 12.3% (n=91) were 
raised with both their mother and father in the same home. The remaining study participants 
grew up in an orphanage (3.2%, n=24) or living with an unrelated adult (3.5%; n=26).  
At baseline (T1), two thirds (66.7%; n=494) had two living parents and a bit less than a 
third (28.1%, n= 208) had one living parent, while 5.3% (n=39) were orphaned (figure 7.2). Five 
percent (n=37) individuals lived in a crèche (orphanage) at some point during their childhood; 
the mean number of years of living in a child care institution was 7.14 years (SD: 4.529 years). 
Participants in the two experimental conditions (interventions B and C) were had a lower mean 
number of years spend in a child care institution compared to participants in the TAU group. 
Being an orphan did not necessarily lead to being placed in a crèche; in fact, most of 
those who were raised in orphanages had one or two living parents. When asked why they were 
placed in a residential institution, half (51.4%; n=19) said it was because their family was too 
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poor to care for them and needed assistance providing them with food, clothing or medical care. 
The second most common reason for being placed in an orphanage was living too far away from 
a primary school or the family not being able to pay for the child to attend school (37.8%; n=14).  
Other reasons for being placed included not having any relatives to care for the child (5.4%, n=2) 
and parental health problems (2.7%, n=1). One respondent did not know the reason he was 
placed in an orphanage.  
At baseline, 82.2% (n=608) of study participants said their home was a house, apartment, 
or farming homestead owned or rented by a parent or another family member (figure 7.2). More 
than a tenth, 13.9%, (n=103) said they considered a friend’s home to be their permanent place of 
residence. And the remaining 3.9% (n=29) didn’t have a permanent or regular place to live. To 
understand socioeconomic status of the household, I looked at the number of rooms in the home, 
access to municipal services, and household income. Of those who said at baseline that they had 
permanent or regular housing at baseline, 16.9%, (n= 120) lived in a home with only one room. 
43.8%, (n=312) lived in homes with two rooms. Only 39.3% (n=280) lived in a home that had 
three or more rooms.  
Of those who had a regular place to live at baseline, participants frequently lacked access 
to regular municipal services (figure 7.2). At baseline just less than half (48.9%, n=348) said 
their permanent home was not wired to receive electricity and 45.2%, (n=322) said their 
permanent home was in an area that received government provided electricity, but only some of 
the time. A minority 5.7% (n=42) supplemented government electricity (when it was on) with an 
inverter system (solar or generator powered) and/or with a generator. 
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Water was another municipal service that many housed study participants lacked with 
30.8% (n=219) of those who had a regular or permeant home reporting that the house had no 
access to water on-site. Just over half (55.7%, n=396) of those with a regular home said the 
house received water from the government (CAMEP), from a spring or rainwater catchment 
system on site, or that the home had a private or shared cistern which could be filled by 
purchasing services from a water delivery truck. The remaining thirteen percent (13.5%, n=96) 
used a combination two or more of these water sources, most often, CAMEP supplemented with 
water delivered to the home’s private or shared cistern by truck.  
Figure 7.2  
Descriptive Statistics for Study Participant Demographics 
 A: TAU B: Faith C: Education Control 
 % within % within % within % within 
Grew up in two parent home 22.0% 4.7% 9.5% 17.2% 
Grew up in single parent home 46.0% 54.7% 51.6% 40.6% 
Raised by relative caregiver 20.0% 37.3% 33.7% 33.6% 
Lived in orphanage as child 10.0% 3.3% 4.4% 4.9% 
Currently an orphan 12.0% 2.7% 3.2% 7.8% 
Currently lives in family home 84.0% 83.9% 82.5% 78.3% 
Currently homeless 2.0% 3.4% 4.8% 4.1% 
Home not wired for electric 49.0% 46.2% 51.2% 52.1% 
Home has municipal rubbish 
collection 
8.2% 7.6% 8.4% 11.5% 
Home has no municipal water  20.4% 27.6% 30.1% 38.0% 
Home shares toilet with others 28.6% 38.3% 38.9% 37.1% 
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Home has pit toilet 36.7% 44.1% 56.7% 44.9% 
Household income <US$1200 26.0% 30.0% 30.6% 27.0% 
 
In the study participants’ ‘permanent homes, most (at baseline) had access to a toilet with 
only 2.5% (n=18) reporting that the home had no toilet facilities. Pit toilets (48.5%, n=345) and 
flush toilets which could be operated by dumping a bucket of water into the bowl (46.2%, 
n=329) were the most common. Only 2.8% (n=20) said that their permanent or regular home had 
a running water flush toilet.  A third of those who said that their permanent home had any type of 
toilet also said that that toilet was shared with other households (36.7%, n=55). Municipal trash 
collection was also rare. Only 9.4% (n=67) respondents said they disposed of their trash on a 
neighborhood trash pile or in a dumpster that was then removed by the government or an NGO. 
26.7% (n=190) of respondents paid a private individual to remove their household trash while 
the majority (63.9%, n=454) said no trash pick-up was available in their area so they disposed of 
household garbage by burning it, burying it, dumping it in the ocean, dumping in a ravine, or 
throwing it away on the street or an empty lot. 
Living in a small home, lacking access to municipal resources, having a shared toilet, and 
lacking a flush toilet (of either type) is associated with familial poverty in Haiti. Poverty can also 
be measured by examining household income, though that is somewhat unreliable in Haiti, 
where employment is often informal and the exchange or barter of goods and services is quite 
common. Nearly all study participants (97.6%, n=722) were unemployed at baseline. But, from 
examining household income at baseline, it appears that most study participants came from 
households that were very low income inclusive of remittances from family and friends abroad; 
  
 
240 
more than half (28.9%, n=214) said their household lived off of USD $1200 or less the previous 
year while a quarter (40.4%, n=299) said their household income was between USD $1200-
1400) and 23.3% (n=173) had an income between $1601-2400 USD. Only 7.4% (n=55) reported 
a household income of more than $2400 USD. A worker earning minimum wage at a full time 
job would earn roughly USD $1400 a year which is enough for a family of five to rent a small 
home in a low-income area, eat two full meals a day with a source of animal protein three times a 
week, purchase treated water for drinking, pay for basic transportation, and cover the costs of 
public primary school or high school for two children. At baseline there was little statistically 
significant difference between the demographics of the treatment and non-treatment groups.  
Program Services  
 The services offered by programs included (for some programs) vocational education, 
classical (high school or college) education, sports and organized recreational activities, social 
work services including case management, mentoring, community service opportunities, 
religious education, internship placement, job training and job readiness skills, and civic 
education.  In addition to receiving these services at the program, some study participants receive 
the same or similar services from other agencies or school programs. To further complicate 
matters, there appear to have been fidelity issues with some of the intervention participants. 
Intervention A participants were supposed to receive four months of services including at least 
three months of vocational training. Figure 7.3 demonstrates that this did not happen for all 
participants. Intervention B and C modified their program content to fit the individual 
educational and vocational goals and background of each student, so, some students received 
more vocational education while others received more classical education.  
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Vocational Education and Mentorship. Vocational education programs included 
formal training in employable professions common in Haiti. These included classes in masonry, 
construction, plumbing, mechanics and other working class professions. In addition, some 
participants received specialized training in newly created industries such as making charcoal 
briquettes using recycled products for a program subsidized through foreign aid aimed at 
reducing the environmental impacts of traditional fuels in Haiti. Other participants were trained 
in businesses skills and entrepreneurship through a program where they created their own 
business selling phone credit (papadap) on the street.  
Figure 7.3 
Mean number of hours of formal vocational education by group 
 
  
 
242 
 
None of the intervention participants reported receiving vocational education in the six 
months prior to baseline. Among those who were eligible to participate in DDR but were not 
selected, three individuals indicated that they had attended vocational training programs. The 
mean number of hours of vocational training at baseline was 3.20 hours (SD: 29.109). At T2, T3, 
and T4, Intervention B had the highest mean number of hours of formal vocational education 
with a mean of 246.65 hours (SD: 91.176), 329.74 hours (SD: 492.88) and 285.54 hours 
(409.376) respectively. The relationship between group and hours of formal vocational training 
was statistically significant at each data collection point after baseline. 
Mentorship referred to one-on-one coaching by an experienced professional in the area of 
work chosen by or assigned to the intervention participant. Mentees were coached on how to 
obtain work, professional soft skills, and how to maintain their job once they found one. 
Mentorship was most commonly given to participants in interventions B and C. The relationship 
between mentorship and program group was statistically significant at all data collection times.  
Classical Education.  In Haiti, classical education refers to formal, non-vocational 
academic education offered in a classroom setting. Classical education is highly prized and is 
considered mark of prestige. Classical education is most commonly offered by private schools; 
approximately 90 percent of classical schools in Haiti are private. Classical education in Haiti 
occurs at the primary, secondary, and post-secondary levels. (Adelman & Holland, 2015; 
Lockheed, 2012; Sabates, Akyeampong, Westbrook & Hunt, 2011; Richardson, 2014)  
The primary level begins with preschool, a non-compulsory but common program of 
preparatory education focusing on writing and reading skills, basic math, and social education 
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attended by students between the ages of three and five. Students frequently start education later 
than the recommended ages and experience breaks due to poverty, political instability, and a lack 
of available space in geographically proximate schools. Preschool is usually skipped by children 
who start their education later than the recommended age with only a fifth of children in this age 
group attending any preschool.  (Bredl, 2011; Frankenberg, Sikoki, Sumantri, Suriastini, & 
Thomas, 2013; Sabates et al, 2011) 
The next stage of primary school encompasses grades one through three; it is the first of 
the three cycles of fundamental education. Students must pass each year to advance to the next 
and must pass an exam at the end of each of the three fundament education cycles. It consists of 
3 cycles of 3 years each, which altogether is called "fundamental education". When looking at 
the three intervention groups together with the control group, at baseline 3.5% (n=208) had 
attended only preschool or had not yet attended school at all. Nearly a quarter (22.4%; n=1328) 
left school during the 1st fundamental cycle (grades 1-3) and another quarter (25.4%; n=1504) 
left school during the 2nd fundamental cycle (grades 4-6). At the conclusion of the 6th grade the 
student takes a government regulated examination and is awarded the Certificat d'Estudes 
Primaires (CEP). (Bredl, 2011; Lockheed, 2012; Sabates et al, 2011) 
Secondary school begins either with the 3rd fundamental cycle or with grade 10, 
depending on the school and its structure. Seventh grade is either technical (vocational) or 
general (classical academics). Eight grade focuses on humanities while ninth grade integrates 
humanities with social sciences, hard sciences, and math. At the end of the third fundamental 
cycle (grade 9) the student takes a government examination and is awarded the Diplóme 
d'Estudes Fondamentales or the Baccalauréat 1e Partie (depending on if the school uses the 
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traditional French system or the newer system that pairs the 3rd fundamental cycle with the rest 
of primary education).  (Atasay & Delavan, 2012; Sabates et al, 2011) 
At the conclusion of grade 9, the student must decide to either pursue an academic or 
technical (vocational) track.  Grade 10, is called the 1é Année Seconde Clasique if taken in an 
academic classical school or Seconde Technique if taken at a vocational high school. Grade 11 
and/or 12 is known at 2é Année Rhetorique (rheto) if taken at an academic classical school or 
Premiére when taken at a vocational school. And the 12th grade of secondary school is called 3é 
Année Philosophie (philo) if taken at an academic classical school or Terminale when taken at a 
vocational school. Most students do two years of philo or rheto if attending classical school. 
During these last three or four years of school the student concentrates on either science and 
math, social sciences, arts and humanities, or vocational studies. The government examination 
taken after the 12th or 13th year is completed (sometimes months later), if passed, earns the 
student a Baccalauréat 2e Partie, the state issued high school diploma. (Atasay & Delavan, 
2012; Gage, 2014; Zanotti, Stephenson & McGehee, 2015)  
When looking at the three intervention groups together with the control group, at baseline 
18.2% (n=1080) left school during the 3rd Fundamental Cycle, 17.5% (n=1040) left during the 
latter part of secondary school; and 13% (n=768) completed high school studies (but didn’t 
necessarily pass the state examination for the diploma). After demobilization, study participants 
from all groups, including the control group of non-intervention participants, attended vocational 
and classical education programs (figures 5.4). Intervention B and C participants received the 
most classical education (figures 5.4) while intervention A participants received some limited 
classical education (even though this was not the focus of intervention A, during records review 
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it was found that some participants were sent to classical education in addition to or in place of 
vocational education and that classes were paid by the implementing partner; it is not known 
why this decision was made for some intervention participants and not others).   
Intervention B and C had more participants who stayed involved in classical education after 
program completion when compared to other groups; for intervention A, no participants reported 
classical education after T4 and for the control group classical education was most  
Figure 7.4 
Mean Hours of Classical Education by Group 
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commonly reported in the year following demobilization; no members of this group were in 
classical education programs after T6 (figure 7.4). Having a greater number of hours of classical 
education was associated with Interventions B and C (see appendix for additional analysis results 
and tests of significance). 
Internships. Completing an internship is a requirement for most career paths in Haiti. 
Young professionals and skilled workers typically complete an unpaid internship lasting 6 to 12 
weeks at the conclusion of their vocational or academic training. For some careers, such as 
banking, medical professions, and electricians, the internship period can last up to six months or 
more. Internships are an opportunity for young people to build relationships and network within 
their field as well as their opportunity to prove their employability. Internships were most 
common during the intervention period for participants in Intervention A where they were 
intended to be an integral part of the intervention. Internships were optional but strongly 
encouraged for participants in the other two interventions. At T2, six months after baseline, the 
mean number of person days in an internship was 68.40 (SD: 52.639), 51.00 (SD: 39.726), and 
47.61 (SD: 41.963) for interventions A, B and C respectively.  
 Informal Education. Opportunities for informal education included workshops, learning 
groups, and skill-specific training which occurred outside the formal classroom or vocational 
training program. This was most often focused on civic education and community organizing or 
advocacy though other content included learning about HIV prevention from a safer sex 
promotion dramatic presentation, participating in a community garden learning and serving 
event, and going to a conference on religious leadership. Informal education was most 
commonly reported by Intervention B and C and it was most common during the first six months 
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after baseline. The mean hours of informal education at T2 were 12.22 (SD: 12.466) for 
Intervention A, 23.04 (SD: 14.872) for Intervention B, and 21.05 (SD: 15.510) for intervention C 
(see appendix). 
 Community Service. Volunteerism through formal programs, community service and 
service learning are new concepts in Haitian culture. These types of activities have rarely been 
integrated into the Haitian educational structure and are viewed as foreign by many students. 
However, informal volunteerism is common in Haitian culture. Integration of volunteer 
opportunities into youth and education programming has become more common in foreign 
funded programs in Haiti over the past ten years; it is seen by many development professionals 
as an opportunity to build social and community bonds for participants of charity programs. 
(Brower, 2011; Carlile, Mauseth, Clark, Cruz & Thoburn, 2014; Pluim, 2012) 
Figure 7.5 
Program services and intervention components received in total by groups 
 
 A: TAU B: Faith C: Education Control 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Vocational education (hours)* 478.50 
(525.88) 
1229.35 
(1013.94) 
1201.48 
(1170.48) 
75.61 
(173.58) 
Classical education (hours)* 188.40 
(442.48) 
1750.50 
(1150.02) 
1210.51 
(749.19) 
39.45 
(244.18) 
Informal education (hours)* 14.21 
(12.34) 
23.18 
(14.82) 
25.54 
(16.13) 
1.30 
(5.87) 
Vocational mentorship 
(hours)* 
8.81 
(24.84) 
49.60 
(35.93) 
43.36 
(33.88) 
1.20 
(7.49) 
Internship (days attended)* 82.55 
(50.68) 
194.11 
(174.82) 
119.95 
(141.17) 
3.30 
(19.02) 
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Community service (hours)* .54 
(2.41) 
560.03 
(605.80) 
141.14 
(265.98) 
8.93 
(70.59) 
Social work services (hours)* 4.02 
(6.71) 
60.59 
(18.25) 
60.84 
(22.11) 
.0331 
(.35) 
Religious instruction (hours)* 168.95 
(370.34) 
489.69 
(608.24) 
48.42 
(241.12) 
41.85 
(200.19) 
Sports/Rec (days engaged)* 73.55 
(62.36) 
94.29 
(46.29) 
117.79 
(71.12) 
69.13 
(74.43) 
* Statistically significant difference ( when comparing means between groups 
 
Volunteerism was most common among Intervention B participants with a mean number 
of volunteer hours of 96.53 (SD: 56.89) at T2.  Study participants in this group volunteered more 
in every time period from T2 through T8. Volunteering was least common among the control 
group and Intervention A participants; it was not a formal part of Intervention A’s program (see 
appendix for a comparison of means and ANOVA table). 
Social Work Services. Participants entering the three DDR programs often came without 
having received any demobilization assistance in the weeks or months since they separated from 
the armed group; the men frequently lacked identification cards, clothing, a place to live, food, 
transportation, and spending money. Most were dependent on the armed group for their daily 
living needs before demobilization. Some had serious medical, dental, and psychological 
problems. At baseline only one respondent reported having a bank account and more than half 
lacked the government documentation including a birth certificate, social security number (NIF), 
and driver’s license or government issued photo identification card needed to open a bank 
account. A quarter of the intervention participants were rural areas a full day or more of travel 
away from the program sites in capital area; of these, half had been separated from their families 
for 12 months or longer.  
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 Social work services in all three interventions focused first on obtaining medical care for 
participants and resolving problems of documentation, identification, and taxes. These steps were 
seen as necessary to enable the participants to work legally, a desired outcome expressed by the 
leadership of all three intervention programs. Additional social work services were offered on as-
needed and as-available basis. These included additional casemangement, assistance finding 
housing, help locating family members, counseling, social skills training or coaching, referral for 
psychiatric evaluation, psychological testing, general assessment, and linkage to community 
services. The provision of social work services varied greatly from program to program (figure 
7.5).  Intervention B participants received 55.09 hours of social work services (SD:18.295) on 
average in the six months after baseline while intervention A participants received 3.46 hours 
(SD: 6.370) on average and intervention C participants received a mean of 37.08 (SD:18.547 
hours). 
 Religious Instruction. Not surprisingly, religious involvement was most common for 
intervention B participants who received a mean of 109.94 hours (SD: 56.05) of religious 
instruction during the first six months after baseline (figure 7.2) compared to Intervention A with 
11.79 (SD: 34.45) hours and Intervention C with 5.48 hours (SD: 19.918 hours). Religious 
instruction was strongly related to group type at all points after T1 (see ANOVA table in 
appendix). 
Sports and Recreation. Study participants engaged in organized sports and recreation 
activities (most commonly basketball) an average of 8.17 days (SD: 11.77) during the six months 
prior to the baseline interview This increased for intervention B and C participants at T2 and T3 
when compared to the control group. There was no statistically significant difference in sports 
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and recreation activities at baseline based on group; however, the difference between groups was 
significant at all subsequent interview points (figure 7.2) (see tests for statistical significance in 
the appendix). 
Clinical Measures 
Criminal Behaviors. The first set of clinical measures examines criminal behaviors 
including alcohol use and abuse, associating with peers from armed groups, involvement in 
crime. There is not a lot of variation between groups or across time when looking at alcohol use 
(figure 7.5) This could be related to cultural concepts of alcohol use in Haiti; drinking alcohol, 
even when underage, is not considered deviant behavior and most Haitians consume alcoholic 
beverages, particularly beer, on a regular basis. The difference in means between groups was not 
statistically significant. 
Figure 7.6 
Mean AUDIT Scores by Group 
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There was more variation when looking at other measures including the respondent’s 
friends in armed groups. This score was derived by first asking the respondent to mark on a 
horizontal line from none to all to indicate the percentage of friends they have today who are 
members of armed groups. The respondent’s mark was measured and converted into a 100 point 
scale (so, a mark halfway between the beginning and the end of the line would be equal to 50 and 
so on) to create the score.  At baseline most of the groups were roughly the same with a mean of 
73.20 (SD: 16.116) of the total. 
Figure 7.7 
Mean Score of “Friends in Armed Groups” as Reported by Respondent 
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At T2, six months after baseline, there was a clear divergence with Intervention B and C 
dropping to 45.71 (SD: 31.651) and 54.39 (SD: 28.663) respectively, and intervention A 
increasing to 79.81 (SD: 26.543). At baseline the difference between groups was statistically 
insignificant (figure 7.7) but at T2 and all subsequent times, the difference was significant at the 
.05 level. The mean score for all groups declined at T3 and on subsequent contacts. However, 
interestingly, the mean score for Intervention A remained higher than the other two interventions 
and it remained higher than the control group throughout the life of the study. At T8 the mean 
score had dropped to 54.69 (SD: 29.147) for intervention A which was still higher than the mean 
score of 18.95 (SD: 22.413) for the control group.  This indicates that intervention A had the 
opposite of its intended effect; rather than reducing the ex-combatant’s peer associations with 
armed group members, it strengthened those relationships, enabling them to continue and to 
decline at a slower rate than normally occurred through the process of maturation as 
demonstrated by the control group. 
Involvement in crime was measured by the Crime Questionnaire which included four 
subscales: property crimes, trafficking, crimes against persons, and crimes related to sex or 
relationships.  There was no statistically significant relationship between the group and the total 
score or any of the subscale scores at baseline. However, the difference between groups was 
statistically significant at T2 and all later points.  It should be noted that the score is based on 
crimes committed since the last interview; the score appears artificially low at T2 because only 6 
months passed between T1 and T2, though 12 months passed between all other data collection 
times.  
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Similarly to the “friends in armed groups” score, the crime questionnaire was produced 
mean scores that were higher for Intervention a participants than the control group across time. 
Mean scores for the total crime score an all subscales were lower at T2 and subsequent data 
collection periods for Intervention B and C. This indicates that Interventions B and C were 
associated with a greater reduction in reported criminal behavior than Intervention A.  
Figure 7.8  
Mean Crime Scores by Program 
 
Violence and other maladaptive behaviors. The second set of clinical measures 
examines other maladaptive behaviors including violence. At baseline, all three intervention 
groups and the control group were statistically similar on all measures of violence and other 
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maladaptive behaviors: the Crime Questionnaire and its subscales, as well as the MOAS. A clear 
difference between groups began at T2 and continued throughout the life of the study. The mean 
scores for interventions B and C were lower on the crime questionnaire (indicating less criminal 
involvement) and lower on the MOAS (indicating less frequently observed violent behavior) 
when compared to both the control group and the intervention A participants (figures 5.17) 
In respect to these two measures, Intervention A participants were more crime involved 
and were observed more frequently being engaged in violence than the control group. While 
scores on the crime questionnaire did not increase respective to scores at baseline, they did not 
fall as far as those of the control group did; this indicates that rather than contributing to a 
reduction in crime, intervention A may have hampered the reduction in crime and violence 
which would have occurred had the participants not been in the intervention.  
A similar picture emerges with regards to violence. On the MOAS, scores for 
intervention A participants increased after baseline, peaked at T3, and then decreased to below 
baseline by T5, after which the scores continued to decrease. This was markedly different than 
that control group, which decreased slowly between baseline and T4. Between T4 and T6 there 
was a very sharp drop in scores for the control group, and afterward T6 the scores continued to 
slowly decrease. Intervention B and C’s mean scores look similar to each other; they both 
decreased sharply between baseline and T3, and then stayed low (at a lower mean than the other 
two groups) through the life of the study.  
Psychological Factors. The third set of clinical measures examines psychological factors 
including locus of control, self-efficacy, hardiness, family functioning, recent exposure to 
stressful or traumatic events, and depression. Recent stressful events was measured using the 
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SRRS. Intervention A participants had a slightly higher mean (10.56, SD: 7.877) at baseline than 
the other groups (the mean for all participants was 8.39; SD:4.846 at baseline) indicating that 
they experienced more stressful and traumatic events in the previous six months; this difference 
between groups was statistically significant (figure 7.16). However, at all later points the 
differences between groups was not statistically significant, indicating that, overall all, all 
participants experienced stressful and traumatic events throughout the life of the study. 
Hardiness, which is related to an ability to cope with stressful events, was measured using the 
Short Hardiness Scale. None of the four groups maintained a higher mean score than another; 
variation in scores on this instrument were not statistically significant any data collection point. 
A depression measure was included as depression has been tied to locus of control, 
traumatic and stressful experiences, self-efficacy, academic achievement, vocational 
performance, learning ability, poor emotional regulation, and involvement in criminal activity. 
Depression was measured using the Beck Depression Inventory. Depression was common with 
60-70% of study population exceeding the symptomatic threshold for depression at any given 
time. There was a statistically significant relationship between intervention/control group and 
depression; a higher percentage of intervention A’s participants were depressed at all points after 
T1 when compared to the other two intervention groups.  
Self-Efficacy scores were also related to intervention type. Between T1 and T3, the mean 
GSE scores increased more for intervention B and C than for the other intervention and for the 
control group; the mean scores for these two groups stayed higher than the other two groups for 
the duration of the study. Intervention A participants had a higher score than the control group at 
all points post-baseline; this indicates that all three interventions were associated with an 
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increase in self-efficacy. The relationship between self-efficacy and program type was 
statistically significant at all points after baseline. 
 
Figure 7.9 
Mean Scores on the SHS by group over time 
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Figure 7.10  
Mean Scores on the GSE by group over time 
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Figure 7.11 
Mean Scores on the Beck Depression Inventory by group over time  
 
 The Levenson LOC scale included three subscales: internality, powerful others, and 
chance. When doing a nonparametric correlation, a negative relationship with internality was 
revealed for both the powerful others subscale (Spearman’s rho: -.043) and chance (Spearman’s 
rho: -.152) subscales. The correlation between chance and powerful others was not statistically 
significant. All four groups (the three interventions and the control) started out similarly at 
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baseline; there was no statistically significant difference by group at baseline. However, after 
baseline, interventions B and C had a higher mean internality score and lower mean score on the 
other two scales when compared with intervention A and the control group. This difference was 
statistically significant. So, intervention B and C were correlated with an increase in a sense of 
control over one’s own destiny, as expressed by scores on the three scales, and a decrease in 
beliefs regarding chance or powerful outside forces controlling ones future.  
Figure 7.12 
Mean LOC scores on the Internality subscale by group and time 
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Figure 7.13 
Mean LOC scores on the Powerful Others subscale by group and time 
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Figure 7.14 
Mean LOC scores on the Chance subscale by group and time 
 
The McMaster Family Functioning score was also examined; at baseline there was no 
statistically significant difference between groups. At T2, Interventions B and C had increased 
their mean score (improved family functioning) while intervention A had decreased and the 
control group had risen, but not as much as that seen in interventions B and C groups. 
Interventions B and C had similar scores at T2 and T3, but at T4 and subsequent observations, 
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intervention B demonstrated higher mean scores than all other groups (see ANOVA table in the 
appendix). 
Figure 7.15 
Mean Scores on the McMaster Family Functioning Devices across time by group 
  
Hypothesis Testing 
 Hypothesis #1. Receiving education increases an ex-combatant’s confidence in their 
own ability to make change as quantified by the participant’s scores on the Generalized 
Self-Efficacy Scale and the internal locus of control score. This hypothesis emerged from both 
the research literature, which highlights the benefits of education in increasing self-efficacy and 
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other factors associated with the successful rehabilitation of crime-involved individuals, as well 
as from the prominent focus on education in the DDR interventions. In order to test this 
hypothesis, I looked at both vocational education and classical education. I set the alpha at .05 
(a= 0.05); the results will only be significant if . I transformed hours of education for 
both categories (vocational and classical) into half school days where 4 hours equaled one half 
day. First I looked at self-efficacy. My model is expressed as: 
 where Y is the GES score, the first effect is class hours 
and the second is vocational hours, R is the random effect and E is the error term.  The number 
of hours of classical education and the number of education of vocational education both had a 
positive effect on the participant’s GSE.  
Figure 7.16 
Hypothesis #1 Estimates of Fixed Effects 
Parameters Estimate SE Sig. 
GSE – Intercept 22.178199 .120928 .000 
GSE – Vocational (half days) .032242 .001754 .000 
GSE – Classical (half days) .033221 .001926 .000 
LOC – Intercept 14.659144 .138391 .000 
LOC – Vocational (half days) .036930 .001950 .000 
LOC – Classical (half days) .033590 .002134 .000 
 
Because this was the first hypothesis I examined, I examined it first without accounting 
for repeated effects or modeling the covariance structure. The -2 Restricted Log Likelihood 
result was shockingly high. I adapted my model, incorporating the repeated effect into my model 
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and ran it again; the second time the -2 Restricted Log Likelihood result was much smaller, 
indicating a better model fit for the data. Adding the repeated effect also reduced the standard 
error of the estimate for both classical and vocational education units. In the end I saw that the 
number of hours of classical education and the number of education of vocational education both 
had a positive effect on the participant’s GSE. These results were statistically significant. There 
was some variation at some time points when looking at the 8x8 table of estimates of covariance 
parameters, but this was small and did not impact interpretation of the model. 
Next I looked at internal LOC as measured by the Levenson subscale. My model is 
expressed as:  where Y is the Internal LOC score, the first 
effect is class half days, the second is vocational half days, R is the random effect and E is the 
error term.  The number of half days of classical education and the number of half days of 
vocational education both had a positive effect on the participant’s internal locus of control, 
indicating that those with more education developed a stronger internal locus of control. This 
relationship was statistically significant; when examining the results for the type III tests of fixed 
effects, the p value was .000, which matched the significance level of the parameters in the 
estimate of fixed effects.  
 The results of these tests indicate that the hypothesis is supported: receiving education 
increases an ex-combatant’s confidence in their own ability to make change as quantified by the 
participant’s scores on the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale and the Levenson internal Locus of 
Control score. 
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Hypothesis #2. Receiving education reduces the likelihood that the participant will 
engage in criminal or maladaptive behaviors including associating with armed peers, 
abusing alcohol, being violent, or engaging in crime. This hypothesis is likewise grounded in 
the research literature reviewed in previous chapters which points to the beneficial impact that 
education has on decreasing crime, violence, and other maladaptive and anti-social behaviors. 
Though much of the research previously reviewed was conducted on other populations, it was 
hypothesized that education would also be beneficial in reducing the likelihood of such 
behaviors in the ex-combatant population.  
To test this hypothesis I used the number of half days of education (both vocational and 
classical) and the scores on the crime questionnaire, the MOAS, the “do you have armed friends” 
variable and the AUDIT score. I tested each of these dependent variables separately. My model 
is expressed as:  where Y is the outcome variable (MOAS 
score, AUDIT score, etc), the first effect is class half days, the second is vocational half days, R 
is the random effect and E is the error term.  For this I also used a linear mixed model; this model 
was the best fit for my analysis as both the education variables and the dependent variables were 
continuous and the education variables had a large, unwieldy range.  
Classical and vocational education both had a negative correlation with the overall crime 
score; that is, the overall crime score decreased with greater amounts of education indicating that 
those who had more education engaged in less crime. This was statistically significant (figure 
7.18). Classical and vocational education also had a slight negative correlation with the property 
crime subscale; this was statistically significant. Similar findings were observed for the 
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trafficking subscale; the physical violence subscale; and the crimes related to sex and 
relationships subscales.  
Violence was quantified using the Modified Overt Aggression Scale (MOAS) scores, 
both the overall score and the score specific to verbal threats of violence. Education of both types 
was associated with a very small drop in the verbal aggression subscale (--.000775 for classical 
education and -.000595 for vocational education). These negative correlations were statistically 
significant. In looking at the overall MOAS score, we see the same thing, a small negative 
correlation that is statistically significant.  
Ex-members of armed groups continuing to socialize or interact with armed peers was a 
great concern expressed by the implementing partners of all three intervention. When examining 
the “armed friends” score, there was a negative correlation with both vocational and classical 
education and the engagement with armed friends. This was statistically significant at all time 
periods. This indicates that increased education is associated with having fewer friends from 
armed groups.  
Figure 7.17 
Hypothesis #2 Estimates of Fixed Effects 
Parameters Estimate SE Sig. 
MOAS – Intercept .791006 .014536 .000 
MOAS – Vocational (half days) -.001941 .000210 .000 
MOAS – Classical (half days) -.001892 .000221 .000 
Crime Score – Intercept 11.108992 .133505 .000 
Crime Score – Vocational (half days) -.029810 .002049 .000 
Crime Score – Classical (half days) -.033011 .002115 .000 
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Armed Friends – Intercept 39.881012 39.881012 .000 
Armed Friends – Vocational (half days) -.051162 -.051162 .000 
Armed Friends – Classical (half days) -.079307 -.079307 .000 
AUDIT – Intercept 3.940714 .058509 .000 
AUDIT – Vocational (half days) -.001472 .000820 .073 
AUDIT – Classical (half days) .000538 .000917 .557 
 
Alcohol abuse was measured using the AUDIT which produced two variables: a 
continuous variable score and a nominal variable (a score over the benchmark for alcohol abuse). 
I used the same linear mixed model with the AUDIT score as the dependent variable and found 
that classical education was negatively correlated with the AUDIT score and that vocational 
education was positively correlated; however, neither was statistically significant and p values on 
the type III test of fixed effects did not support the hypothesis that receiving education reducing 
alcohol abuse.  
To further examine this question I looked at the AUDIT benchmark scores which were 
used to create a nominal variable for healthy use of alcohol, harmful use of abuse and 
dependence on alcohol. Healthy use of alcohol was associated with a greater amount of both 
classical and vocational education. However, this was not statistically significant (p values: .106 
and .972 respectively).  
As previously mentioned, some participants received both vocational and classical 
education. I created a new variable combining the hours of both types of education. I grouped the 
participants into three groups using this variable so that I could examine differences between 
groups. The groups were: received no education; received less than the average (mean) number 
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of hours of education; and received education equal to the mean or higher than the mean. I 
examined mean AUDIT scores by group for each of the eight observations; however there was 
no statistically significant relationship between AUDIT scores and any of the three groups. 
The analysis outlined above supports the hypothesis that education reduces the likelihood 
that the participant will engage in criminal or maladaptive behaviors including associating with 
armed peers, being violent, or engaging in crime. However, my original hypothesis is only 
partially supported. Education reduces engagement in some criminal and maladaptive behaviors 
but the hypothesis that education reduces alcohol abuse was not supported.  
Hypothesis #3. Participants who engaged in sports and recreation were less likely to 
revert to criminal behavior or interact with armed friends in the post-demobilization 
period. As discussed in the previous chapter, sports are widely used in development and 
peacekeeping operations. They are integrated into many DDR programs and are quite popular 
among funders. However, the empirical research on their efficacy in contributing to the 
rehabilitation of members of armed groups is limited. This hypothesis tests the common 
assumption about sports and organization recreational programs made by policymakers, 
development professionals, and funders which guides the funding focus on sports as a 
component of DDR programming.  
Figure 7.18 
 
Hypothesis #3 Estimates of Fixed Effects 
Parameters Estimate SE Sig. 
Crime Score – Intercept 10.943978 .140174 .000 
Crime Score – Sports & Recreation (days engaged) -.082202 .004737 .000 
Armed Friends – Intercept 37.546316 .521430 .000 
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Armed Friends – Sports & Recreation (days engaged) -.233015 .017661 .000 
 
Again I used a mixed linear model as both the dependent and the independent variables 
were continuous. My model is expressed as:  where Y is the 
dependent variable (crime score), days engaging in sports or recreation is the covariate, R is the 
random effect and E is the error term. Engaging in sports or recreation had a slight negative 
correlation (-.082202; 95% CI: -.091489 − -.072914) with the total crime score. A type III test of 
fixed effects demonstrated that this was statically significant. Similar but very small, statistically 
significant results were found with the subscales. One subscales stands out: physical crimes 
against persons. Engaging in sports or recreation was negatively correlated with physically 
violent crimes against persons (-.26213; 95% CI: -.029837 − -.022589). The results of this 
analysis indicate that the hypothesis is supported: Participants who engaged in sports and 
recreation were less likely to revert to criminal behavior in the post-demobilization period. 
Hypothesis #4. Receiving education is associated with increased pro-social capacities 
and behaviors.  As noted in chapters two and three, DDR occurs within a larger peacekeeping 
mission which has the goal of stabilizing the country and creating the conditions for peaceful 
expression of political activities. DDR programs are seen as an essential tool in part because they 
are purported by policymakers to reshape the political behaviors of participants from that which 
is violent to peaceful means of participation. However, this is rarely empirically tested. To test 
this hypothesis I quantified the increase in pro-social capacities and behaviors as hours spend 
volunteering, scores on the McMaster Family Functioning Device, the Decision Making Skills 
Survey, the Political Conversations with Others questionnaire, the Competence for Civic Action 
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survey, and the Political Voice measure.  Some of these instruments measure both capacities and 
behaviors while others measure just behaviors, a self-assessment of skills, or beliefs about one’s 
own capacities.   
First I looked at family functioning. My model is expressed as: 
 where Y is the McMaster FAD score, the first effect is 
classical education units and the second is vocational education units, R is the random effect and 
E is the error term.  Both classical and vocational education were associated with an increase in 
family functioning as expressed through the McMaster Family Functioning Assessment Device 
score; this was slightly higher for classical education than for vocational education. Next I 
looked at the scores on the decision making, political voice, and civic action scales. Each was 
associated with a small, statistically significant increase based on both educational and 
vocational education.  
Figure 7.19 
Hypothesis #4 Estimates of Fixed Effects 
Parameters Estimate SE Sig. 
McMaster – Intercept 25.916513 .130970 .000 
McMaster – Vocational (half days) .006494 .001747 .000 
McMaster – Classical (half days) .010764 .001963 .000 
Decision Making – Intercept 16.941783 .192054 .000 
Decision Making – Vocational (half days) .063737 .004975 .000 
Decision Making – Classical (half days) .053671 .003636 .000 
Civic Action – Intercept 16.774998 .101781 .000 
Civic Action – Vocational (half days) .028822 .001474 .000 
Civic Action – Classical (half days) .024860 .001623 .000 
PCWO – Intercept 36.869984 .212196 .000 
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PCWO – Vocational (half days) 1.002247E-5 .002993 .997 
PCWO – Classical (half days) -.001752 .003262 .591 
Political Voice – Intercept 7.573724 .048623 .000 
Political Voice – Vocational (half days) .003243 .000713 .000 
Political Voice – Classical (half days) .003929 .000778 .000 
Volunteering (hours) – Intercept .202953 .114889 .078 
Volunteering (hours) – Vocational (half days) .200177 .013023 .000 
Volunteering (hours) – Classical (half days) .178114 .012584 .000 
 
Next I examined the Political Conversations with Others (PCWO) scale; there was some 
association present (negative for classical education, positive for vocational education) but it was 
not statistically significant. Lastly I examined hours spent volunteering.  To do this I excluded 
volunteering which was required by the intervention program. There was a notable positive 
relationship between both vocational education and classical education on volunteering hours. 
This was statistically significant.  
The results of this analysis partially support the hypothesis that ex-combatants receiving 
education is associated with increased pro-social capacities and behaviors.  Vocational and 
classical education had a positive impact on family functioning, decision making skills, 
engagement in civic action, having a political voice, and volunteering hours. However, the 
hypothesis is only partially supported as neither form of education had a statistically significant 
effect on engagement in political conversations with others.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
While DDR programs may have country- and conflict-specific goals, the thrust of all 
DDR programs is to successfully rehabilitate and reintegrate members of armed groups into 
society such that individual are economically productive, law-abiding citizens who engage in 
political expression and action only using socially approved, non-violent methods. Programmatic 
success of DDR efforts (typically defined as whether the activities occurred and intervention 
services were delivered as planned at all three phases of the program) is often causally linked by 
policymakers and IO actors with the success of peacekeeping efforts.  Today, DDR programs are 
viewed as essential in preventing war-recurrence in post-conflict situations involving civil, 
internal, or insurgent conflict. DDR programs have been moved to the forefront of peacemaking 
and peacekeeping programs, they are the extolled as a key part of current international aid 
practices in post-conflict areas, and are described in the policy literature as indispensable to 
peacekeeping efforts in many situations. However, to date there has been little research to 
establish how DDR actually works on the individual level and what aspects of DDR, in any, are 
actually working to accomplish the lofty goals set out for this intervention program. This study 
was an effort to begin to test some of the assumptions on which DDR efforts are based. 
This dissertation examined three types of DDR interventions which were based on 
different theoretical underpinnings: strain theory, social control theory, and theories of social 
ecology and social disorganization. The longitudinal data collected on participants in these 
programs, as well as eligible but non participating community members, was examined to begin 
to shed light on exactly what it is within the DDR effort that changes individual attitudes and 
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behaviors which may lead to changes in group level behavior (and perhaps eventually lead to 
state-level effects such as peace). The limited scope of this study was focused on individuals and 
their behavior as it related to specific changes including a reduction of crime and other 
maladaptive behaviors and an increase in pro-social behaviors. No effort was made to link this 
individual-level change to larger conclusions about the success or failure of DDR efforts in post-
coup Haiti or in post-conflict societies in general on a mezzo or macro level. The individual 
factors examined in this study cannot be isolated as the only, or even the most, important aspects 
of what makes DDR work; they are simply a part of the larger picture of DDR success. 
This dissertation study looked at several key aspects to individual success in behavior 
change: developing a sense of self-efficacy and the sense that ones’ actions influence their 
future; reducing interactions with and behaviors related to armed peer groups; increasing pro-
social attitudes and behaviors; and decreasing maladaptive and violent behaviors. A review of 
the literature emphasized the importance of attitude and beliefs in behavioral change; locus of 
control and self-efficacy were specifically highlighted for their importance in adopting new ways 
of interacting with society including choosing non-violent methods for political expression, 
becoming economically self-reliant, and succeeding in educational and self-improvement efforts. 
Engagement in sports was also studied, as it has been widely used both in DDR and in post-
conflict peace efforts. And lastly, education, which the research literature posits as having a 
tremendous impact on the rehabilitation of people engaged in crime was also examined, 
particularly since the large body of research on this type of intervention suggests its potential for 
reshaping identities and beliefs, a core aspect of individual-level DDR interventions. 
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What I do determines my future 
 One attitudinal change linked to many of the desired outcomes for DDR (educational 
success, financial stability, etc.) is the development of belief that one’s actions matter, that the 
individual has the ability to influence their own life and that they can be effective in adopting a 
new way of working, living, or relating to the government and the community. The idea that 
“what I do determines my future” is linked to both self-efficacy and to having an internal locus 
of control. While self-efficacy is frequently seen in the literature as something which can be 
fostered or increased in intervention participants, locus of control has historically been treated as 
a static variable with the assumption that LOC is related to aspects of personality that are 
unchanged throughout a person’s lifetime. However, recently that notion has been challenged 
and LOC is beginning to be seen as something both tied to self-efficacy, and something that is 
changeable (Green, & Kavas, 2014; Cobb-Clark, D. A., & Schurer, 2013;. Ryon, & Gleason, 
2014; Worell, & Tumilty, 2013). This study treated LOC as a dependent variable, one that could 
be shaped by the amount and type of services received.  
My first hypothesis was that receiving education increases an ex-combatant’s confidence 
in their own ability to make change. I quantified this by using the participant’s scores on the 
Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale and the Levenson’s Internal LOC score. I found that for both 
types of education (vocational and classical) individuals gained a greater sense in their ability to 
make change and to control their own future when they had more education. This finding is 
particularly important because all DDR program to date have included an educational 
component. Usually this component is vocational in nature and is presented as giving former 
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combatants an alternative career path so they don’t engage in crime to support themselves. While 
this pragmatic approach to vocational education is understandable, there is a greater importance 
to this finding. If we can shape and increase self-efficacy and LOC through education, this may 
contribute to the larger, often unarticulated, goal of identity change (from armed combatant to 
peaceful civilian).  
Education 
 Related to this idea of identity change through education is the transformation of 
individual behavior. More research, perhaps qualitative in nature, is needed to elucidate exactly 
how and why this process happens.  From the quantitative lens of this study we can see that 
education didn’t just increase self-efficacy and a sense of one’s control of their own future, but it 
also reduces the likelihood that the participant will engage in criminal or maladaptive behaviors 
including associating with armed peers, being violent, or engaging in crime. The more education 
participants received, the less they socialized with armed peers. It is not possible to determine if 
a reduction in socializing with armed peers is what made these educated individuals less violent 
and less involved in crime, but there is a clear relationship between education and these positive 
outcomes of violence reduction, less engagement in crime and a reduction in socializing with 
armed peers.  
 Classical education is rarely emphasized in DDR efforts. In Haiti, the inclusion of this 
type of education was intentional. Classical education is highly valued in Haitian society; to 
complete secondary school is considered a major accomplishment which brings honor to one’s 
entire family. The inclusion of classical school as an option for DDR participants was made with 
the idea that classical education could help reshape the identities of individuals sot that they 
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identified as scholars or educated people rather than as gang members, as chimere (a derogatory 
term for unemployed young men from urban slums), or as members of a particular armed group. 
Ebaugh (1988) gives a theoretical framework for understanding the process of role exit. 
She identifies four stages in role-exit: having doubt, seeking alternatives, reaching a turning 
point, and creating an ex-role. First, at the doubt stage an individual begins to question his or her 
role. These doubts can happen due to a major external stimulus (for example, job loss) or through 
a gradual process of self-reflection. Second, a person will research potential alternatives and 
begin considering what life would be like in a different role. Third, the turning point serves three 
basic functions: reducing cognitive dissonance, serving as opportunity to announce the new role 
to others, and gathering resources needed to facilitate an exit. Lastly, the creation of an ex-role is 
the process by which the individual forms, embodies, and communicates a new identity.  
This process of identity formation applies to those undergoing the transition from role of 
armed group member to former armed group member. As previously mentioned, the theories of 
change embraced by Intervention C, ecological and social disorganization, put forth the idea that 
the place in which young people are raised and the disorganization and negative influences in 
that place socializes them into deviance by shaping a personal identity and set of beliefs which 
approve of or advocate for illegal or violent behavior.  Similarly, the theory of change embraced 
by Intervention A, strain theory, also emphasizes the importance of identity and personal beliefs 
and the role that the conflict between society’s values and one’s sense of their own ability to 
achieve success as measured by those values plays in the choice to engage in crime.  Armed 
groups are incredibly pervasive in the lives of their participants. An armed group will propagate 
itself by relying on the unrelenting loyalty and subordination of individuality of its members. 
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Thus, reaching the first stage Ebaugh’s framework is incredibly challenging. The post-conflict 
environment serves as a major stimulus and helps cast doubt on participation in armed groups, 
since the groups may no longer be socially tolerated. However, there are two major challenges 
faced by those attempting to rehabilitate ex-members of armed groups. First, identity is derived 
from the individual, and thus an identity cannot be imposed externally (though, as noted 
previously, place, friendships, and community are important influences on identity). Even the 
most successful interventions are not able to impose a new identity on participants without their 
consent. Second, group identities are deeply entrenched and a short-term program is unlikely to 
reshape identity entirely.  
If the incentive structure for group participation changes in the post-conflict setting, the 
opportunity for the doubt phase may present itself. If this happens a former armed group member 
may begin to consider alterative options for their future plans. In the case of education-based 
interventions, participants were presented with attractive alternative options. Participants in the 
interventions could envision themselves in new careers or as educated people, which helped 
speed up the process of role transition. Another aspect which may support this process is the 
friendships which are developed within the DDR program among participants. These were 
intentionally cultivated within Intervention B (faith based) and may have occurred naturally in 
other interventions as well.  
The third component of role transition, turning point, can really only be identified by the 
participants themselves. However, of the three subcomponents of the tipping point phase, the 
intervention helps the participants gather resources to make an exit most successfully. With the 
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classical education and/or vocational training courses, participants have greater prospects for 
successfully shifting roles.  
Lastly, encouraging adopting and embodying a new role is ultimately the aim of DDR 
interventions. Labels are important when discussing the role of identity formation and change. 
To look at it from a Foucauldian perspective: the identity of the individual is defined by a 
continuing discourse and a shifting communication and identification of oneself to others. The 
externally imposed labels of ex-combatant, gang member, criminal, etc. can be adopted by the 
individual and internalized or they can be rejected; when education facilitates the individual 
adopting a new identity of being a student or scholar and engaging with that concept of 
themselves in the community, it can help create the type of identity change being sought by DDR 
interventions. In cultures, such as in Haiti, where classical education is high prized, choosing to 
include classical in additional to or in place of vocational education may be advisable to aid this 
internal shift in identity. 
Engagement in Sports 
 Sports are frequently cited as an effective way to build peace and facilitate the climate for 
development efforts in less hospitable cultures because they are seen as building friendly bridges 
or relationships between somewhat hostile actors. In DDR sports are also promoted as a way of 
ex-combatants letting off steam or getting their aggressions out, with the assumption that 
individual-level anger, stress, or aggression contribute to non-rehabilitative behaviors. Testing 
these assumptions was not the focus of this study. But this study did find evidence to support the 
assertion that DDR participants who engage in organized sports and recreational activities are 
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less likely to engage in criminal behavior or socialize with people win armed groups. The causal 
relationships within this process are unclear and would be a fruitful project for future research. 
Pro-Social Political Behaviors and Competencies 
 One hypothesis that this dissertation examined was that receiving education is associated 
with increased pro-social capacities and behaviors. This was partially supported; the results of 
this analysis partially support the hypothesis that ex-combatants receiving education is associated 
with increased pro-social capacities and behaviors.  Vocational and classical education had a 
positive impact on family functioning, decision making skills, engagement in civic action, 
having a political voice, and volunteering hours. However, the hypothesis was only partially 
supported as neither form of education had a statistically significant effect on engagement in 
political conversations with others. 
 Within Haitian culture, political discussions are commonplace; politically themed call in 
shows dominate the radio waves every evening and it is difficult to find a Haitian adult who 
doesn’t have a political opinion to share. This could be the reason that the PCWO scale wasn’t 
impacted by education; individuals in the study seemed to engage in political conversations 
frequently, despite their impact of the intervention.  
 However the other measures which were included in testing this hypothesis illuminate 
some areas for increased intervention and support. In particular, community service, engaging in 
civic actions (such as voting), and expressing one’s political voice non-violently are all behaviors 
which are in concert with the goals and objectives of DDR. These outcomes were not the result 
of intensive interventions; in fact, only Intervention C (Education-Focused) had specific 
workshops on non-violent political expression and activities. In the other two interventions the 
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importance of these behavioral changes were implicit. A possible future adaptation to DDR 
programming would be to include, explicitly, the goals of non-violent political participation 
through community organizing, voting, peaceful protest, lobbying, having political discussions 
with others, community service, etc. through workshops or group activities to teach and practice 
these skills. The social work services provided by the three interventions, which did include 
assisting participants in obtaining a voter registration card, could be tied to this; but the findings 
also indicate a fruitful area for increased programming within the intervention aimed at explicitly 
promoting forms of non-violent, pro-social political participation. 
Intervention Fidelity 
 Intervention fidelity is the degree to which an intervention does what it set out to do. 
(Gearing, et al., 2011) Interventions in two different contexts may be identical on paper, but in 
practice they almost always take on different forms. This is because there are confounding 
factors that make it impossible to replicate an intervention exactly. Things like cultural variation, 
differences in competencies, viewpoints of key staff, access to equipment, and countless other 
factors shape the intervention.  
Fidelity is an important aspect of accountability. Measuring fidelity is one of the ways 
that interventions are assessed by funding agencies, thus holding the implementing organization 
accountable for meeting expectations (Berger & Grossman, 2007). In the absence of fidelity 
measures, organizations may ignore the evidence base in lieu of more convenient or popular 
approaches. Fidelity can be measured across program-specific dimensions. For example, the 
evaluation of a mental health program focused on organization, staffing and service (McGrew, 
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Bond, Dietzen, & Salyers, 1994). Gearing et al. (2011) identifies four generic components of 
intervention fidelity and helps us understand how to evaluate each component:  
1. Intervention design and protocols 
2. Intervention training 
3. Monitoring of intervention delivery 
4. Monitoring of intervention receipt 
According to the authors, all four of these components are integral to the functioning of a 
program and the fidelity of each can be measured by evaluating protocols, execution, 
maintenance, feedback, and threats. Protocols are the frameworks and measures for fidelity 
assessment. Execution covers how the fidelity measurement process will actually take place. 
Maintenance is an assessment of ongoing training and adherence to plans. Feedback looks at 
corrective feedback procedures for addressing deviation from the program plan. Lastly, threats 
looks at the potential obstacles that can undermine fidelity.  
 Carroll et al. (2007) take a similar approach and identify four aspects of intervention 
fidelity at the adherence stage of program implementation: details of content, coverage, 
frequency, and duration. These factors can have an impact on the delivery process (educational 
program vs. distribution program) and the quality of delivery. The intervention may change to 
meet the needs of the participants if it is found that the participants respond to some intervention 
aspects better than others. Furthermore, the responsiveness of participants can play a role. If 
participants do not buy in to the intervention, additional time or modifications will be needed. 
Also, there will be variation in participation, where some participants do all intervention-related 
activities and others either participate partially or drop out.  
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There are many potential sources of infidelity, and some of them may actually be 
permissible depending on the standpoint of the organization and funder. There is a strong 
justification for adjusting to better serve the needs of the population. There is a tradeoff between 
implementation fidelity and program adaptation, and some level of adaptation is often needed 
when a program is being implemented in a new cultural context (Castro, Barrera, & Martinez, 
2004). Thus, sometimes an intervention can lack fidelity because it has been changes for the 
better.  
There are three principal ways that an intervention can be improved by compromising 
fidelity: cultural sensitivity, utilization of local strengths, and meeting community needs. First, 
programs must be modified to be culturally appropriate. For example, a healthcare intervention 
in Haiti may need to account for voodoo-based approaches in addition to traditional medicine 
and western medicine in order to increase participation rates. Second, an intervention may make 
use of local strengths, such as community or religious leaders. If there is an existing network or 
technology that can facilitate community outreach, such as a local clinic, a program may be 
adapted to reach the target population as effectively as possible. Lastly, the intervention can be 
modified to meet the needs of the community. For example, an agency may come in to the 
community to run a nutritional education program. However, if people in the community lack the 
resources to buy food, they may divert resources to food distribution. Thus, there is mission drift 
if an intervention is struggling to be relevant.  
Interventions may lose fidelity in ways that compromise their efforts negatively. There 
are several ways in which this can happen. First, corruption can sap a program of the resources it 
needs to accomplish its intervention goals. Diverting funds is only one type of corruption. 
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Individuals may also fraudulently claim to be working on the project or hire unqualified friends 
to work on the intervention. Secondly, limited human capital undermines the fidelity of a 
program. An absence of experts and trained individuals is particularly noticeable in developing 
world contexts. Thus, an intervention may not accomplish everything it set out to accomplish, 
simply because it lacks the appropriate manpower to do so. Lastly, limitations like a dearth of 
resources can result in an intervention that falls short of expectations. If a program is 
underfunded, or if necessary equipment is unavailable, low fidelity can occur. 
The issue of intervention fidelity undercuts the ability of a program to assess success and 
recommend future action. Researchers have a difficult time discerning what works and what 
doesn’t work, and thus, generalizations are difficult to make. This is particularly true for 
international organizations that operate in many countries. For example, if an organization is 
doing an intervention in over one hundred countries, evaluating the intervention will be 
incredibly challenging. This is because, in most cases, the interventions from one country to the 
next are wildly different from each other. This is certainly the case for DDR programs, which is 
why researchers must be cautious about accepting the results from one iteration of the 
intervention. 
Of these issues, the biggest obstacles faced in this dissertation are 1) adherence and 
competence of intervention practitioners and 2) varying levels of participation by intervention 
participants. Breitenstein et al. (2010) discuss the concepts of adherence and competence of 
intervention practitioners. Adherence is a measure of how closely intervention practitioners 
follow intervention protocol. Competence looks at how skillfully an intervention is executed.  It 
is incredibly difficult to account for these measures empirically, since researchers must often rely 
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on self-reported measures. Self-reported measures are problematic because practitioners have an 
incentive to make themselves appear to be adherent and competent than they actually are. 
Independent evaluations are one way to address this issue, like the work in this dissertation 
project. However, interventions only happen in fixed points of time and often don’t capture 
adherence and competence over time. Thus, a common limitation of program evaluations is that 
they don’t get much traction on organizational obstacles to executing an intervention.  
Assessing levels of participation is particularly difficult because implementing agencies 
have an incentive to present the most attractive data on their programs. For example, an agency 
may say that they had 200 people participate in an intervention, when in reality only 100 people 
participated in the intervention and the rest dropped out along the way. The issue of intervention 
fidelity also has empirical implications. First, it is difficult to compare interventions across time 
and geographic location. What works in one country may not work in another country. This 
poses major challenges to transnational and international organizations, since they must incur 
costs every time they begin a project trying to develop appropriate modifications to an 
intervention.  
One clear difficulty with evaluating the three different approaches included in this study 
was one of intervention fidelity. Each of the three programs was funded at one time or another by 
at least three different funding agencies including internal DPKO and UN funding sources, 
foreign governments, other IOs, and NGOs. Each funder had explicit demands for what services 
should be offered and these requirements were outlined in a series of program documents 
including project proposals, responses to requests for proposals (RFP), MOUs, and contracts. 
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The services outlined in these documents should have, for the most part, matched the services 
received by each of the participants. They did not. 
 Interventions B and C both gave minimum levels of services they would provide in the 
areas specified by the funders; for the most part both programs complied with this. There were 
some individuals who dropped out, refused to attend classes, or were uncooperative in other 
ways and thus received fewer services than was intended. These cases were clearly documented 
and were easily identified. 
 Both B (Faith Based) and C (Education) interventions used an individualized assessment 
and planning process where each participant was assessed, tested for educational skills, and then 
participated in a planning meeting where they choose a vocational or classical educational 
program (or both) and in which other services or requirements (such as visiting ones children 
each week or opening a bank account) were included in their plan. This meant that interventions 
B and C sometimes often provided more services than the minimum in some areas. However, it 
appears the inclusion of additional services, though challenging from an evaluation perspective, 
was done to improve the services to meet the unique needs of the participants. 
 Intervention A, on the other hand, had other, more problematic fidelity issues. In addition 
to poor record keeping (which could have been related to administration, a lack of skills on the 
part of the local staff, or simply, not valuing the need to keep detailed accurate records) meant 
that some individuals assigned to the program simply disappeared in their first few days of 
contact, before baseline assessments could be taken. There were 22 people listed on the program 
records who could not be located at all and who did not receive services, though it appears that 
some services were (erroneous) billed on behalf of these participants.  
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 Although all participants in Intervention A were supposed to receive the same number of 
days of vocational training and the same number of days in internship placement, this did not 
occur and staff members were unable to account for the reason for the change in services for all 
of the participants. Some drop outs were listed in program records as deceased but were later 
located by research team members doing follow up interviews. This confusion made it difficult 
to determine who actually got what service. To reconcile this issue empirically, I decided not to 
use a categorical variable of participation versus non-participation. Rather, I looked at 
participation in terms of number of hours logged. Each service was billed and the billing records 
corresponded to a sign in/sign out sheet or other documentation of service contact. When using 
this to determine the services it was clear that some participants in Intervention A did get the 
vocational training and internship placement that was intended. However, the variation was so 
great that I was not able to compare intervention approaches by program as intended. Rather, I 
compared by the amount of education and the amount of sports programming. This allowed me 
to make more nuanced observations about the intervention types associated with aspects of 
successful reintegration.  
 Ultimately, a policy implication of the potential lack of intervention fidelity is that 
program evaluations must gain a level of nuance that goes beyond a determining if a program 
was completed. Forcing a binary results in overlooking what really happened in the day-to-day 
program. Service practitioners need to ask about what happens after participants arrive for a day 
of program participation: Does the individual actually participate? Or, does he hang out in the 
yard drinking beer with his buddies? Is the program exaggerating the level of participation to 
bring in more aid dollars? Or, are participants actually sitting in the classroom and participating 
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in the training the entire time? These are questions that those administering DDR programs have 
an imperative to ask.    
Implications for Social Work Practice 
 There is a rich literature on interventions for those involved in crimes who are exiting 
prison settings, however we know less about how to respond appropriately to ex-members of 
armed groups in community settings. Many of the options available for the punitive response to 
crime typically seen in conflict prone and developing countries are simply not feasible in a post-
conflict setting. First, this is because post-conflict reconstruction brings with it a set of 
international norms in which crimes committed in the course of war are treated differently than 
those committed during non-conflict times. Even when the laws of war are broken, there are high 
levels of leniency because there is a strong interest in reconciling society. Participants in both 
legitimate and illegitimate armed groups are not typically imprisoned, except in some cases 
where they committed crimes against humanity. Third, often concessions are made in peace 
settlements that ban punitive actions against ex-combatants. Lastly, post-conflict institutions are 
often damaged and lack the capacity to respond by incarcerating or otherwise punishing ex-
combatants.  
 This opens the door for social work interventions which might not otherwise have been 
possible. The state is constrained in how it can respond to former members of armed groups. 
While criminals receive a combination of carrot (rehabilitation) and stick (prison) responses, 
meaningful punitive responses often are not options for ex-offenders. This means that 
rehabilitative programs are often voluntary for ex-members of armed groups. The implication is 
that the rehabilitative program must be inherently valuable to compel ex-members of armed 
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groups to participate. This can be done by providing ex-offenders with side benefits, like food or 
payment, or by providing direct benefits like providing the participant with a usable skill.  
 This provides an opportunity for evidence based social work practices to be implemented 
into existing DDR interventions in an effort to enhance the programs services and empower the 
participants to actively engage in the DDR process and the process of creating a new life for 
themselves. Rather than being a minor side component, social work services should be integrated 
into early engagement with members of armed groups and the communities to which they are 
relocating, the planning and creation of program content, the implementation of the 
interventions, and evaluation and follow up with the participants.  
This seems obvious, since DDR programs are essentially, at the individual level, a social 
work intervention. However, in practice, the social worker is often an afterthought, if they are 
included at all, and DDR programs themselves are typically managed and led by administrators 
with a military or a UN bureaucrat background. The two programs whose participants were most 
likely to have positive outcomes and least likely to continue to be engaged in crime or socialize 
with armed peers were both led by social workers. While a causal connection is not established 
by this research, the social work emphasis on integrating evidence based practices including 
intentionally including education and volunteering in the intervention programs was clearly 
helpful in achieving positive outcomes.  
This research suggests that in addition to receiving education itself, there is also value in 
the fact that one has become an educated person.  From an empowerment perspective, the fact 
that gang members and insurgents view themselves as part of a particular community is 
important to consider when facilitating their exit from that community. The individual is most 
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successful when adopting a new identity that fills that which was satisfied by role the armed 
group played in their previous life. Education programs give ex-members of armed groups a new 
self-identity. Though education can influence identity formation of any person involved in crime, 
members of armed groups are particularly vulnerable and often come from marginalized 
socioeconomic communities; to promote education as an opportunity for identity reformation, is 
then, particularly important.  
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Appendix A: Study Measures 
 
Levenson Multidimensional Locus of Control Scales 
 
Instructions. For each of the following statements, indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree by writing in the appropriate number. 
–3 = strongly disagree 
–2 = disagree somewhat 
–1 = slightly disagree 
+1 = slightly agree 
+2 = agree somewhat 
+3 = strongly agree 
 
Questionnaire. 
1. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability. 
2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings. 
3. I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people. 
4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a driver I am. 
5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work. 
6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck. 
7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky. 
8. Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility without 
appealing to those in positions of power. 
9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am. 
10. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others. 
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12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck. 
13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests when they 
conflict with those of strong pressure groups. 
14. It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter 
of good or bad fortune. 
15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me. 
16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I’m lucky enough to be in the right 
place at the right time. 
17. If important people were to decide they didn’t like me, I probably wouldn’t make many 
friends. 
18. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life. 
19. I am usually able to protect my personal interests. 
20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver. 
21. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it. 
22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the desires of people who 
have power over me. 
23. My life is determined by my own actions. 
24. It’s chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many friends. 
 
Scoring. Total your responses for the items listed for each of the three parts of the scale; 
add +24 to each of your three totals. Internal Locus of Control: Total your responses for items 1, 
4, 5, 9, 18, 19, 21, and 23; then add +24. Powerful Others: Total your responses for items 3, 8, 
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11, 13, 15, 17, 20, and 22; then add +24. Chance: Total your responses for items 2, 6, 7, 10, 12, 
14, 16, and 24; then add +24. 
 
CES D-10 
 
Instructions. This is a list of some of the things you may have felt or ways you may have 
behaved. Please indicate how often you have felt this way during the past week. 
 
  Rarely or none 
of the time 
(less than 1 
day) 
Some or a 
little of the 
time 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
or a moderate 
amount of time 
(3-4 days) 
All of the 
time 
(5-7 days) 
1 I was bothered by things 
that usually don’t bother 
me. 
beach blue line door opening 
into a room 
family 
photograph 
2 I had trouble keeping my 
mind on what I was 
doing. 
purple circle ocean bayawonn· 
tree 
furniture 
3 I felt depressed. wet floor trousers sun park 
4 I felt that everything I did 
was an effort. 
river woman on 
roof 
fan child 
studying 
5 I felt hopeful about the 
future. 
yellow square hill men’s 
underwear 
door 
6 I felt fearful. hamburger two red 
lines 
dining room snake 
7 My sleep was restless. desk porch forest brown cross 
8 I was happy. camera orange 
turtle  
kitchen hut boy 
9 I felt lonely. mountain lock and 
key 
curtain fork 
10 I could not “get going.” oil lamp couch patat desert 
 
Scoring instructions: For items five and eight, use reserve scoring. For the rest, “rarely 
or none” is 0, “some or a little” is 1, “occasionally or a moderate amount” is 2, and “all of the 
time” is 3.  
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McMaster Family Functioning Scale 
 
Instructions. This assessment contains a number of statements about families. Read each 
statement carefully, and decide how well it describes your own family. You should answer 
according to how you see your family. For each statement are four (4) possible responses:  
1. Strongly agree (SA): Choose SA if you feel that the statement describes your family 
very accurately. 
2. Agree (A): Choose A if you feel that the statement describes your family for the most 
part. 
3. Disagree (D): Choose D if you feel that the statement does not describe your family for 
the most part. 
4. Strongly disagree (SD): Choose SD if you feel that the statement does not describe 
your family at all. 
Try not to spend too much time thinking about each statement, but respond as quickly and as 
honestly as you can. If you have difficulty, answer with your first reaction. As I read the 
question, choose the picture that matches your answer. 
 SA A D SD 
1. Planning family activities is difficult because 
we misunderstand each other. 
red 
triangle 
broccoli camel tongue 
2. We resolve most everyday problems around 
the house. 
teeth orange cat Jesus 
3. When someone is upset the others know 
why. 
C-clamp nose cabbage wolf 
4. When you ask someone to do something, you 
have to check that they did it. 
propane 
tank 
cheetah green 
circle 
smile 
5. If someone is in trouble, the others become 
too involved. 
blue line 
 
stomach CD 
player 
pants 
6. In times of crisis we can turn to each other alarm purple chisel door 
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for support. clock umbrella handle 
7. We don't know what to do when an 
emergency comes up. 
moon electric 
drill 
chicken Black 
truck 
8. We sometimes run out of things that we 
need. 
pajamas shoulders cow carrot 
9. We are reluctant to show our affection for 
each other. 
finishing 
sander 
yellow 
backpack 
chimp jigsaw 
puzzle 
10. We make sure members meet their family 
responsibilities. 
hacksaw suitcase green 
pepper 
raincoat 
11. We cannot talk to each other about the 
sadness we feel. 
people 
swimming 
rainbow scarf desert 
12. We usually act on our decisions regarding 
problems. 
cannon rubber 
bands 
diamond 
ring 
pupil 
13. You only get the interest of others when 
something is important to them. 
paint 
brush 
sweet 
pepper 
bow and 
arrow 
cub 
14. You can't tell how a person is feeling from 
what they are saying. 
paper pipe 
clamp 
lion stone 
15. Family tasks don't get spread around 
enough. 
vise celery crocodile hurricane 
16. Individuals are accepted for what they are. cress dog toe ice 
17. You can easily get away with breaking the 
rules. 
dolphin old car saw school 
boy 
18. People come right out and say things 
instead of hinting at them. 
musical 
notes 
herb pipe 
wrench 
coffee 
cup 
19. Some of us just don't respond emotionally. pliers duck fire corn 
20. We know what to do in an emergency. doctor jeans cucumber plane 
21. We avoid discussing our fears and 
concerns. 
dress eggplant eagle lightning 
22. It is difficult to talk to each other about 
tender feelings. 
elephant school 
uniform 
barge roof 
23. We have trouble meeting our financial 
obligations. 
doll squirrel propane 
torch 
whale 
24. After our family tries to solve a problem, 
we usually discuss whether it worked or not. 
bat putty 
knife 
school 
girl 
fan 
25. We are too self-centered. knife fish neck ATV 
26. We can express feelings to each other. nurse tractor fly rowboat 
27. We have no clear expectations about toilet 
habits. 
sharpening 
stone 
glass dog dad with 
baby 
28. We do not show our love for each other. bath mouth fox hammer 
29. We talk to people directly rather than 
through go-betweens. 
duster hamster forest soldering 
gun 
30. Each of us has particular duties and 
responsibilities. 
feet jar tiger kite 
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31. There are lots of bad feelings in the family. girl stapler flood jacket 
32. We have rules about hitting people. drill truck frog  
33. We get involved with each other only when 
something interests us. 
man wire 
brush 
restaurant goldfish 
34. There is little time to explore personal 
interests. 
bicycle giraffe money dock 
35. We often don't say what we mean. bow taptap goat hotel 
36. We feel accepted for what we are. lips hat rain boat 
37. We show interest in each other when we 
can get something out of it personally. 
map mom & 
baby 
pie rat 
38. We resolve most emotional upsets that 
come up. 
bus sun pan men 
39. Tenderness takes second place to other 
things in our family. 
son pot toe pig 
40. We discuss who are responsible for 
household jobs. 
bike apple tub security 
guard 
41. Making decisions is a problem for our 
family. 
car gloves locust banana 
42. Our family shows interest in each other 
only when they can get something out of it. 
emery 
board 
bar of 
soap 
van arm 
43. We are frank (direct, straightforward) with 
each other. 
zipper hallway bird book 
44. We don't hold to any rules or standards. helicopter dress cyclone ferry 
45. If people are asked to do something, they 
need reminding. 
Bwa Pie 
tree 
chin flag staple 
gun 
46. We are able to make decisions about how to 
solve problems. 
clover nail brush billboard clam 
47. If the rules are broken, we don't know what 
to expect. 
taxi ribbon classroom fangs plunger 
48. Anything goes in our family. wrench ship horse crib 
49. We express tenderness. file legs peas coat 
50. We confront problems involving feelings. bus clouds rope club 
51. We don't get along well together. women torch  scooter 
52. We don't talk to each other when we are 
angry. 
can yellow 
car 
nail 
clippers 
fang 
53. We are generally dissatisfied with the 
family duties assigned to us. 
hen safety 
pins 
boy ladder 
54. Even though we mean well, we intrude too 
much into each other's lives. 
cow flower road 
grader 
hat 
55. There are rules in our family about 
dangerous situations. 
crown odometer book corn 
56. We confide in each other. hip coins bun desk 
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57. We cry openly. tank hill game scissors 
58. We don't have reasonable transport. cat tweezers knees freighter 
59. When we don't like what someone has 
done, we tell them. 
crow car shaving 
brush 
cap 
60. We try to think of different ways to solve 
problems. 
combine 
harvester 
crowd crayon cake 
 
Scoring Instructions: The FAD is scored by adding the responses (1-4) for each scale 
(negatively worded statements are reversed) and dividing by the number of items in each scale.  
Higher scores indicate worse levels of family functioning. (Miller et al., 2000). 
Subscales.   
Problem Solving.1. We usually act on our decisions regarding problems. 2. After our 
family tries to solve a problem, we usually discuss whether it worked or not. 3. We resolve most 
emotional upsets that come up. 4. We confront problems involving feelings. 5. We try to think of 
different ways to solve problems. 
Communication. 1. When someone is upset the others know why. 2. You can't tell how a 
person is feeling from what they are saying. 3. People come right out and say things instead of 
hinting at them. 4. We are frank with each other. 5. We don't talk to each other when we are 
angry. 6. When we don't like what someone has done, we tell them. 
Roles. 1. When you ask someone to do something, you have to check that they did it. 2. 
We make sure members meet their family responsibilities. 3. Family tasks don’t get spread 
around enough. 4. We have trouble meeting our bills. 5. There’s little time to explore personal 
interests. 6. We discuss who is to do household jobs. 7. If people are asked to do something, then 
need reminding. 8. We are generally dissatisfied with the family duties assigned to us. 
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Affective Responsiveness. 1. We are reluctant to show our affection for each other. 2. 
Some of us just don't respond emotionally. 3. We don't show our love for each other. 4. 
Tenderness takes second place to other things in our family. 5. We express tenderness. 6. We cry 
openly. 
Affective Involvement. 1. If someone is in trouble, the others become too involved. 2. 
You only get the interest of others when something is important to them. 3. We are too self-
centered. 4. We get involved with each other only when something interests us. 5. We show 
interest in each other only when they can get something out of it personally. 6. Our family shows 
interest in each other only when they can get something out of it. 7. Even though we mean well, 
we intrude too much into each other's lives. 
Behavior Control. 1. We don't know what to do when an emergency comes up. 2. You 
can easily get away with breaking the rules. 3. We know what to do in an emergency. 4. We have 
no clear expectations about toilet habits. 5. We have rules about hitting people. 6. We don't hold 
any rules or standards. 7. If the rules are broken, we don't know what to expect. 8. Anything goes 
in our family. 9. There are rules about dangerous situations. 
General Functioning. 1. Planning family activities is difficult because we misunderstand 
each other. 2. In time of crisis we can turn to each other for support. 3. We cannot talk to each 
other about sadness we feel. 4. Individuals are accepted for what they are. 5. We avoid 
discussing our fears and concerns. 6. We can express feelings to each other. 7. There are lots of 
bad feelings in the family. 8. We feel accepted for what we are. 9. Making decisions is a problem 
for our family. 10. We are able to make decisions about how to solve problems. 11. We don't get 
along well together. 12. We confide in each other.  
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General Self-Effecacy Scale 
Instructions. Choose the best response for each item.  
 
  Not at all 
true (1) 
Hardly true 
(2)   
Moderately 
true (3) 
Exactly 
true (4) 
1 I can always manage to solve 
difficult problems if I try hard 
enough. 
bowl couch drill taxi 
2 If someone opposes me, I can find 
the means and ways to get what I 
want. 
pepper horse glass scissors 
3 It is easy for me to stick to my aims 
and accomplish my goals. 
truck blanket nurse flower 
4 I am confident that I could deal 
efficiently with unexpected events. 
black line manioc bath tub fork 
5 Thanks to my resourcefulness, I 
know how to handle unforeseen 
situations. 
donkey bed red star 
crying 
baby 
6 I can solve most problems if I 
invest the necessary effort. 
dish 
bag of 
millet 
football notebook 
7 I can remain calm when facing 
difficulties because I can rely on 
my coping abilities. 
mangrove 
tree 
wrench shirt plow 
8 When I am confronted with a 
problem, I can usually find several 
solutions. 
motorcycle chin macaroni field 
9 If I am in trouble, I can usually 
think of a solution. 
Eucalyptus waterfall cactus ship 
10 I can usually handle whatever 
comes my way. 
elbow vise bathroom cup 
  
The Modified Overt Aggression Scale (MOAS) 
 
Instructions. Rate the patient’s aggressive behavior over the past week. Select as many 
items as are appropriate.  
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Scoring. 1. Add items within each category. 2. In the scoring summary, multiply sum by 
weight and add all the weighted sums for total weighted score. Use this score to track changes in 
level of aggression over time.  
MOAS Items. 
 
Verbal Aggression. Verbal hostility, statements or invectives that seek to inflict 
psychological harm on another through devaluation/degradation, and threats of physical attack.  
0. No verbal aggression  
1. Shouts angrily, curses mildly, or makes personal insults  
2. Curses viciously, is severely insulting, has temper outbursts  
3. Impulsively threatens violence toward others or self  
4. Threatens violence toward others or self repeatedly or deliberately (e.g., to gain money 
or sex) 
Aggression Against Property. Wanton and reckless destruction of ward paraphernalia or 
other’s possessions.  
0. No aggression against property  
1. Slams door angrily, rips clothing, urinates on floor  
2. Throws objects down, kicks furniture, defaces walls  
3. Breaks objects, smashes windows  
4. Sets fires, throws objects dangerously  
Autoaggression. Physical injury toward oneself, self-mutilation, or suicide attempt.  
0. No autoaggression  
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1. Picks or scratches skin, pulls hair out, hits self (without injury)  
2. Bangs head, hits fists into walls, throws self on floor  
3. Inflicts minor cuts, bruises, burns or welts on self  
4. Inflicts major injury on self or makes a suicide attempt  
Physical Aggression. Violent action intended to inflict pain, bodily harm, or death upon 
another.  
0. No physical aggression  
1. Makes menacing gestures, swings at people, grabs at clothing  
2. Strikes, pushes, scratches, pulls hair of others (without injury)  
3. Attacks others, causing mild injury (bruises, sprains, welts, etc.)  
4. Attacks others, causing serious injury (fracture, loss of teeth, deep cuts, loss of 
consciousness, etc.) 
Crime Questionaire 
Instructions. I am going to read you some questions. You have a paper on which you 
will write your answers. I can’t see your answers. They are private. Afterwards you will put them 
in an evelope and you will seal the envelope. Your answers will be put in a file, but it will be 
seperated from your name and any information that could identify you. This is to protect your 
privacy. Your name will never go on this paper and we will not report your name and what you 
say you’ve done to anyone, including the police, the people who lead this program, the 
government, and your family.   
Let’s practice filling out the form. See this example. On the paper there are numbers next 
to a box. On the box you see a picture. So let’s practice. I’m going to read you a question. If the 
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answer is yes, please make a mark in the box here, where you see the picture of a mango. If the 
answer is no, make a mark here, where you see the picture of a car. If you don’t want to answer 
the question, please make a mark here, where you see the picture of a boy. The question is “Have 
you ever gone to the beach?” If yes, make a mark here on the box with the mango. If no, mark 
the box with the car. If you don’t want to answer this question, mark the box with the boy.  
Okay now that you’re comfortable filling this out, let’s start! 
 
First, I’d like to ask you about crimes involving property. 
V
er
y
 b
ad
 (
1
) 
A
 l
it
tl
e 
b
ad
 (
2
) 
N
u
et
ra
l 
(3
) 
G
o
o
d
 (
4
) 
N
o
 r
es
p
o
n
se
 
1 Theft is the removal of property without the property owner’s 
consent. “Theft” excludes burglary and housebreaking as well as 
theft of a motor vehicle. If this has happened to you, think about 
how your reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone 
did this to you or a member of your household. Would you think this 
is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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2  “Burglary” may be understood to mean unlawful entry into 
someone else’s premises with the intention to commit a crime. If 
anyone ever broke into your house or business to steal from you, 
think about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine 
someone did this to you or a member of your household. Would you 
think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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3 “Automobile theft” may be understood to mean the removal of a 
motor vehicle such as a car, moto, or truck without the consent of 
the owner of the vehicle. If anyone ever did this to you, think about 
how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone 
did this to you or a member of your household. Would you think this 
is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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4 “Fraud” may be understood to mean the acquisition of another 
person’s property by deception. If anyone ever did this to you, think 
about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine 
someone did this to you or a member of your household. Would you 
think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
T
h
u
m
b
 
F
la
g
 
E
y
eg
la
ss
es
 
T
o
m
at
o
 
D
o
n
k
ey
 
  
 
306 
5 “Embezzlement” may be understood to mean the wrongful 
appropriation of another person’s property that is already in the 
possession of the person doing the appropriating. So this is if you 
have access to someone else’s property or money and you take it 
from them. So if you worked for a business and the owner put you in 
charge of the business while he was away and you took the money 
that customers paid for the services of the business and you kept it 
for yourself and then lied to the boss and said the money was never 
paid or that it was put in the bank or that it was lost. If anyone ever 
did this to you, think about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened 
to you, imagine someone did this to you or a member of your 
household. Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or 
good? 
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6 “Robbery” may be understood to mean the theft of property from a 
person, overcoming resistance by force or threat of force. If anyone 
ever did this to you, think about how you reacted. If this hasn’t 
happened to you, imagine someone did this to you or a member of 
your household. Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or 
good? 
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Now I’d like to ask you about your own experiences with property 
crimes.  
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7 Theft is the removal of property without the property owner’s 
consent. “Theft” excludes burglary and housebreaking as well as 
theft of a motor vehicle. In your lifetime, how often have you done 
this? 
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8  “Burglary” may be understood to mean unlawful entry into 
someone else’s premises with the intention to commit a crime. In 
your lifetime, how often have you done this? 
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9 “Automobile theft” may be understood to mean the removal of a 
motor vehicle such as a car, moto, or truck without the consent of 
the owner of the vehicle. In your lifetime, how often have you done 
this? 
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10 “Fraud” may be understood to mean the acquisition of another 
person’s property by deception. In your lifetime, how often have 
you done this? 
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11 ”Embezzlement” may be understood to mean the wrongful 
appropriation of another person’s property that is already in the 
possession of the person doing the appropriating. In your lifetime, 
how often have you done this? 
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12 “Robbery” may be understood to mean the theft of property from a 
person, overcoming resistance by force or threat of force. In your 
lifetime, how often have you done this? 
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Okay, now let’s talk about crimes that involve trafficking. 
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13 Drug trafficking is the illegal cultivation, manufacture, distribution 
and sale of substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws. 
In Haiti this includes drugs such as marijuana and cocaine but does 
not include alcohol, tobacco products, or the hallucinaginic herbs 
used for medicinal purposes. If you know someone who did this, 
would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
A
ir
p
la
n
e 
S
ch
o
o
lc
h
il
d
 
G
as
 s
ta
ti
o
n
 
B
al
lo
o
n
 
D
o
n
k
ey
 
14 Weapons trafficking is the illegal trafficking or smuggling of guns, 
other weapons, or ammunition. This does not include the buying or 
selling of small arms and light weapons through an authorized 
business by an individaul with a current gun permit from the 
government. If you know someone who did this, would you think 
this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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15 Human trafficking is the trade of people, most commonly for the 
purpose of sexual slavery, forced labor or commercial sexual 
exploitation. This can include selling a child to someone as a 
worker, transporting a child illegally or selling them for adoption, 
forcing a person to work under threat of harm such as forced labor 
of Haitian migrants in the Dominican sugar fields, or any other act 
where a person it made into a slave.  If you know someone who did 
this, would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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16 Trafficking in stolen goods occurs when a person knowingly buys, 
sells, or assists in the sale of things that have been stolen. For 
instance, if a person steals a box of clothes from the factory where 
they work, the people who buy or sell the clothing would be 
involved in trafficking; so would the person who removes the labels 
from the clothing so they cannot be identifed or who transports the 
clothes he knows were stolen to another city where they can be sold 
more easily. If you know someone who did this, would you think 
this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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17 Trafficking of prohibited or restricted products occures when 
something that hasn’t be stolen, but is illegal or prohibited is 
produced, transported, sold, exchanged, or purchased. For example, 
when the Haitian government outlawed the eggs and salami from 
the Dominican Republic, people who snuck those things into the 
country or who knowingly sold them at the market were engaging 
in this type of trafficking. If you know someone who did this, 
would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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Now let’s talk about your own experiences with trafficking.  
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18 Drug trafficking is the illegal cultivation, manufacture, distribution 
and sale of substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws. 
In Haiti this includes drugs such as marijuana and cocaine but does 
not include alcohol, tobacco products, or the hallucinaginic herbs 
used for medicinal purposes. In your lifetime, how often have you 
done this? 
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19 Weapons trafficking is the illegal trafficking or smuggling of guns, 
other weapons, or ammunition. This does not include the buying or 
selling of small arms and light weapons through an authorized 
business by an individaul with a current gun permit from the 
government. In your lifetime, how often have you done this? F
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20 Human trafficking is the trade of people, most commonly for the 
purpose of sexual slavery, forced labor or commercial sexual 
exploitation. This can include selling a child to someone as a 
worker, transporting a child illegally or selling them for adoption, 
forcing a person to work under threat of harm such as forced labor 
of Haitian migrants in the Dominican sugar fields, or any other act 
where a person it made into a slave.  In your lifetime, how often 
have you done this? 
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21 Trafficking in stolen goods occurs when a person knowingly buys, 
sells, or assists in the sale of things that have been stolen. For 
instance, if a person steals a box of clothes from the factory where 
they work, the people who buy or sell the clothing would be 
involved in trafficking; so would the person who removes the labels 
from the clothing so they cannot be identifed or who transports the 
clothes he knows were stolen to another city where they can be sold 
more easily. In your lifetime, how often have you done this? 
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22 Trafficking of prohibited or restricted products occures when 
something that hasn’t be stolen, but is illegal or prohibited is 
produced, transported, sold, exchanged, or purchased. For example, 
when the Haitian government outlawed the eggs and salami from 
the Dominican Republic, people who snuck those things into the 
country or who knowingly sold them at the market were engaging 
in this type of trafficking. In your lifetime, how often have you 
done this? 
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Okay, now let’s talk about crimes that involve harm or the threat of 
harm against another. V
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23 Menancing is any intentional act that causes another person to fear 
that she is about to suffer physical harm.  This includes threatening 
someone with rape or unwanted sexual contact against their will, 
but it doesn not include threatening someone with a voodoo curse. 
If anyone ever did this to you, think about how you reacted. If this 
hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone did this to you or a 
member of your household. Would you think this is very bad, a 
little bit bad, or good? 
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24 Sometimes people will also threaten another person with a curse or 
will acutally put a curse on another person in the hopes that it 
brings them bad luck, illness, financial ruin, or other calamities. If 
anyone ever did this to you or threatened to put on a curse on you, 
think about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, 
imagine someone did this to you or a member of your household. 
Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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24 Attempted assault is when a person tries to hurt another person 
phsycially but is stopped before they are able to do so. For 
example, if a person ran towards someone with a machete, 
intending to cut them, but was stopped by other people or was shot 
before he could hurt the victim, that person would be guilty of 
attempted assault. This does not include attempted sexual assaults. 
If anyone ever did this to you, think about how you reacted. If this 
hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone did this to you or a 
member of your household. Would you think this is very bad, a 
little bit bad, or good? 
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25 Simple assault is when a person knowingly or recklessly causes 
bodily injury to another person such as by punching them or 
kicking them. Simple assualt doesn’t usually involve a weapon. If 
anyone ever did this to you, think about how you reacted. If this 
hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone did this to you or a 
member of your household. Would you think this is very bad, a 
little bit bad, or good? 
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26 Aggrevated assault causes serious or lasting injury and is usually 
done using a weapon such as gun or knife. If anyone ever did this 
to you, think about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to 
you, imagine someone did this to you or a member of your 
household. Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or 
good? 
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27 Physical child abuse is assault, with or without a weapon, against a 
child by an adult. Physical child abuse can damage a child 
psychologically as well as physically. It can include beating a child 
with an object like a stick or whip, throwing a child against a wall, 
or any other act that causes harm to the child’s body. This doesn’t 
include sexual abuse of a child. If anyone ever did this to you, 
think about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, 
imagine someone did this to you or a member of your household. 
Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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28  Kidnapping is when a person is abdupted by force, threat of force 
or coersion. A person might be held for ransom or may be held for 
other reasons against their will. This does not include the legal 
detention of a person by police but it does include the illegal 
detention of a person by any group or individual including armed 
political groups. If anyone ever did this to you, think about how 
you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone did 
this to you or a member of your household. Would you think this 
is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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29 Homicide is the deliberate killing of one person by another. If 
anyone ever did this someone you loved, think about how you 
reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone did this 
to a loved one or a member of your household. Would you think 
this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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Now let’s talk about your own experiences with crimes against people.  
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30 Menancing is any intentional act that causes another person to fear 
that she is about to suffer physical harm.  This includes threatening 
someone with rape or unwanted sexual contact against their will, 
but it doesn not include threatening someone with a voodoo curse. 
In your lifetime, how often have you done this? 
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31 Sometimes people will also threaten another person with a curse or 
will acutally put a curse on another person in the hopes that it 
brings them bad luck, illness, financial ruin, or other calamities. In 
your lifetime, how often have you done this? 
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32 Attempted assault is when a person tries to hurt another person 
phsycially but is stopped before they are able to do so. For 
example, if a person ran towards someone with a machete, 
intending to cut them, but was stopped by other people or was shot 
before he could hurt the victim, that person would be guilty of 
attempted assault. This does not include attempted sexual assaults. 
In your lifetime, how often have you done this? 
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33 Simple assault is when a person knowingly or recklessly causes 
bodily injury to another person such as by punching them or 
kicking them. Simple assualt doesn’t usually involve a weapon. In 
your lifetime, how often have you done this? S
h
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34 Aggrevated assault causes serious or lasting injury and is usually 
done using a weapon such as gun or knife. In your lifetime, how 
often have you done this? 
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35 Physical child abuse is assault, with or without a weapon, against a 
child by an adult. Physical child abuse can damage a child 
psychologically as well as physically. It can include beating a child 
with an object like a stick or whip, throwing a child against a wall, 
or any other act that causes harm to the child’s body. This doesn’t 
include sexual abuse of a child. In your lifetime, how often have 
you done this? 
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36 Kidnapping is when a person is abdupted by force, threat of force 
or coersion. A person might be held for ransom or may be held for 
other reasons against their will. This does not include the legal 
detention of a person by police but it does include the illegal 
detention of a person by any group or individual including armed 
political groups. In your lifetime, how often have you done this? 
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37 Homicide is the deliberate killing of one person by another. In 
your lifetime, how often have you done this? Ic
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Okay, now let’s talk about crimes that involve sex and relationships. 
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38 Sexual harassment is when a person in a position of power such as 
a your professor, a police officer, or your supervisor at work tries 
to pressure a person to have sex or go on a date, or talks about sex 
in a way that makes the person uncomfortable when the person has 
no power to make them stop. If anyone ever did this to you, think 
about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine 
someone did this to you or a member of your household. Would 
you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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39 A zokiki is a girl who is not yet an adult who has sex with an adult 
man in exchange for gifts such as clothing, shoes, or papadap. If 
you ever had a zokiki, think about how you felt about it. If you 
haven’t, imagine someone a member of your household was a 
zokiki. Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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40 Child sexual abuse is when an adult has sex with a child or does 
sexual things to a child or in front of a child such as showing the 
child pornography or touching the child’s private areas or asking 
the child to touch his private areas. If anyone ever did this to you, 
think about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, 
imagine someone did this to you or a member of your household. 
Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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41 Sexual exploitation is when a child or vulnerable adult exchanges 
sex for something they need such as food, a place to sleep, 
medicine, or a job. If anyone ever did this to you, think about how 
you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone did 
this to you or a member of your household. Would you think this 
is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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42 Prositituation is when a person pays another person money for sex. 
If you have been involved in this, think about how you reacted. If 
this hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone did this to you or a 
member of your household. Would you think this is very bad, a 
little bit bad, or good? 
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43 Date rape is when two people go a date or have a romantic 
relationship and one person does not want to have sex but the other 
person forces them to do so; this happens between two people who 
know each other and are already interacting socially. If anyone 
ever did this to you, think about how you reacted. If this hasn’t 
happened to you, imagine someone did this to you or a member of 
your household. Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, 
or good? 
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44 Domestic violence includes the physical or sexual abuse of a 
spouse or partner such as a man forcing his wife to have sex when 
she refuses or when a person gets angry and hits their spouse. This 
can include a range of behaivors including hitting, pinching, 
burning, threatening with a weapon, humilating, and threatening or 
hurting pets or children to frighten or control the other person. If 
anyone ever did this to you, think about how you reacted. If this 
hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone did this to you or a 
member of your household. Would you think this is very bad, a 
little bit bad, or good? 
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45 Molestation is when a person forces or coerces a person to do 
sexual things – other than intercourse – which the person doesn’t 
want to do. This includes acts done while the victim is unable to 
give consent, such as fondling the breasts of a women while she is 
sleeping, or waiting until someone is drunk to have sex with them, 
without knowing if they had given permission to have sex while 
they were still able to think clearly. This can also include touching 
or rubbing against people in public places, such as on a tapap, 
showing sexual things to someone without their consent, or using a 
threat or force to make a person touch you sexually or allow 
themselves to be touched sexually. If anyone ever did this to you, 
think about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, 
imagine someone did this to you or a member of your household. 
Would you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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46 Statatory rape is when a person has sex with a younger person who 
is not old enough to consent to sex. This is usually when an adult 
has sex with someone who is under the age of 18. Generally it is 
not considered a crime if the adult is just a year or two older than 
the child (for example, when two seconardy school students date 
and decide to have sex with each other). Stacatory rape can also 
happen when a person is not able to consent because they are a 
cognitive disability.   If anyone ever did this to you, think about 
how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine someone 
did this to you or a member of your household. Would you think 
this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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47 Rape is when a person is forced or coerced to have sex including 
sexual intercourse, oral sex, anal sex, or the penetration of the 
vagina or anus with any object including the fingers. The victim 
can be forced by using threats, a weapon, or by another means of 
creating fear in the victim. If anyone ever did this to you, think 
about how you reacted. If this hasn’t happened to you, imagine 
someone did this to you or a member of your household. Would 
you think this is very bad, a little bit bad, or good? 
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Now let’s talk about your own experiences with crimes that involve sex 
and relationships.  
0 1 2 
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48 Sexual harassment is when a person in a position of power such as 
a your professor, a police officer, or your supervisor at work tries 
to pressure a person to have sex or go on a date, or talks about sex 
in a way that makes the person uncomfortable when the person has 
no power to make them stop. In your lifetime, how often have you 
done this? 
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49 A zokiki is a girl who is not yet an adult who has sex with an adult 
man in exchange for gifts such as clothing, shoes, or papadap. In 
your lifetime, how often have you had a zokiki? 
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50 Child sexual abuse is when an adult has sex with a child or does 
sexual things to a child or in front of a child such as showing the 
child pornography or touching the child’s private areas or asking 
the child to touch his private areas. In your lifetime, how often 
have you done this to someone else? 
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51 Sexual exploitation is when a child or vulnerable adult exchanges 
sex for something they need such as food, a place to sleep, 
medicine, or a job. In your lifetime, how often have you done this 
to someone else? 
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52 Prositituation is when a person pays another person money for sex. 
In your lifetime, how often have you paid someone else for sex? 
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53 Date rape is when two people go a date or have a romantic 
relationship and one person does not want to have sex but the other 
person forces them to do so; this happens between two people who 
know each other and are already interacting socially. In your 
lifetime, how often have you done this to someone else? 
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54 Domestic violence includes the physical or sexual abuse of a 
spouse or partner such as a man forcing his wife to have sex when 
she refuses or when a person gets angry and hits their spouse. This 
can include a range of behaivors including hitting, pinching, 
burning, threatening with a weapon, humilating, and threatening or 
hurting pets or children to frighten or control the other person. In 
your lifetime, how often have you done this to someone else? 
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55 Molestation is when a person forces or coerces a person to do 
sexual things – other than intercourse – which the person doesn’t 
want to do. This includes acts done while the victim is unable to 
give consent, such as fondling the breasts of a women while she is 
sleeping, or waiting until someone is drunk to have sex with them, 
without knowing if they had given permission to have sex while 
they were still able to think clearly. This can also include touching 
or rubbing against people in public places, such as on a tapap, 
showing sexual things to someone without their consent, or using a 
threat or force to make a person touch you sexually or allow 
themselves to be touched sexually. In your lifetime, how often 
have you done this to someone else? 
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56 Statatory rape is when a person has sex with a younger person who 
is not old enough to consent to sex. This is usually when an adult 
has sex with someone who is under the age of 18. Generally it is 
not considered a crime if the adult is just a year or two older than 
the child (for example, when two seconardy school students date 
and decide to have sex with each other). Stacatory rape can also 
happen when a person is not able to consent because they are a 
cognitive disability.   In your lifetime, how often have you done 
this to someone else? 
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57 Rape is when a person is forced or coerced to have sex including 
sexual intercourse, oral sex, anal sex, or the penetration of the 
vagina or anus with any object including the fingers. The victim 
can be forced by using threats, a weapon, or by another means of 
creating fear in the victim. In your lifetime, how often have you 
done this to someone else? 
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AUDIT 
Instructions. Because alcohol use can affect your health, it is important that we ask some 
questions about your use of alcohol. Your answers will remain confidential so please be honest. 
Please select the response that best describes your answer to each question. 
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1. How often do you 
have a drink 
containing alcohol? 
0 = Never 
1 = 
Monthly 
or less 
2 = Two to 
four times a 
month 
3 = Two to 
three times 
per week 
4 = Four or 
more times a 
week 
Cow  Bread  Hair bow  Hotel  Bike  
2. How many drinks 
containing alcohol do 
you have on a typical 
day when you are 
drinking? 
0 = 1 or 2 1 = 3 or 4 2 = 5 or 6 3 = 7 to 9 
4 = 10 or 
more 
Shoe  Wall  Peanut  Wick  Sky  
3. How often do you 
have six or more 
drinks on one 
occasion? 
0 = Never 
1 = 
Monthly 
or less 
2 = Two to 
four times a 
month 
3 = Two to 
three times 
per week 
4 = Four or 
more times a 
week 
Spider Pineapple Mountain Sorcerer Baby  
4. How often during 
the last year have you 
found that you were 
not able to stop 
drinking once you 
had started? 
0 = Never 
1 = 
Monthly 
or less 
2 = Two to 
four times a 
month 
3 = Two to 
three times 
per week 
4 = Four or 
more times a 
week 
Plantain 
tree 
Bike 
accident 
Dominos Eye Hog 
5. How often during 
the last year have you 
failed to do what was 
normally expected 
from you because of 
drinking? 
0 = Never 
1 = 
Monthly 
or less 
2 = Two to 
four times a 
month 
3 = Two to 
three times 
per week 
4 = Four or 
more times a 
week 
Card 
game 
Wrench Flying kite Cereal Tire 
6. How often during 
the last year have you 
needed a first drink in 
the morning to get 
yourself going after a 
heavy drinking 
session? 
0 = Never 
1 = 
Monthly 
or less 
2 = Two to 
four times a 
month 
3 = Two to 
three times 
per week 
4 = Four or 
more times a 
week 
Key 
Pink 
house 
Heart Rain clouds Twins  
7. How often during 
the last year have you 
had a feeling of guilt 
0 = Never 
1 = 
Monthly 
or less 
2 = Two to 
four times a 
month 
3 = Two to 
three times 
per week 
4 = Four or 
more times a 
week 
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or remorse after 
drinking? 
Bottle 
opener 
Monkey 
Vodou 
princess 
Old woman Hot pepper 
8. How often during 
the last year have you 
been unable to 
remember what 
happened the night 
before because you 
had been drinking? 
0 = Never 
1 = 
Monthly 
or less 
2 = Two to 
four times a 
month 
3 = Two to 
three times 
per week 
4 = Four or 
more times a 
week 
Clothing 
on line 
Bean plant Old man Flat tire 
Bird on tree 
branch 
9. Have you or 
someone else been 
injured as a result 
of your drinking? 
0 = No 2 = Yes, but not in the last year 
4 = Yes, 
during the last 
year 
Razor Bouillon cube Generator 
10. Has a relative or 
friend, or a doctor or 
other health worker 
been concerned about 
your drinking or 
suggested you cut 
down? 
0 = No 2 = Yes, but not in the last year 
4 = Yes, 
during the last 
year 
Thermos Toothpaste on toothbrush 
Painting a 
wall 
 
Scoring.  Scores for each question range from 0 to 4, with the first response for each 
question (e.g. never) scoring 0, the second (eg less than monthly) scoring 1, the third (e.g. 
monthly) scoring 2, the fourth (eg weekly) scoring 3, and the last response (eg. Daily or almost 
daily) scoring 4. For questions 9 and 10, which only have three responses, the scoring is 0, 2 and 
4 (from left to right). A score of 8 or more is associated with harmful or hazardous drinking, a 
score of 13 or more in women, and 15 or more in men, is likely to indicate alcohol dependence. 
 Short Hardiness Scale (SHS) 
Instructions. Below are statements about life that people often feel differently about. 
Please show how much you think each one is true. Give your honest opinions. There are no right 
or wrong answers. 
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0 = not at all 
true 
1 = a little 
true 
2 = quite true 
3 = 
completely 
true 
1. Most of my life gets spent 
doing things that are 
worthwhile. 
Crook Goose Crackers Straw 
2. Planning ahead can help 
avoid most future problems. 
Gate Grasses Fish hook Stove 
3. I don’t like to make changes 
in my everyday schedule. 
Walking trail Star Jail Kitten 
4. Working hard doesn’t 
matter, since only the bosses 
profit by it. 
Ball of string 
Kissing a 
baby 
Lightbulb Bread loaf 
5. Changes in routine are 
interesting to me. 
Traffic jam Doctor Zebra Sewing 
6. By working hard you can 
always achieve your goals. 
Downtown Airplane Frog Army 
7. I really look forward to my 
work. 
Horse 
Mother and 
child 
Helicopter Paint brush 
8. If I’m working on a difficult 
task, I know when to seek help. 
Owl Pail Butter Broken leg 
9. Most of the time, people 
listen carefully to what I say. 
Park Tray of cakes Rabbit 
Vase of 
flowers 
10. Trying your best at work 
really pays off in the end. 
Garden plot 
Water 
fountain 
Wheel Airport 
11. It bothers me when my 
daily routine gets interrupted. 
Rake Red bird 
Sack of 
potatoes 
Sailboat 
12. Most days, life is really 
interesting and exciting for me. 
Green onions Bar of soap Spark plug Yard 
13. I enjoy the challenge when 
I have to do more than one 
thing at a time.  
Spoon Dirty boys Musical notes Planet earth 
14. I like having a daily 
schedule that doesn’t change 
very much. 
Scales of 
justice 
Gasket 
Broken 
window 
Cherries 
15. When I make plans, I’m 
certain I can make them work. 
Cave Spider web Coil Egg 
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Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS) 
Instructions. Please indicate which of the following events have happened to you during 
the past 12 months. 
 1 Yes 0 No 
1. Death of spouse Glove Wood 
2. Divorce Ball Glue 
3. Menopause Apple Nail 
4. Separation from living partner Cobweb Beetroot 
5. Jail term or probation Crow Elbow 
6. Death of close family member other than spouse Badge Basket 
7. Serious personal injury or illness Face Beetle 
8. Marriage or establishing life partnership Bubble Cannon 
9. Fired at work Pill Fish 
10. Marital or relationship reconciliation Bandage Cloth 
11. Retirement Gate Coach 
12. Change in health of immediate family member Crate Hair 
13. Work more than 40 hours per week Donkey Brain 
14. Pregnancy or causing pregnancy Hot pan Branch 
15. Sex difficulties Bucket Cattle 
16. Gain of new family member Celery Jellyfish 
17. Business or work role change Finger Guitar 
18. Change in financial state Dominos Ladybug 
19. Death of a close friend (not a family member) Goose Singer 
20. Change in number of arguments with spouse or life partner Ghost Circle 
21. Mortgage or loan for a major purpose Giraffe Box 
22. Foreclosure of mortgage or loan Honey Freezer 
23. Sleep less than 8 hours per night Oatmeal Island 
24. Change in responsibilities at work Jeans Taptap 
25. Trouble with in-laws, or with children Judge Millet 
26. Outstanding personal achievement Lace Papadap 
27. Spouse begins or stops work Calculator Lamp 
28. Begin or end school Cable Lettuce 
29. Change in living conditions (visitors in the home, change in 
roommates, remodeling house) 
Sorghum Picture 
frame 
30. Change in personal habits (diet, exercise, smoking, etc.) Marbles Ocean 
31. Chronic allergies Cemetery Pear 
32. Trouble with boss Plane Cabbage 
33. Change in work hours or conditions Cyclone Playing 
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34. Moving to new residence Poison Judge 
35. Presently in pre-menstrual period Scarf Cemetery 
36. Change in schools Queen Faucet 
37. Change in religious activities Popcorn Feathers 
38. Change in social activities (more or less than before) Seahorse Magic 
39. Minor financial loan Bedsheet Smoke 
40. Change in frequency of family get-togethers Street Slave 
41. Vacation Throne Sugarcane 
42. Presently in winter holiday season Turkey Wrench 
43. Minor violation of the law Stream Bra 
 
Decision-Making Skills 
Instructions. Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements 
by marking the appropriate box. Would you say you strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree 
nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree?  
 
 strongly 
disagree 
1 
Disagree  2 neither 
agree nor 
disagree 3 
Agree 4 strongly 
agree 5 
1. I take the 
responsibility for my 
own actions 
Carpenter Mermaid 
Bowl of 
fruit 
Gas can Heart 
2. I set long term 
goals for myself 
Pharmacy Puppies Laborer 
Lock with 
key 
Money 
3. I am confident 
about my ability to 
lead 
Pregnant 
woman 
Cornmeal 
with bean 
sauce 
Pillow Minister 
Mountain 
range 
4. I achieve anything 
I set out to do 
Radio 
playing 
music 
Cucumber Pocket plastic Pile of coal 
5. I know how to 
plan projects 
Axe 
Button 
down shirt 
People 
walking 
Beach Schoolbooks 
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6. I feel comfortable 
talking in front of 
groups 
Medication 
bottle 
Girl with a 
blue shirt 
Toussaint L 
’Overture 
Bundle of 
sticks 
Red truck 
 
 
Competence for Civic Action (CCA) 
 
Instructions. If you found out about a problem in your community that you wanted to do 
something about (for example, illegal drugs were being sold near a school, or high levels of lead 
were discovered in the local drinking water), how well do you think you would be able to do 
each of the following? I Definitely Can’t (1); I Probably Can’t (2); Maybe (3); I Probably Can 
(4); I Definitely Can (5) 
1. Create a plan to address the problem. 
2. Get other people to care about the problem. 
3. Organize and run a meeting  
4. Express your views in front of a group of people. 
5. Identify individuals or groups who could help you with the problem. 
6. Write an opinion letter to a local newspaper. 
7. Call someone on the phone that you had never met before to get their help with the 
problem. 
8. Contact an elected official about the problem. 
9. Organize a petition, protest, or other political action to pursade policymakers to 
address the problem. 
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Political Conversations with Others (PCWO) 
Instructions. Here are some questions about your political discussions with others. 
Indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. Strongly Disagree (1); Disagree 
(2); Uncertain (3);  Agree (4); Strongly Agree (5) 
1. I talk to my parents/family elders about politics. 
2. I’m interested in my parents’/ family elders’opinions about politics. 
3. My parents/ family elders encourage me to express my opinions about politics and current 
events, even if they are different from their views. 
4. I talk to my teachers/internship supervisor/program leaders about politics.  
5. I’m interested in my teachers/internship supervisor/program leaders’ opinions about politics. 
6. My teachers/internship supervisor/program leaders encourage me to express my opinions 
about politics and current events, even if they are different from their views. 
7. I talk to my friends about politics.  
8. I’m interested in my friends’ opinions about politics. 
9. My friends encourage me to express my opinions about politics and current events, even if 
they are different from their views. 
10. I talk to my classmates/other participants/other interns about politics.  
11. I’m interested in my classmates/other participants/other interns’ opinions about politics. 
12. My classmates/other participants/other interns encourage me to express my opinions about 
politics and current events, even if they are different from their views. 
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Prospective Civic Engagement 
Instructions. Next time you have the opportunity, how likely is it that you will do each of 
the following? (1) Not at All Likely (2) Maybe  (3) Extremely Likely 
1. Vote on a regular basis.  
2. Wear a campaign button, write band, t-shirt, or hat to support a candidate. 
3. Volunteer for a political party.  
4. Participate in a boycott against a company. 
5. Refuse to buy clothes made is sweatshops. 
6. Participate in political activities such as protests, marches, or demonstrations. 
7. Do volunteer work to help needy people. 
8. Get involved in issues like health or safety that affect your community. 
9. Work with a group to solve a problem in the community where you live. 
Political Voice 
Instructions. The next time you have the opportunity, how likely is it that you would do 
each of the following? (1) Not at All Likely; (2) Maybe; (3) Extremely Likely 
1. Contact or visit someone in government who represent your community. 
2. Contact a newspaper, radio, or talk show to express your opinion on an issue. 
3. Sign an e-mail or written petition. 
Would you consider doing any of the following, even if you were not paid to do so? 
(1) YES   (0) NO 
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4. Trying to talk to people and explain why they should vote for or against one of the 
parties or candidates during an election? 
5. Expressing your views about politics on a website, blog, or chatroom? 
6. Participating in a poetry slam, youth forum, live music performance, or other event 
where young people express their political views? 
7. Working as a canvasser (i.e., someone who goes door to door for a political or social 
group, or candidate? 
School Climate Scale 
Instructions. This survey is a series of statements allowing you to tell us how you think 
and feel about things in your school. Remember: we are only asking for what you think, not what 
other people think. There are no right and wrong answers, so please choose the answer that best 
tells us how you think or feel about each statement. If you do not wish to respond to the question, 
please choose the “pass” option. Think about how strongly you disagree or agree with the 
following statements about your school. Mark the answer that best shows us what you feel based 
on your experiences since the last time we talked to you (or, at baseline, “during the past year”). 
 
 Really 
Disagree 
 
Disagree Agree 
 
Really 
Agree 
 
1. My teachers respect me. Ant Ball Milk Dog 
2. My teachers are fair. Cat Spider Shirt Car 
3. Teachers in my school are nice people. Banana Hammer Bike Boy 
4. When students break rules at my school, they 
are treated fairly. 
Tire Birthday 
cake 
Door Lamp 
5. The principal asks students about their ideas at 
my school. 
Window Tree Wrench Mango 
6. My school is a good place to be. Phone Taptap Baby Goat 
7. I feel like I belong at my school. Bat Bed Laundry Man 
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8. My school is important to me. Plumber Truck Bread Horse 
9. Teachers and staff at my school are doing the 
right things to prevent students from mistreating 
each other. 
Donkey Pliers Bench Pencil 
Financial Self-Efficacy Scale (FSES) 
Instructions. Please respond to the following statements using these response categories: 
1=Exactly true; 2=Moderately true; 3=Hardly true; 4=Not at all true 
1. It is hard to stick to my spending plan when unexpected expenses arise.  
2. It is challenging to make progress toward my financial goals.  
3. When unexpected expenses occur I usually have to use credit.  
4. When faced with a financial challenge, I have a hard time figuring out a solution.  
5. I lack confidence in my ability to manage my finances.  
6. I worry about running out of money in retirement.  
Job Search Readiness Checklist 
Instructions. Use this tool to determine the participant’s level of job search readiness. 
Use it to track participant development throughout their progress in the program.  
Motivation and Follow-Through. 
1. Has the participant been punctual to all meetings with staff and all classes, groups, and 
trainings? 
2. Has the participant met the program’s attendance requirements and been engaged in 
the activities of the program? 
3. Has the participant followed up on all job search assignments given by staff or 
suggested during workshops or trainings? 
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4. Has the participant taken initiative to find employment on his / her own and utilized 
personal networks as a source of job leads? 
Job Search Preparation. 
1. Has the participant identified appropriate short term and long term career goals? 
2. Can the participant describe their unique transferable skills? 
3. Has the participant completed a sample application that has been reviewed and 
approved by a staff member? 
4. Has the participant completed a sample resume that has been reviewed and approved 
by a staff member? 
5. Does the participant have all the documents that are typically required in the job 
application process including a NIF and identification card? 
6. Has the participant identified an approved list of employment references that they have 
received permission to use? 
7. Has the participant demonstrated how to leave a professional voicemail or narrative 
message? 
8. Has the participant written a finalized thank you letter that a staff member has 
approved? 
9. Has the participant demonstrated that they can dress professionally and appropriately 
for the job? 
10. Does the participant have access to at least one appropriate clothing outfit that they 
can wear for interviews? 
Interview Preparation. 
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1. Can the participant talk clearly about his/her background, skills, interests and goals? 
2. Have they practiced common interview questions with others? 
3. Have they participated in at least three mock interviews (preferably one with an 
employer) to practice answering common questions? 
4. Has the participant received acceptable ratings in at least 2 of 3 mock interviews? 
5. If applicable, have they answered any questions about their criminal 
record/involvement in an armed group to the reviewer’s satisfaction? 
Scoring. Total the sum of “Yes” responses. Participants should have a total number of 
15“Yes” responses to be considered job search ready. 
Supervisor Evaluation 
Instructions. This form should be completed by the participant’s supervisor at their job or 
internship. 
Meets 
expectations: 
Poor (does not) - 
1 
Fair 
(occasionally) - 2 
Very good 
(usually) - 3 
Excellent 
(always) - 4 
Attendence     
Punctuality     
Quality of work 
produced 
    
Quanity of work 
produced 
    
Professionalism     
Iniative     
Communication 
Skills 
    
Teamwork     
Problem Solving     
Response to 
supervision 
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Conflict Resolution – Individual Protective Factors 
Scoring. The items listed under Self-Control are scored as follows: Yes! = 1, yes = 2, no 
= 3, NO! = 4. The Cooperation items are reverse coded. To score, point values for all 12 items 
are added. Blank items are excluded, with the score adjusted for the number of items completed 
when two or few items are blank. The maximum obtainable score of 48 indicates a high level of 
conflict resolution skills. A minimum score of 12 indicates a low level. 
Instructions. Respondents are asked to indicate how closely several statements match 
their feelings. A“YES!” is checked if the statement is very true for them; “yes” if it is 
somewhat true; “no” if it is somewhat false; and “NO!” if it is very false. 
Self-Control. 1. Sometimes you have to physically fight to get what you want. 2. I get 
mad easily. 3. I do whatever I feel like doing. 4. When I am mad, I yell at people. 5. Sometimes I 
break things on purpose. 6. If I feel like it, I hit people. 
Cooperation. 1. I like to help around the house. 2. Being part of a team is fun. 3. Helping 
others makes me feel good. 4. I always like to do my part. 5. It is important to do your part in 
helping at home. 6. Helping others is very satisfying. 
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